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THE APOTHECARY SHOPPE 
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INTRODUCTION 
Source of Control. Value of timely action. Proposals to avoid 
or meet crises. Requirements of democratic government. Direct 
and representative democracy. Congress and improved representa-
tion. Powers of congress and the states. Power and term of the 
president. Selection and qualifications. Advice and council to 
the president. The courts. Checks and balances. Political par-
ties. 
OLD AND NEW APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY 
Basic concepts. Events, conditions, principles and personalties 
and their contribution to the new constitution. Congress placed 
first but divided. Planned in one way the Constitution has 
worked out in another. Personality and the office of president. 
Congress and the bureaucracy. Fads in thinking. Scandals and 
abuses. Need for internal and external control of bureaucracy. 
Reapplication of· the principles of the founding fathers. ·Need 
for a revitalized Constitution and increased democracy. Demo-
cratic input in policy ·formation. Renewal of personnel. More 
timely decisions. Restudy of the British system of government 
for concepts applicable to the United States. 
.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Diagnosis. Weakening condition. Entrenched power. Special 
privilege. Seniority system. Filibuster. Inaction and undue 
delay. lobbying and special interest. Senate no longer rep-
resentative of the states. 
Prescription. A single house congress. Election of the a.t-
torney general by the house. Election of supreme c.ourt jus-
tices by the house subject to confirmation by the senate. 
Transfer of the senate to the executive branch. Increased 
representation. Voting in the house by concurrent majority, 
including a majority from a majority of the states as well 
as a majority of the members. Having three committees of the 
whole and a rules committee to govern the agenda of each. 
Sel,_ection of committee members, half by party leade.rship to 
represent special interest and half by lot to represent the 
general public. Selection of chairman of each committee by 
majority party members voting by secret ballot. Requirement 
that bills be reported out of committee within thirty days 
with provision for extension of time at option of house. 
Redistribution of work load through new committees parallel 
to major agencies. Establish committee on repeal and,recod-
ification. 
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DISTRICT COUNCILORS 
Diagnosis. Insufficient opportunity to keep track of Congress 
and Congressmen by the voters. Newspapers, TV, radio and other 
mass media insuffici~nt. Scandals and special legislation too 
common. 
Prescription.· Five district councilors to be elected by dis-
trict within and from each congressional district. Increase 
points of view represented. Relieve congressman of much case-
work and permit him or her to concentrate on legislation. 
District councilors tE serve as members of a mixed caucus for 
proposing party nominees for president. Function as presiden-
tial electors. Observe and check on congressmen. As trained 
and seasoned candidates· compete for office.of congressman. 
Limiting maximum time to be served to twenty years. Develop-
ing legislative federalism. 
SENATE 
Diagnosis~ Present senate weakens Congress. Delays action. 
Increases appropriations. Does not represent states. Inade-
quate oversight of the executive branch. C.Oncentrates too 
much power in conference committees and in senators who fili-
buster. Frustrates majority control and action. 
Prescription. Place senate in the executive branch. Retain 
power of senate to confirm appointments and ratify treaties. 
Add power to senate· to reconfirm appointments periodically and 
have instant fiscal, personnel, program and policy audit of 
the executive branch with full access to pertinent official 
records. Senato.rs to become ex officio members of all depart-
ments, boards and commissions. Senate to have power to dis-
allow rules and regulations having the force and effect of 
law. Senate to have no power to pass legislation. Election 
of senatorial appointments secretary by the senate to have 
sole power to make all appointments with the president one day 
a week. Committee size and membership to be flexible to per~ 
mit all members so desiring to be on any and all committees. 
Senate to submit periodic reports to the president and to con-
gress. Senate to function in advisory capacity to the presi-
dent. Provide double accountability of government officials. 
Senators to initiate impeachment proceedings. Prosecution to 
be in hands of attorney general and conducted in the house. 
Senators to be ombudsmen. Membership, three from each state 
with overlapping terms of nine years and a maximum. of twenty 
years. 
PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL 
Diagnosis. Historical precedent and need for council. Too 
much advice and policy formation from appointed sources and 
not enough from electe·d sources. Failure to make sufficient 
use of the cabinet in advisory capacity. 
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Prescription. Election by the senate of a bipartisan continu-
ing presidential council of fifteen members from within its own 
membership. Selection to be made of five members by the fifty 
members or·political parties thereof by secret ballot. Provi-
sion for advice from also rans and past government officials. 
Constitutional requirement for meeting with the president and 
refusal thereof to be an -impeachable offense. Presidential 
councilors and senators grooming themselves for the presidency. 
VICE PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY 
Diagnosis. Vice president no longer the second best man. Cho-
sen to balance the ticket. Having little power in the senate. 
Not well informed or used in the executive branch. Inadequate 
choice or preparation for presidential successor. 
Prescription. Choosing a person capable of being president as 
the running mate. Electing the vice president elect as senator 
at large to have full rights and privileges of that body. Pos-
sibility of selecting two vice presidents elect. Improving the 
selection process. Requiring that all in the line of succes-
sion to the presidency have the same prerequisites as those re-
quired of the president. 
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PRESIDENT ELECT 47 
Diagnosis. Lack,of adequate prepar~tion of president. Inade-
quate time for ~roper transition to the office. 
Prescription. Lengthening the transition period. Having the 
president serve two years as president elect to gain on the 
job training. Delaying taking office as president providing 
two years to ·investigate election irregularities prior to the 
president',s taking office as president. Providing additional 
time for formation of budget, planning programs, observing 
congress, and gaining information on foreign policy. Stabi-
lizing influence of a longer transitibn period on the economy 
and foreign policy. 
PRESIDENT 
Diagnosis. Lack of either legislative or executive experience 
or both at the national level. Inadequate control of the pres-
ident in the light of increased power. Use of executive agree-
ments to avoid need for ratification by the senate. Failure of 
the president to remove individuals considered persona non 
grata. Lack of opportunity to give president unwanted advice. 
Abuse in use of power of office by incumbent to gain reelec-
tion. 
Prescription. Selecting president elect nominee from the ·sen-
ate whic~ has been placed in the executive branch. Using two 
years as president elect to learn more about the office of the 
president. Requiring a two thirds majority vote of the Congress 
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to grant war· powers and a simple majority not subject to veto 
to remove them. Requiring ratification of executive agreements 
by the senate. Permitting removal of presidential appointees, 
subject to confirmation by the senate, by action of either the 
president or the senate. Having the president serve two years 
as president elect and six years as president. Providing for 
vote of confidence each two years and removal if that vote were 
not favorable by a majority. Having him serve only one elected 
term. 
ELECTIONS 
Diagnosis. Elections costly, traumatic, dishonest and divi-
sive, creating false impressions of mandates and popularity. 
Elec~oral college no longer important in nominating process 
and an inaccurate recorder of the popular vote. Direct pri-
mary not sufficiently influencing the choice of party nomiees 
for president. Increased voter apathy. Electoral advantage 
of incumbency. Insufficient competition from trained'candi-
dates. Lack of ethics among politicians and insufficient 
strength of laws and committees controlling elections. Proc-
ess of government affected too much by election campaigns. 
Prescription; Decreasing cost of elections by cutting size of 
districts, shortening time for campaigning. Decreasing•size 
of electoral college district to make recount feasible. Not 
having-electoral college vote cast as·a block for candidate 
winning a plurality of popular votes in the state. Increasing 
size of electoral college to three thousand. Having the elec-
toral college function as a mixed caucus for party nomination 
for president elect and vice president elect, choosing three 
candidates on basis of ability. Having the party convention· 
choose from these the two candidates with· the best opportunity 
of winning. Having nationwide direct closed primaries of each 
party to let the party members choose the final nominee. Con-
voking the 3,000 district councilors to decide contested elec-
tions for president elect and vice president elect. Providing 
for overlapping terms and smoother transition. Decreasing or 
eliminating the opportunity for an incumbent to succeed him-
self in office. Increasing the competition for office by in-
creasing the number of trained candidates. Providing for con-
tinuity of government during campaigns by decreasing the num-
ber of offices to be filled at any one time~ 
57 
APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 67 
Diagnosis. Lack of provision for senate alone to remove offi-
cials. No provision for periodic reconfirmation. Impeachment 
and conviction too traumatic. 
Prescription, Permitting· senate acting alone to remove offi-
cial by a two thirds vote. Continuing president 1 s power to 
remove. Providing for senate confirmation of more individuals 
in high government positions now subject only to appointment 
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by president. Providing for periodic reconfirmation of policy 
forming officials and federal court judges at all levels. 
BUREAUCRACY 
Diagnosis. Bureaucrats overspecialized and overinfluenced by 
special interest groups. Government hampered by excessive 
rules, regulations, directives and procedures. Rewards for 
failure instead of for success. waste from false economy. 
Antidemocratic tendency of the bureaucracy, superannuated and 
overspecialized personnel. Overprotection of the agencies. 
Insufficient opportunity for confirmation and reconfirmation 
of appointees. Bureaucracy unrepresentative in character and 
open to problems of conflict of interest. Having too many 
new programs and· agencies added to the Executive Office of 
the President. Failure to place agency properly when estab-
lished aausing need for later reorganization. 
Prescription. Seeking broader trained generalists. Using 
experts for advice but not decision making. ·cutting down ex-
cessive rules and regulations. Having policy determine the 
.use of money. Increasing control over.-welfare spending. Ex-
tending the senate's power of confirmation and providing for 
decennial reconfirmation of bureau chiefs and other high gov-
ernment officials. Providing for.broader representation on 
advisory committees, boards and commissions to avoid overrep-
resentation of special interests. Having the senate rather 
than the president select the members of boards and connnis-
sions. Providing for lateral entry and lateral transfer of 
personnel to add a variety of experience 'and ·avoid provincial-
ism, networks of special privilege and even dishonesty. Phas-
ing out some of the federal bureaucracy and making its talent 
available to the states. 
COURTS 
Diagnosis. Protection of court to promote impartial judgment 
resulting in overprotection. Political implications of high 
percentage of judges being ·appointed belonging to same party 
of the president appointing them. Implications of selection 
of judges by the president. Policy making by interpretation. 
Differing standards of courts compared to the majority of 
citizens. Renewal of the court dependent upon death and res-
ignation, possible but not probable impeachment and convic-
tion. 
Prescription. Requirement that judges contribute to their own 
retirement. Election of judges by the Congress.subject to 
· confirmation by the .senate to avoid having a chief justice ap-
pointed by the president preside over his trial. Having judges 
reconfirmed decennially. Requiring judges to place their in-
ve~troents in.a blind trust upon confirmation and not permitting 
them to receive other income from outside sources while on the 
bench. Not permitting judges to be advocates of public causes 
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while on the bench. Giving Congress the power to reverse de-
cisions on constitutional questions by a three fourths concur-
rent majority vote. 
FEDERALISM AND COMMUNITY 
Diagnosis. Decreasing representation, overconsolidation, loss 
of community,· and loss of individualism. Increasing differ-
ences between,. core city and suburbs of.largest metropolitan 
areas. Increasing fragmentation of metropolitan government. 
Changing from federalism toward the unitary form of government. 
Increasing centralization and consolidation. 
Prescription. Deliberate decentralization •. cutting problems 
down to size. Decreasing the size of school and classes. Em-
phasizing high moral standards for the protection of both in-
dividuals and society. Establishing tax incentives to encour-
age growth of metropolitan areas of 500,000 or less population. 
Freeing the national arena for national issues· by deferring .to 
state and local judgments. Providing income tax revenue ade-
quate for state and local needs, Eliminating the at large dis-
tricts as unrepresentative of the citizens within the geograph-
ical areas of the city. Giving cities of over three million 
population full power and representation as states. Granting 
statehood to regions within states having over three million 
population. 
DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY 
Diagnosis. The losing of political and economic liberty 
through the growth of monopolies, conglomerates and multina-
tional corporations. Continuing foreign aid without suffi-
cient determination that it will be used wisely. Failing to 
provide loan funds for building at a reasonable rate of inter-
est. Using grants-in-aid to distort state spending and in-
crease federal control over state activities. Spending of 
revenue sharing funds for capital goods and things, but not 
for services. Failing to stockpile food and strategic mate-
rials. Increasing trade with the USSR. Getting caught by 
the over ordering of wheat by the USSR. Failing to recognize 
the danger of communist totalitarianism. Weaknesses in think-
ing about ideologies and their followers. 
Prescription. Using low interest loans to encourage home 
building and home ownership. Limiting foreign aid, Returning 
nearly all of the income from the federal income tax that is 
not needed for national defense or pilot ·projects to the states 
on a per capita and need basis. Having the federal government 
raise tIDCes during wartime, especially excess profits taxes. 
Stockpiling food and strategic material.. Refraining from trad-
ing with the USSR. Establishing .a government corporation to 
trade with the USSR when-such trading does take place. Con-
trolling size of corporation and government. Recognizing that 
communist totalitarianism is as bad as Nazi totalitarianism •. 
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Recognizing weaknesses in present day American thinking. 
Avoiding foreign negotiations during periods of internal weak-
ness. Developing a systematic method of gradual renewal of 
leadership. 
DEMOCRACY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 95 
Diagnosis. Middle and lower classes endangered by overconcen~ 
tration of wealth. Competition being destroyed and.corporations 
continuing to grow. Dangers in bigness per se. 
Prescription. Scaling down of subsidies to be available only to 
the smaller economic units. Increasing enforcement of antit.rust 
laws. Disposing of excess property of corporations. Congres.s 
setting a limit on the. size of corporations, making exceptions 
for natural monopolies such as public utilities. Prohibiting 
interlocking directorates. Increasing taxes as the corporation 
grows. Doing away with tax breaks for the wealthy. Tying tax 
rates for those of moderate and lower incomes to the buying 
power of the dollar. Increasing tax rates fo~ those in the 
higher income brackets during inflation. Levying a graduated 
property tax on the bigger corporations and on corporate farms. 
Creation of a new Bank of the United States. Granting tax off-
sets to college ·students for money spent for college tuition. 
Starting With a lower minimum wage for those eighteen years old 
and increasing it yearly to full amount at twenty-one. Creat-
ing more sheltered workshops. Providing for more gradual re-
tirement. 
DEMOCRACY AND THE. HOME 
Diagnosis. Democracy being taken for granted. Homes where 
special privilege is taught preparing a destructive element 
to society. Granting of welfare funds without expecting some-
thing in return. Not requiring a suitable home for thos~ re-
ceiving assistance. Failing to adequately protect neglected 
or abused children. Improper payments to clients, fraud and 
waste. 
Prescription. Placing more emphasis on teaching democracy in 
the home. Having families get together at least once a week. 
Teaching responsibility. Adequate diet. Granting welfare as 
a paycheck and expecting services rendered for it. Expecting· 
welfare mother to render a minimum standard of family care. 
Not condoning poor living condit~ons. Providing positive in-
centives to improve conditions in.the home. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning· to colonial and early constitutional principles 
would establish the. framework for the middle class to present 
problems in a democratic fashion. Channels would be avail~ 
able for gradual change in leaders and policy. The framework 
for feedback and democratic control wciuld be available. Since 
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the present party and governmental system seem to cater to the 
rich, the elitists and those on welfare, the proposed changes 
are needed to protect the middle class. Evidence of discontent 
with the two major parties might indicate the development of a 
party for the middle class. With the decline of the middle 
class the extremes would be left to fight it out. Gradual 
change needs to be made while there is still time. Acceptance 
and use of some of these proposals would push us in the direc-
tion of more democratic control and a more democratic society. 
we would have a revitalized constitution. Increased democracy 
would be possible. 
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PROLOGUE 
Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey, 
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay! 
Princes and Lords may flourish, or may fade; 
A breath can make them, as a breath has made; 
But a bold Peasantry, their country's pride, 
When once destroyed, can never be supplied! 
A time there was, ere England's griefs began, 
When every rood of ground maintained its man-. 
For him light labour spread her wholesome store, 
Just gave what life required; but gave no morel 
His best companions, Innocence and Health; 
And his best riches, Ignorance of Wealth! 
But Times are altered. Trade's unfeeling Train 
Usurp the land, and dispossess the swain. 
Along the lawn, where scattered hamlets rose, 
Unwieldy Wealth and cumbrous Pomp repose, 
And every want to Opulence allied, 
And every pang that Folly pays to pride. 
Oliver Goldsmith 
Goldsmith, in his Deserted Village, repeats the feelings of the 
dispossessed. He shows well the human losses that are far greater than 
that of land alone. The movement of population to the cities in his 
time, parallels somewhat a like migration in Roman history of the First 
Century B.C. These are similar t~ recent migrations. In some ways all 
three are fully as tragic. In the declining period of Rome, the poor 
were flocking to the cities to be fed and entertained by circuses, in-
cluding the throwing of Christians to the lions. In modern times, the 
poor have flocked to the cities to be fed, entertained and be drawn 
into riots. Modern spectacles result from the throwing of Christian 
principles to the wolves. Are we to repeat Rome's stagnation, loss of 
inner strength and.morality? Shall it be our standard, also to bow to 
opulence and consider ourselves above the law and guilty only when 
caught? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many of these proposals are old and generally accepted as essential 
to the development and maintenance of democracy. Others are new or used 
in new places. The problem is one of implementation in the face of op-
position from those in favored positions. How can power be taken 
through the democratic process from those who have it? The answer is 
found in the nature of mankind, that once they get too much power they 
are inclined to abuse it and thereby lose their influence. Watergate 
and related instances typify this situation. Once sufficiently alerted, 
the electorate reasserts control. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that excess breeds excess, and the 
pendulum swings from one extreme to another. The challenge in a democ-
racy is how to atop movements before they go too far, so that they are 
corrective without becoming destructive or nondemocratic. Change should 
occur in the lull following a crisis before the next crisis sets in. 
Those needing control should accept it gracefully. 
Source of Control 
Much control needs to be. self-control exerted from within. That 
which the executive branch corrects by itself, Congress will not have 
to control. Whatever the·executive branch refuses to correct may well 
lead to stronger control of the President. If Congress does not enact 
laws and if the executive branch does not enforce laws that will ~on­
trol overconsolidation of wealth, the electorate, after long suffering, 
will change both. 
Direct election of senators came because the Senate was practi-
cally a millionaire's club catering to big business. The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act was brought on by the abuses of business. The oil companies 
lacking self-control will have control forced upon them. Working to 
stop regulation by a group sympathetic to them in the hopes that they 
can avoid control will fail. Control will come at the hands of a Con-
gress changed by election to be unsympathetic. In Michigan conservative 
Republican legislators refused to support moderate fiscal reform pro-
posed by Governor Romney. They stopped fiscal reform for the time be-
ing. Following the defeat of Goldwater and the effect of his losing 
coattails, and following further losses from reapportionment and gerry-
mandering, a Democrat majority was elected to push through changes even 
more distasteful to the conservative Republicans. 
Value of Timely Action 
When will those in power ever learn that timely compromise is bet-
ter than waiting until the tables of power have turned! Southern slave 
owners might have had compensation for the loss of their slaves if Dred 
Scott had become free, if South Carolina had not seceded, if other 
things had not happened, but not after the toll exacted by the Civil 
War. 
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These proposals are made while we still have a big middle class 
and while democracy is still being taught in schools and.homes. They 
are made before the extremes of a depression. But how long can these 
essentials for democracy be maintained without sufficient redistribu-
tion of wealth or adequate control of bigness, whether business, labor 
or government? Watergate, oil shortages, the truckers' strike, and an 
earlier strike against General Motors are examples of dangers of big-
ness. Need more take place to make evident the necessity for pursuing 
old and new approaches to democracy? The hope is that sufficient timely 
action may be taken for the spirit and practice of democracy to live on. 
Proposals to Avoid or Meet Crises 
These proposals are being made to meet the problem of running gov-
ernment during a crisis of leadership of the Presidency and Executive 
Branch. They are also being made to avoid such a crisis. They include 
internal controls within the executive and legislative branches, prepa-
ration of and gradual change in legislative, executive, and judicial 
personnel, decreased cost of elections, opportunity for increased de-
mocracy in choice of party nominees, and in removal of officials of 
government. 
Requirements of Democratic Government 
Wilson felt that secret treaties were the cause of wars and coined 
the slogan "Open covenants openly arrived at. 11 Paraphrasing this for a 
demo~racy where the concept is even more appropriate, the rallying cry 
would be, 110pen governments, openly arrived at. 11 
Democratic government requires a strong, free people, economically 
independent and in a position to control their own political affairs. 
By controlling their political affairs, they can prote~t their lives, 
liberty and property. Democracy becomes more difficult to operate as 
government increases in size. What could have been done directly at an 
earlier time must now be accomplished indirectly through repr~senta­
tion. 
Deliberate diffusion of power, economic and political, must offset 
or avoid possible overcentralization. Checks and balances are more 
necessary than ever in a growing society. A strong leadership chosen 
by the people in free competitive elections rather than by sel~­
selection or manipulation is required. Democratic policy formation, 
the important product of democrattc government, ideally includes a va-
riety of input from those elected or appointed to positions of author-
ity by Constitutional means. A people, their government and its lead-
ers, all accountable for their actions, this is the essence of 
democracy. 
Direct and Representative Democracy 
Today, more than ever, the basic philosophy of the Founding 
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Fathers as expressed in ~he Constitutional Convention and in the final 
·document should be followed. The preamble starts 11We the People 11 signi-
fying in Lincoln 1 s words "government .of the people, by the people and 
for the people." Continuing the British tradition of representative 
government and developing elements of direct self-government in the May-
flower Compact and New England town meetings, the Constitutional Conven-
tion established a Congress of the United States. It is very signifi-
cant that this Congress was established in Section 1 of Article 1. By 
the time of the Convention and following unhappy colonial experiences 
with royal governors and His Majesty's government, the colonists' trust 
was in their representatives in the colonial legislatures. 
Congress and Improved Representation 
The Founding Fathers were right that the number of representatives 
in Congress should not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but it 
should come far closer to this number than the present four .hundred and 
seventy-five thousand. Representation should.be increased. The great 
increase in national governmental activity makes this everi more nec-
essary. 
The Founding Fathers compromised well in agreeing that Congress 
should have representation, both by population and by equal representa-
tion of the states; but now the states are not being represented as they 
were intended to be. Geographical representation, proposed by the 
Founding Fathers, helps to overcome some of the pressures of factional-
ism. Further changes in representation are needed to control factions 
or political interest groups and provide better state representation. 
Powers of Congress ·and the States 
Following the British tradition of taking power from the monarch in 
the Magna Charta and providing for control of taxes by the House of Com-
mons, Congress was placed first in the Constitution, and in Article I, 
Se-ction 7, it provides that "All bills for raising revenue shall origi• 
nate in the House of Representatives." Congress, placed first in the 
Constitution, needs to be strengthened to remain first. In union there 
is strength. A Congress combining the legislative power of the House 
and Senate in one chamber would be stronger. 
£ongress, representing the United States, should have delegated 
power and there should be additional necessary and proper power implied 
from those delegated powers, as stated in Article 1, Section 8, but the 
power to tax and spend should not be used in areas where power has not 
been delegated or could not be implied from delegated powers. Reserved 
power, by the Tenth Amendment, is to be left to the states or to the 
people thereof. 
Power and Term of the President 
The executive power should be vested in· a president. The term of 
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four years has been found too short for some Presidents who have been 
re-elected. Continued re-election or a life term as proposed by 
Hamilton has been precluded by the Twenty-Second Amendment. The maximum 
term is now ten years. With the great amount of power the President has 
gained to meet depressions and wars, the length of term and the extent 
of accountability need to be reassessed. 
Selection and Qualifications 
The President as provided in the Constitution should be chosen by 
electors, that no Senator or Representative or person holding an office 
of trust or profit under the United States shall be appointed an elec-
tor. The electors as chosen are to be agents of the state, but nothing 
is said about the electors of a state voting as a unit. The electoral 
college concept of selecting individuals, most knowledgeable of the 
qualities of potential presidents, to elect the President and Vice 
President has great merit. With the development of political parties 
electors should participate in party nominations. Greater emphasis 
should be placed on the personal qualifications, training, and experi-
ence of the President and Vice President that more may be required than 
just the legal qualifications. 
As stated in the Constitution the President and Vice President 
should be natural born citizens. That requirement may have some value 
for others in high governmental positions. A parallel to civilian 
control of the military might be drawn. 
Advice and Council to the President 
The President, as provided in the Constitution, should be able to 
require the opinion of the principal officer in each of the executive 
departments, but does he ask for enough advice from his cabinet? The 
failure to consult the cabinet is well known. Are those appointed by 
the President free to give unpleasant or unwanted advice? An alternate 
advisory system appears to be needed. 
The advice and consent of the Senate, required for treaties and 
appointments to high offices, should be extended. Executive agreements 
are being used to circumvent the action of the Senate and many in high 
offices close to the President are not required to have Senate confir-
mation. The importance of executive agreements and of the high posi-
tions held justify more control. Should the role of the Senate in 
advice and oversight of the executive branch be expanded? Could these 
functions be performed more effectively if the Senate were· in the 
executive branch? 
The Courts 
The functional distribution of power in the Constitution includes 
a judicial branch, but if Congress as it says in the Constitution is to 
have the sole power to make laws, that precludes the judicial branch· 
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from lawmaking. The courts presently go beyond judicial self restraint 
and in their interpretations make law. Congress, which makes law, is 
subject to the public will through elections. The President, who has 
much influence in proposing, passing, or vetoing legislation, is subject 
to periodic election. Since the judicial branch in effect goes beyond 
interpretation it should be subject to periodic review, also. Some 
action needs to be taken so that Congress can remain the ultimate 
authority in law making as intended by the Constitution. 
Checks and Balances 
The Constitution includes additional restraints through checks and 
balances by giving one branch part of the power of another. The Presi-
dent 1s veto power over bills passed by Congress is but one example. 
There are many others. But are the present checks enough? What will it 
take to control a burgeoning bureaucracy? Increased democratization, 
decentralization, and decreasing concentration of political and economic 
power will be necessary to develop a responsive and effective government 
as a means of adequately protec~ing the life, liberty and property of 
all individuals, weak as well as strong. 
Political Parties 
Would a responsible party system be sufficient to meet the chal-
lenge of democratic government in the present day? As stated in the 
report of the Conmiittee on Political Parties of the American Political 
Science Association in 1950, political parties are 11indispensible in-
struments of government." Granted, they are. But responsible parties 
alone are not enough to meet today's needs for responsible government. 
Or, perhaps, the problem is that the- proposal for a responsible party 
government has not been realized. 
Political parties even with direct primaries are still not demo-
cratically controlled. Shades of smoke-filled rooms and continued 
manipulation by the political and economic elite continue to haunt and 
even dominate the parties. How are parties to be responsible and yet 
avoid the problem of a tyranny of the majority? What is the way to 
develop the organization and system of parties, government, and economy 
to avoid either the tyranny of a majority or the tyranny of a minority? 
How are the citizens to control directly or indirectly? How are they 
to have the opportunity far a workable variety of simple majority, 
extraordinary majority and consensus techniques of decision making 
available? 
7 
OLD AND NEW APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY 
Basic concepts considered necessary for self-government and gener-
ally accepted by Americans include: separation of powers, checks and 
balances, popular sovereignty, representative democracy, rights of indi-
viduals, all of these determined, guaranteed and protected by written 
constitutions, judicial review and free and periodic elections. 
In the establishment of the Constitution embodying these concepts, 
events, conditions, principles and personalities played their part. The 
experiences of colonial government and self-government, conflicts be-
tween colonists and the Crown, m.ercantilism, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Revolution, Shays' Rebellion, depression, rights of Eng-
lishmen, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, Hamilton, and others, 
each contributed in its own way to the new Constitution. 
At the time of the forming of the Constitution, legislatures were 
trusted because they were chosen by and representative of the colonists. 
But because in republican government the legislative authority neces-
sarily predOifinates, according to Madison, that must be lessened by 
dividing it. So although Congress was in first place in the Constitu-
tion, it was weakened by the establishment of two houses having differ-
ent types of representation. The House represented population, the 
Senate represented the states. The Connecticut Compromise, providing 
this difference in representation, created division betweell the two 
houses, weakening each and weakening Congress as a whole. The Senate, 
the less representative body, was expected to be the more conservative. 
Over the years it has become the more liberal of the two branches. 
Planned in one way, the Constitution has worked out in another. Planned 
to make laws, set policy, and supervise the executive branch, Congress 
has become more and more subject to the influence and control of the 
President and the bureaucracy. What had started as a legislative body 
representing the people and the states, has become almost something like 
one self-perpetuating board of trustees, the Congress, elected by the 
people but controlled by seniority and.the few, catering to another, the 
bureaucracy. 
Personalities ·played their part not only in .the Consti~ution making 
process, but also in the determination of its content. The executive 
branch was designed with Washington as the man expected to be President. 
There was a provision for impeachment, conviction, and removal, but this 
was made sufficiently difficult to make it less probable ~nd uncommon. 
In seeking a strong executive and seeing Washington as President-to-be, 
did the Founding Fathers protect this country sufficiently from the ac-
tions of a different type of President? From a President who refused a 
third term, we have gone to one who has sought and gained a fourth. 
From a President who had the trust of the people, we have gone to one 
who has had their mistrust. From Presidents who have considered them-
selves as executors of the laws of Congress, we have come to Presidents 
who have exceeded their authority, to be checked by the Supreme Court. 
At a time when the main thrust of the newly elected members of 
Congress may be on cutting expenditures, that of the members with 
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greatest seniorityJ whose ties are closest to the bureaucracy, may be on 
increasing expenditures. Large increases in government employees during 
.wars or depressions bring ·in many with .similar points of view. Close 
association with these contemporaries and continued reinforcement of 
their ideas within government year after year because of this associa-
tion, do little to prepare them for different ways of thinking or long 
range planning. Long reinforcement of a depression or war psychosis may 
hinder proper planning under different conditions. Not that depressions 
or wars should be quickly forgotten. They should not. But they should 
be taken in their proper context. There are ways of thinking and .fads 
of thinking within bureaucracy. Group think described by Janis in his 
book, Victims of Group Think, is far more prevalent than the few exam-
ples he gives.2 What are other causes of this burgeoningJ self-
aggrandizing, self-indulgent, and.self-protecting bureaucracy with its 
tendency toward group think and tunnel vision? Are personnel hampered 
by manuals that are too detailed and specific? Are ·there too many lev-
els of supervision and too many -steps in the line of communication? Is 
the input from the top or bottom occurring too late? Are there adequate 
provisions for preventing or controlling illegal activities throughout 
government and all its branches? Is political participation becoming 
too costly~ Are the costs of elections or political appointments too 
high? Is the growth of bureaucracy and the national government· a seri-
ous threat to the states and ·the federal system? Are- special interests 
and government becoming too big to control? Scandals and abuses involv-
ing officials of all branches of government and special interests con-
tinue to occur. Teapot Dome, Harry Vaughn, Billy Sol EstesJ Bobby 
Baker, Nat Voloshin and the more recent Watergate scandal are periodic 
examples. Following the Watergate affair and revelations of large 
political donations and other abuses, this question arises, 11Should 
there be continuous investigation of the executive branch of government, 
including the President, his advisors, all departments, bureaus· and 
agencies, in fact, all national govern.ment? 11 The answer is ••yes. 11 The 
next question is, 11How can this investigation continue without disrupt-
ing the conduct of government?" · How can it be done in such a way that 
Congress can get about its other business? How can the question of 
executive privilege be met to gain access to information from the exec-
utive branch? How can the problem of separation of powers be overcome? 
How can Congress be strengthened? How can it be made responsible also? 
What can be.done to make the judicial branch equally responsible? 
How can we answer these questions? Reorganization of the execu-
tive branch continues. That doesn't seem to be enough. Control of 
policy seems to be slipping in the executive branch·from the appointed 
heads to the bureaucrats. Those being regulated tend to regulate them-
selves. How can the general public be protected from the special in~ 
terests? These and other questions may be answered in part by taking 
another look at old approaches to democracy ·and applying them in new 
places.. 
A return to the principles of the Founding Fathers would do much to 
increase democratic control. These principles among others are separa-
tion of power, division of power, checks and balances, periodic elec-
tions, advice and consent, Presidential electors, delegated, reserved 
and denied power, and representation and administration more related to 
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the total population. In the space age quicker feedback and more sensi-
tive control-is necessary. In the earlier period strengthening the ex-
ecutive, the judicial and the national government was required. The 
Constitution had to he broadly construed to cover the purchase of the 
Louisiana territory, the establishment of judicial review and the pro-
tection of the instrumentalities of the national government from crip-
pling taxation by the states. Present day excess use and abuse of power 
requires further distribution of power,.checks on officials and their 
use of it. The answer is a revitalized Constitution and increased 
democracy. 
In government--legislative, executive, or judicial--there is a 
greater need to practice John Stuart Mill's concept for·tieeking truth, 
competition of ideas in the market place, by gaining information through 
parallel or divergent sources. Equally important is the need for re-
newal of personnel through periodic election, elected representation.in 
policy formation, lateral entry, lateral transfer, competition for posi-
tion, training for advancement, limit on length of service, and retire-
ment. This combination is necessary to avoid both the overfresh and the 
overpreserved. By combining fresh points of view with seasoned experi-
ence, not bound by dead hands or dead wood, more timely decisions .might 
be made available. The promptness of an action may be fully as impor-
tant as the action itself. Too much delay gives too much hope for 
avoiding enactment altogether. Delay in either lawmaking or execution 
protects the offenders at the expense of the victims. 
The concepts listed above are now new, but there may be different 
ways and more ways for them to be used in search of increased democratic 
control of government. How may they be applied more effectively in both 
the bureaucracy and Congress? 
Much of the emphasis in political science for the half century of 
Wilsonian and post Wilsonian politics was on American adoption of the 
British mode of government. The President was to become like the Prime 
Minister and lead the legislative as well as the executive branch. Sec-
retaries of departments were to become members of Congress just as po-
litical secretaries of departments in Britain were members of the House 
of Lords and House of Commons. Oversight of administration was to be 
like that of the House of Commons through the ques~ion hour. As prac-
ticed in Britain this oversight would be by the whole House, not by 
committees, The department head would be a member and present for 
questions from any other member. Control of the party would be cen-
tralized at the top. 
Removal of the Prime Minister when there is a failure to win a vote 
of confidence constitutes a check on the executive. Resulting dissolu-
tion- of Parliament was a very strong motive for party members to support 
him and avoid losing office. Collective responsibility would be the 
basis of putting party policy into operation. Proposals to add these 
features of British government to that of the United States were com-
monly offered and supported by political' scientists. Rarely, if ever, 
was there a proposal to reduce the American court's role to that of 
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the British, where without a single written constitution, laws enacted 
by Parliament are not subject to judicial review. 
But can you superimpose one system on another without serious side 
effects and unforeseen ramifications. Perhaps not, but some features 
might be adoptable without substituting our concept of separation of 
power for their concept of legislative supremacy. Some changes might 
help avoid the growing executive and judicial supremacy over the legis-
lative branch. Let us borrow from the British and elsewhere whatever 
may improve our government and make it more democratically controlled. 
What may we adopt to make the Congress, if not first as anticipated 
by the Founding Fathers, at least coequal to the other branches? What 
cah be done to make the parties, not only more effective but also more 
democratic? What can be done to make the whole party system more repre-
sentative? Yb.at can be done to make the governmental system more repre-
sentative? How can we improve the qualifications of elected as well as 
appointed officials? How can we make elective offices available on a 
fair competitive basis in the same way that government employment is 
through the merit system? How can we make the judicial branch answer-
able to the people for its decisions just as the legislative and execu-
tive branches are? 
A restudy of the British system of government as it might be 
applied to American g9vernment may be profitable for several reasons: 
(1) The concept of the major role of the legislative and executive part 
of government in policy formation, (2) The vote of confidence as a means 
of controlling the executive, (3) The questioning of the executive de-
partments by Parliament in full session and not by subject matter com-
mittees, (4) Greater per capita representation of constituencies, (5) 
Use of broad representation committees to consider general aspects of 
legislative proposals, (6) Selection of party leaders by those most 
knowledgeable of them, (7) Shorter time for campaigning, and (8) Much 
smaller election expenses to individual candidates. 
Combining these features of British government with American use of 
separation of powers, checks and balances and federalism could do much 
to insure the responsiveness of those in power to voters and others who 
placed them there. Further development of functional distribution of 
power within the branches could add both efficiency and constraint. 
The vote of confidence together with American periodic elections could 
increase timely control. 
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
There is a widespread recognition of the need for strengthening 
Congress. It has been criticized for lack of initiative, lack of lead-
ership, for its seniority system, its centers of entrenched power and 
special privilege. Congress as a whole may be representative, but its 
committees are not. Time and time again bills passed in one house fail 
to pass in the other, causing inaction or undue delay. Many bills, of 
course, should be killed, but failure to act or acting too late can 
callse great hardship. 
Congress, expected by the Founding Fathers to be the branch to form 
legislation and policy, has abdicated this position to the President or 
those of his choice. An example of this trend was the selection of 
Sargent Shriver by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to develop legislation 
establishing the Office of Economic Opportunity. The content of the 
bill was determined completely without any help from or knowledge by 
Congressmen prior to introduction. 
Another area taken over by the President is budgeting. Starting 
with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the President began to gain 
overall control of the National Budget. Struggle over impoundment of 
funds by the President is the natural outcome of this development. The 
Budget Bureau first located in the Treasury Department was placed in the 
Executive Office of the President in 1939. By executive order in 1970, 
President Nixon renamed it the Office of Management and Budget. Until 
1974, there was nothing comparable in Congress to the President 1 s budget 
staff for financial overview. Congress needs to be reorganized to de-
velop stronger, more responsive leadership for effective overall policy 
formation. The days of Czar Reed and Boss Cannon are over; Senator 
Norris, with help, broke some of the speaker 1 s powers, but the Reorgani-
zation Act of 1946 has not corrected the overconcentration of power in 
the committee chairmen or the fragmentation of leadership. 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the number of 
standing committees in the Senate from 33 to 15 and in the House from 
48 to 19.3 But the number of subcommittees has increased so that there 
are now approximately three hundred committees and subcommittees. The 
standing committees were provided with professionally trained staff, 
but little staff assistance is available to minority members of commit-
tees to develop opposing points of view. Each standing committee was 
authorized to conduct investigations and directed to exercise oversight 
of departments and agencies within its jurisdiction. But presently 
this oversight by Congressional committees is limited by their being 
outside of the executive branch and not having full access to documents, 
tapes, memos and other material necessary to conduct a full investiga-
tion. Nothing was done at the time, and little since, to limit the 
unwritten rule of seniority, filibuster in the Senate, or the power of 
the House Rules Committee to block legislation. The Reorganization Act 
of 1946 strengthened the committees and their chairmen. The increase 
in subcommittees has fragmented the work of. Congress and has made it 
virtually impossible for Congress or its leaders to develop or maintain 
a broad overview of policy or legislation. The development of subcom-
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mittees has further increased the strength of special interests, their 
pressure groups, and their lobbyists. Once hailed as a way to improve 
the representative process, these political interest groups, more accu-
rately called pressure groups, have subverted the representative process 
to gain overrepresentation and even domination in some cases. 
In contrast to current emphasis on committee subject matter spe-
cialization, more should be said about functional specialization of 
elective bodies. In contrast to administrative federalism, there needs 
to be a new thrust in the direction of legislative federalism. 
As a former legislator, lobbyist and state official, I see the need 
for legislative reorganization to offset the monopoly in policy forma-
tion held by committee specialists, bureaucratic· specialists and lobby-
ists for special interest groups. To accomplish this purpose there 
needs to be greater input in policy formation by those not representing 
the special interests, especially in the formative stages. 
Lobbyists and reapportionment, extolled for years as the answer to 
the need for more balanced representation, have created overrepresenta-
tion for the powerful interests and less representation for the weak 
and unorganized. Functional specialization can.provide increased repre-
sentation, a streamlined legislative body, greater oversight of the 
executive branch, and increased advisory input relative ta.policy-making 
and execution. 
The basic functions of a legislative body are representation, leg-
islation, and oversight. A separate body for each of these functions 
would increase effectiveness in each of these areas. 
How much of a chanie would it take to make Congress effective and 
responsive?· How can Congress renew itself?. How can Congress provide 
for more competition of ideas long stifled by committee chairmen or the 
Rules Committee? How can investigation of the executive branch be con-
ducted without interfering with the legislative process? Since form, 
organization, and procedure can help or hinder the strength and repre-
sentative quality and process of Congress, these factors as well as the 
members, their qualifications, apportionment, constituency, selection, 
terms and tenure, all bear consideration. 
Starting first with form, shall there be two houses or one? By 
eliminating undue rivalry, duplication, friction and delay, Congress 
could speak more promptly and with the undiluted strength of a majority. 
The most important step to accomplish this would be to have but one 
chamber, the House of Representatives, and let it speak with one voice. 
The unicameral body eliminates the rivalry of the two houses and does 
away with delays caused by the second house. Specifically, it does 
away with the duplication of committees and their hearings, the need 
for conference cormnittees, and the opportunity for filibusters. This 
would strike significantly at entrenched power and minority con4rol. 
De Tocqueville speaks of the danger of tyranny of the majority. There 
is also danger of tyranny of a minorit·y. Both conference committees 
and filibusters cater to special interests and minorities. Striking 
at entrenched power-, special interests and minority control would 
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increase majo~ity rule, an essential aspect of democracy. 
The new House would·have all the power of the present Senate except 
confirmation of appointments and ratification of treaties. It would 
have all the power of the.present House except the power of .impeachment. 
Instead of having the power to impeach by a majority vote, it would have 
the power to try impeachment cases and convict by a two-thirds vote. It 
would elect an Attorney General, not subject to confirmation, for a term 
of six years; and elect Supreme Court justices subject to confirmation 
by the Senate. This would mean that there would be no possibility that 
a President being tried following impeachment would have his appointee 
as the presiding officer at his trial. If President Nixon had been im-
peached, his appointee, Chief Justice Burger, would have presided over 
his trial in the Senate. 
The Senate, originally planned to represent and protect the states, 
no longer performs that function. Senators under the Constitution were 
elected by -their respective state legislatures. They were chosen as 
'Senators who would represent the state. ·OVer the years corruption en-
tered in and they were not chosen for that purpose. Manipulated by 
railroads and big business, the legislators chose millionaires who 
sought protection for themselves and the interests they represented. 
The Seventeenth.Amendment, designed to correct the situation 1 provided 
for direct election of Senators. Although still intended under the new 
system to represent the states, they do not. Instead the longer they 
are in office, the more they represent national interests, not state 
interests and not necessarily the national interest. The Senate pro-
vides more tax loopholes for special interests than does the House. 5 
Senators increase House recommendations for appropriationg at the behest 
of special interests, both outside and inside government. Continued 
reelection and extremely long tenure makes them less state oriented. 
As potential Presidents, they seek a national constituency. The repre-
sentation of states as such, the basic funCtion for which they were 
created, is no longer performed. The Connecticut Compromise has become 
an empty gesture. The Senate, no longer useful to represent the states 
in Congress, is needed as a check in the executive branch. 
But if the Senate were transferred to the executive branch, what 
would compensate for thf loss of the Senate in Congress? What vote 
would protect the Federal system and the states? How would the vote of 
each state be determined? How could it be done with a membership of 
435? Madison said, 11The representatives must be raised to a certain 
number to guard against the cabals of a few ••• and however large • 
limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of 
a multitude. 117 With the great increase in population and no increase 
in members since 1920, are the variety of interests throughout the 
United States adequately represented today? See Table I. 
There has been a large increase in the staff of Congress and its 
cormnittees since that time, but there has been no comparable increase in 
members. Since 1920 the population of the United States has increased 
from 105,710,620 to 215,000,000 persons and has doubled in the past half 
century. A comparable increase in House members would bring the number 
from 435 to 833. The·United Kingdom, with a popul~tion of 55,710,700, 
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TABLE I. HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF CONGRESSMEN AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN RELATION TO POPULATION 
Pop. Per Federal Fed. Employees 
~ Po2ulation Cong;ressmen Cong. District Emelo::z:ees Per 1000 Po2. 
1820 9,638,453 186 51,820 6,914 1.4 
1970 203,184,772 435 467,091 2,843,000 71.5 
Per Cent 
Increase 2,108'7o 2337. 901% 41, 119% 5,090% 
Number of Federal employees in 1970 if increased since 1820 at same rate as Congressmen - 16,110 
Number of Congressmen in 1970 if increased since 1820 at same rate as Federal employees - 76,470 
has 635 members in its. House of Co1I11I10ns. With only a little more than 
a quarter of the United States population, the United Kingdom's House 
of Commons has nearly half again as many members or about six times the 
representation. Each member represents an electorate of about 62,000.8 
As long as twenty-five years ago, Herman Finer was proposing a Hause of 
800 members. 9 Going less than halfway toward this number, the member-
ship of the House could be increased to 600 with the provision that 
each state have at least three members. See Table II. This would be 
the equivalent of combining the present House and Senate and increasing 
the representation of the larger states by 65 members. The determina-
tion of each state's position on issues would be more accurate than the 
present method of having two senators who may be on opposite sides and 
simply cancel out each other's vote, leaving their state unrepresented 
on that question to all intents and purposes. See Tables III and IV. 
By having at least three representatives from each state, the determi-
nation of the state's position would be made by more than just one Con-
gressman. Cancellation of a state 1 s vote would be possible because of 
absenteeism, but complete unrepresentation would be less likely under 
this proposed system. 
But how could the state 1 s vote be counted under such a system? 
John C. Calhoun proposed the concept of a concurrent majority to pro-
tect the individual state's interests. He proposed "to give to each 
division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concur-
rent v~bce in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execu-
tion.11 A modified form of Calhoun's concurrent majority would let 
the state speak in Congress as a unit in favor or in opposition to a 
bill. Passage of a bill could require the winning vote to include not 
only a majority of the members, but also a majority of the states as 
determined by the majority vote of each state's delegation. Voting 
machines and computers could determine very quickly whether or not a 
bill had the combined support of a majority of the members and a major-
ity of th~ states. 
A bill receiving one of these majorities but not both, would be 
recommitted to the standing committee from which it had been reported 
for further study and revision. Action on such a bill could be much 
faster than the present method of sending it to the Senate, where it 
would be referred to a new committee. Under the present system, fol-
lowing action of the committee and the Senate, it would be sent back 
to the House, where there might be a need for a conference committee 
and further delay before passage. All of these transactions would take 
much more time than simply sending it back to the same connnittee which 
had already had it under sufficient consideration to make the original 
recommendation for passage. That committee could build on previous 
knowledge to make further modification to seek final passage. 
The elimination of the Senate would end the filibuster, stop rid-
ers, decrease some of the effects of seniority, do away with conference 
committees, fifteen standing committees, and all of their related sub-
cormnittees. The establishment of a unicameral legislature with six 
year overlapping terms for members would make possible the division of 
membership into three classes, one for each year of election of one-
third of the members. Membership of 600 would leave 200 in each class. 
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TABLE II 
Apportionment: 95th Congress, House 435 Members 
Apportionment: Proposed House 600 Members 
600 435 
* 
600 435 
Members Members ~ Po2ulation Members Members ~ Poeulation * 
57 43 California 19,953,134 7 6 South Carolina 2,590,516 
52 :l9 New York 18,241,266 7 6 Oklahoma 2,559,253 
35 25 Pennsylvania 11,793,909 6 5 Kansas 2,249,071 
33 24 Texas 11,196,730 6 5 Mississippi 2,216,912 
33 24 Illinois 11,113,976 6 5 Colorado 2,207,259 
32 23 Ohio 10,652,017 6 4 Oregon 2,091,385 
26 19 Michigan 8,875,083 5 4 Arkansa~ 1,923,295 
21 15 New Jersey 7,168,164 5 4 Arizona 1,772,482 
20 15 Florida 6,789,443 5 4 West Virginia 1,744,237 
16 12 Massachusetts 5,689,170 4 3 Nebraska 1,483, 791 
15 11 Indiana 5, 193,669 3 2 Utah 1,059,273 
~ 15 11 North Carolina 5,082,059 3 2 New Mexico 1,016,000 <» 
14 10 Missouri 4,677,399 3 2 Maine 993,663 
14 10 Virginia 4,64~,494 3 2 Rhode Island 949, 723 
13 10 Georgia 4,589,575 3 2 Hawaii 769,913 
13 9 Wisconsin 4,417,933 3 2 ¥few Hampshire 737,q81 
11 '8 Tennessee 3,9?4,164 3 2 Idaho 713,008 
11 8 Maryland '3,922,399 3 2 Montana 694,409 
11 8 Minnesota 3,805,069 3 2 South Dakota 666,257 
10 8 Louisiana 3,643,180 3 l North Dakota 617,761 
10 7 Alabama 3,444,1~5 3 1 Delaware 548, 104 
10 7 Washington 3,409,169 3 l Nevada 488,738 
9 7 Kentucky 3,219,311 3 1 Vermont 444,732 
9 6 Connecticut 3,q32,217 3 1 Wyoming 332,416 
8 6 Iowa 2,825,041 3 1 Alaska 302,173 
*Population as of 1970 census 
TABLE III. PARTY AFFILIATION OF THE 9Sth CONGRESS 
Senate House Senate House 
~ ~ Rep. ~ Rep. ~ Dem. Rep. ~ Rep. 
Alabama 2 4 3 Montana 2 1 1 
Alaska 1 1 1 Nebraska 1 1 1 2 
Arizona 1 1 2 2 Nevada i 1 1 
Arkansas 2 3 1 New Hampshire 2 1 1 
California 1 1 29 14 New Jersey 1 1 11 4 
Colorado 2 3 2 New Mexico 2 1 1 
Connecticut 1 1 4 2 New York 1 1 28 11 
Delaware 1 1 1 North Carolina 1 1 9 2 
Florida 2 10 5 North Dakota 1 1 1 
Georgia 2 10 Ohio 2 10 13 
Hawaii 2 2 Oklahoma 2 5 1 
.... Idaho l l 2 Oregon 2 4 
"' Illinois l l 12 12 Pennsylvania 2 i7 B 
Indiana 1 1 B 3 Rhode Island l 1 2 
Iowa 2 4 2 South Carolina 1 l 5 l 
Kansas 2 2 3 South Dakota 2 2 
K~ntucky 2 5 2 Tennessee l 1 5 3 
Louisiana 2 6 2 Texas 1 l 22 2 
Maine 2 2 Utah 2 1 1 
Maryland i l 5 3 Vermont l l 1 
Massachusetts l 1 10 2 Virginia i* l 4 6 
Michigan 1 1 11 B Washington 2 5 2 
Minnesota 2 4 4 West Virginia 2 4 
Mississippi 2 3 2 Wisconsin 2 7 2 
Mj.ssouri 1 1 B 2 Wyoming 2 1 
*Independent 
TABLE IV 
Summary of Party Affiliation of Congressmen by State 
Number of States 
, Senators Democrat House Majority Democrat 13 
Senators Democrat House Membership Evenly Split 3 
Senators Democrat House Majority Republican 3 
Senators Split House Majority Democrat 14 
Senators Split House Membership Evenly Split 2 
Senators Split House Majority Republican 7 
Senators Republican House Majority Democrat 3 
Senators Republican House Membership Evenly Split 2 
Senators Republican House Majority Republican 3 
Senators Split 23 States 
House Membership Evenly Split 7 States 
Note that there are only s~teen states in which the political party is 
the same for both the two senators and the majority of House members of 
the same state. 
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Under the present membership of 435 in the House, a quorum of 100 
is required for a Conmlittee of the whole. With 600 members it would be 
possible to have 200 on each of three Committees of the whole and re-
quire 100 present for a quorum. These committees would be similar to 
the ABCD and Scottish Conmlittees of Parliament, except that they would 
determine the final form of the bill. The second weakness in the House 
is the refusal of the Rules Committee to permit a bill to be taken up 
until its substance is acceptable to it. If there were separate rules 
committees for scheduling bills for each committee of the whole, the 
legislative process would be speeded up. Bills could be considered 
three times as fast. Final vote would be by the whole House with op-
portunity for roll call and debate to protect members not taking part 
in other committees of the whole. Jurisdiction of these three rules 
committees and the three committees of the whole would be concurrent 
so that if the sponsor of a bill could not get his bill through one 
rules committee or one committee of the whole, he might get it through 
another. John.Stuart Mill 1 s concept of competition in the market place 
to get the truth, mentioned above, is applicable for getting proposed 
laws. A Vice Speaker elected by each of the three committees of the 
whole would preside, or decide who would preside over his respective 
committee. 
The greatest weakness in Congress is the domination of committees 
by special interests. This includes lawyers on the Judiciary Commit-
te'e. Barbara Hinckley states, 11 Committee assignments, as shaped by the 
leadership and members' self selection ••• norms of specialization 
and seniority ••• support constituency representation by the same in-
terests on the same collDDittee over a long period of time. 1111 This pro-
vides for al.most complete and continuous representation of special in-
terests. In addition, "Committees are reluctant to change because 12 their members fear both organizational and personal loss of power." 
What can be done to balance out special with general interest, 
producer with consumer interest? What can be done to provide for grad-
ual change within the committees? What can be done to provide for dif-
fering points of view within the committees in'policy making, bill 
drafting and markup and consideration of bills? To provide for gradual 
change, membership of standing committees would be apportioned so that 
an equal number would be chosen from each of the three classes. Just 
under one-half of the membership on each committee would be chosen by 
party leaders taking requests of members into consideration. This part 
would represent special interests. A majority of the committee would 
be chosen by lot and would come closer to representing the general pub-
lic. This same ratio should be maintained within subcommittees. As a 
result of the varied points of view on the subcommittees and commit-
tees, compromise and adjustment satisfact6ry to both the special inter-
est group and the general public might be developed at an earlier stage 
in the legislative process. This in turn could speed up later stages 
and assist in moving the legislation on to its ultimate passage or de-
feat. There would be reason for more optimism for the proposal's pas-
sage once it had cleared these first hurdles. John Gardner of Common 
Cause proposes "rotation of members among committees so-that members 
would receive wider exposure to governmental policy and would thus be 
better prepared to make broad and deep judgments on the issues before 
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them. 1113 He gives a second advantage of rotation as 11 the breaking up 
or hampering development of the underground alliance of a committee 
member, a middle level bureaucrat and ~ special interest lobbyist con-
cerned with the same subject matter. 1114 A third advantage of rotation 
according to Gardner would be to 11strike the death knell for legisla-
tive fiefdoms presided over by again satraps. 11 15 Such rotation would 
greatly increase representation of the general public. Committee chair-
men would be chosen by the majority party members of the committee using 
a secret ballot, the method proposed by Senator Joseph S. Clark of 
Pennsylvania in 1965. 1b This would permit majority party control of 
committee chairmen. If it is important to have a secret ballot to pro-
tect union members as they choose their leaders, it should also be im-
portant to have a secret ballot when committee members choose their 
chairman. In both cases it is needed for protection against retali-
ation. Committees should be required to report bills out within thirty 
days or request an extension of time if not ready to report.17 This 
extension of time could be granted by a.majority vote of the House. If 
the extension were not.granted, the bill would be discharged from the 
committee and refer~ed .to a general committee for its consideration. 
This would be done to stop the killing of bills by the inaction of com-
mittees. Bills should be reported out to be amended,·passed, or killed 
by a majority vote of .the House and not controlled by a few committee 
members or even just the chairman.· This, plus the use of three rules 
connnittees and three committees of ·the whole, would move bills along. 
Consensus is general in government, and many bills are passed by 
overwhelming .majorities;"but the exigencies of government cannot wait 
for complete agreement and the satisfaction of every last member. For 
while delay may protect the rights of one individual, it can stop the 
protection of many, just as the overprotection of criminals can leave 
their victims underprotected. It is better many times to pass a law, 
test it, and amend it, if necessary, than to have no law at all. 
Better use of Mondays and Fridays would also speed up the legis-
lative process. Why cater to a few congressmen who live nearby to the 
detriment of the country as a whole? Chronic absenteeism should be 
noted and reported to constituents so that all members would be either 
present or accounted for. Congress, as well as the President, can set 
the tone for the country through ethics, accountability and work. Dis-
trict councilors mentioned below can assist those wishing to consult 
with constituents so that there would be less reason for the Tuesday 
Thursday Club members to be gone over weekends. The presence of dis-
trict councilors and their observation would probably do much toward 
insuring the attendance of congressmen. It could also help improve 
their moral and ethical standards, 
More emphasis should be placed on a continued re-evaluation of 
laws, rules, and regulations having the force and effect of law and on 
seeking amendment, elimination or repeal wherever indicated by the re-
evaluation. Attempts should be made to eliminate special legislation 
or special rules as much as possible. For example, changes in the In-
ternal Revenue Code and Internal Revenue Service Regulations to achieve 
uniformity of application of the law are necessary to do away with the 
special privilege of those having greater wealth. A standing committee 
22 
on repeal·and recodification would have much to do. An Office of Law 
Revision·Counsel, such as the one proposed by House Resolution 98818 in 
the 93rd Congress, could assist the standing committee on repeal and 
recodification. Intensive study of executive orders and sublegislation 
established by departmental rules and regulati_ons would give ample evi-
dence of delegation "run riot." This is where Congress has let its 
power be eroded away to be added by accretion to the executive branch. 
Much work needs to be done to reverse this trend. The boundary line 
between legislative and executive power has been shifted so gradually 
that it would take a flood to put it back in its old channel. Instead 
of coming from Congress, much of legislative input is from the Presi-
dent and the executive branch. There is little opportunity for broad 
overview by the legislative branch with its many committees and subcom-
mittees. To rectify this situation the committee structure of the 
House should include not only the newly proposed House Budget Committee 
and committees paralleling the work of the departments, but also com-
mittees paralleling any high executive group such as the National Secu-
rity Council, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Domestic Affairs, 
and the like, so that Congress could develop overall policy and not 
·just policy in a narrower sense. The budget committee should be drawn 
from Ways and Means, Appropriations and members at large, sufficient to 
overcome entrenched power centers. Jurisdiction of committees should 
be realigned to apportion the work more evenly as proposed by House 
Resolution 988.19 
With these broader-based policy committees, Congress would be in 
a better position to.help control government budgeting, initiate legis-
lation and develop governmental policy. Its present role in establish-
ing departments, passing laws, indicating powers and functions, and in 
continuing investigation and appropriation should be further imple-
mented and intensified. Senator Brock of Tennessee said in Congress 
"that perhaps a third11 of General Accounting Office effort "goes to a 
comprehensive review and analysis, and even that tends to be in terms 
of dollars and cents but not terms of human life • • • and it is long 
past time that we had a human audit to gauge the positive or negative 
impact of our efforts. 1120 Congress's role in developing policy could 
be greatly enhanced, 
Thomas Cronin, seeking ways 11to keep the Presidency in line and to 
insist on more honest and candid Presidential reporting, 11 proposes 
"that Congress establish standi"ng committees on the Executive Office 
and Presidential operations, 112 Such committees would be similar to 
those above, but put more emphasis on reporting and control than on 
policy formation, Doubtless such committees could also participate in 
that function as well, through the additional information gained from 
the President and those around him. 
Jurisdiction of the Budget Committee and the other standing com-
mittees should be redefined to provide for a more equitable distribu-
tion of work. The Judiciary Con:onittee of the Senate had over 29 per-
cent of the work in 1973.22 No committee should have more than ten 
percent of the work load. More than that develops too great a concen-
tration of power. Reestablishment of a few more committees and doing 
away with some of the subcommittees could improve coordination and the 
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balancing out of interests. Since subcommittee reports are generally 
accepted by the whole cozmnittee, special interests are apt to be over-
represented. The time to achieve balance between interests is in the 
early stages of legislation. It is almost impossible to do it later. 
Failure of the unicameral body to assist significantly in policy 
formation could not be blamed on another branch of the legislature, 
for that other branch would not be there to blame. The unicameral 
body would either produce or be judged accordingly. These proposed 
changes are not intended to favor any one philosophy over another in 
the end product of law. The sole intent is to have Congress as a 
whole make these decisions rather than having them made by a few mem-
bers in key positions of entrenched power. 
Congress has long been noted for specialization on a subject mat-
ter basis. Standing committees have been set up for that purpose. 
Members gain status and stature as subject matter experts. Experts 
are called in to committees to testify. Committee staff is chosen on 
an expertise basis. Administrative assistants develop expertise. But 
Congress has failed to specialize on a functional basis. The three 
functions which Congress serve are representation, legislation and 
oversight. In all three functions Congress is becoming less effective 
than it could be, because it has not specialized by function to meet 
problems caused by increased population, industrialization, and a bur-
geoning bureaucracy created to cope with domestic and foreign economic, 
social and military situations. 
On a population basis Congress is about half as representative as 
it was fifty years ago. See Table V. It is one-ninth as represen-
tative as it was in 1800 when each Congressional district contained 
50,080 people. Today th·e number of people in each district is over 
467,000. Membership in the House has increased from 65 to 435. That 
number was fixed in 1920 and was changed temporarily in 1959 to 437 to 
provide representation for the two new states, Alaska and Hawaii. Dur-
ing the time that representation of the people has decreased nine 
times, the bureaucracy has increased 411 times. 
Today there is great need for increased representation, more time 
for legislating and far greater need for legislative oversight of the 
huge bureaucracy. More emphasis should be placed on the creative rather 
than the corrective role of Congress. It needs to reassert itself as 
a positive force in developing new legislation rather than wait for ex-
ecutive initiative. This Congress could do, if it could spend more 
time on legislation and less time on.representation and oversight. But 
how can this be done and still provide adequate representation and suf-
ficient oversight? How can representation be increased, legislation 
speeded up, and oversight improved? 
Congress should keep its oversight functions relative to general 
policy and appropriations. It needs not only the help of the comptrol-
ler general for financial matters, but also that of the attorney gen-
eral for legal matters, such as interpretation of laws passed by Con-
gress and investigation of questionable departmental activity. If the 
attorney general is elected by Congress as proposed, he would function 
24 
TABLE V. TABLE OF REPRESENTATION 
Year PoE:ulation Consressmen PoE:ulation Per District 
1790 3,929,214 65 60,449 
1800 5,308,483 106 50,080 
1810 7 ,239,881 142 50,985 
1820 9,638,453 186 51,820 
1830 12,866,020 213 60,404 
1840 17,069,453 242 70,535 
1850 23,191,876 232 99,965 
1860 31,443,321 237 132,672 
1870 38,558,371 243 158,676 
1880 50,155,783 293 171,180 
1890 62,947,714 332 189,602 
1900 75,994,575 357 212,870 
1910 91,972,266 391 235,223 
1920 105,710,520 435 243,013 
1930 122,775,046 435 282,241 
1940 131,669,275 435 302,688 
1950 150,697,361 4378 346,431 
1960 179,323,175 435 412,237 
1970 203,184,772 435 Present 467 ,091 
203,184,772 600 Proposed 338,641 
203,184,772 3000b Proposed 67. 728 
8 Temporarily for 1959 
bnistrict Councilors 
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under the direction of Congress and not the President. If Congress 
passes the laws their agent should help enforce them and· not be control-
lable by the President to protect and cover up poor administration. 
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DISTRICT COUNCILORS 
What provisions could be made for increased representation and 
closer observation of government by citizens, whether directly or in-
directly? Direct democracy was most effective when the governmental 
unit was small and the voters more aware of the problems and person-
nel of government. As the population grew in Massachusetts, there 
was change from direct democracy to representative democracy in the 
town meeting, 
At this stage in government, the voters could still watch those 
they chose to represent them as they decided the business of the' town. 
Distance was short and tradition long in watching government operate. 
As population increases, as government becomes more complicated, as 
distances become greater, how can the voter maintain adequate control? 
Is the increase in the number of representatives sufficient? Can the 
elected representative .be observed carefully enough by the voters? Is 
reporting by newspapers and other mass media enough? Are the average 
voters as much in touch with their representatives as are the lobby-
ists? 
Just as the executive branch needs to be observed by the Senate 
and House, so too, does Congress need to be observed. Just as the 
most effective observation can come from elected senators within the 
executive branch, so too, the most effective observation can come 
from elected councilors from within the legislative branch. If in 
the process of representation, congressmen are elected by constitu-
ents to pass laws when those constituents cannot do it directly, why 
is it not equally important to elect people to observe the lawmakers 
when constituents are not in a position to observe the lawmakers per-
sonally? At present most ~f the information that comes to voters 
comes from news reporters, congressmen, or lobbyists who have their 
own points of view to represent. They have their own axe to grind. 
This information does not come from persons elected for that purpose 
by the general public. Who has the time, money and interest to ob-
serve the action or lack of action of Congress? Who could observe Con-
gress closely? Who could observe. Congress partly from the inside? Few, 
if any, other than paid lobbyists, can do this at the present time. 
Congress and congressmen have grown away from their constituencies as 
the work of the congressmen and size of the constituencies have ~rown. 
Both the work of the congressmen and the constituencies need to 
be cut down in size. Transferring the Senate to the executive branch 
would eliminate the statewide district. Having at least three members 
from each state would eliminate the at-large district from the House. 
Having five district councilors from within each congressional dis-
trict would decrease the size of each constituency even further. The 
size of such districts would about equal the size of congressional 
districts in 1790 and the following fifty years. This would bring 
representation and observation of Congress closer to home. 
Five district councilors elected from separate districts within 
the c9ngressional district would provide opportunity for a greater 
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variety of representation within the congressional district and through-
out the country. The number of points of view Q)uld be increased five-
fold. Variety of representation within the congressional district now 
comes through lobbyists representing state and national pressure group· 
organizations. The elected district councilors would represent differ-
ent points of view; and since they were paid by the general public and 
not by the pressure group, the loyalty of each would be to his own con-
stituency rather than to a narrow part of it. 
The claim has been that the bigger the district, the more the po-
litical interest groups would balance each other out. In fact, in the 
large districts, particularly when the whole state is the district, as 
in the present United States Senate, only the large, well-organized 
pressure groups will be adequately or overrepresented. The smaller, 
less powerful organizations and the unorganized public lose out. 
Election at large would mean representation at large and rerepre-
sentation of the same winning majority over and over again. This is 
seen repeatedly in city elections where the ward system is not used. ·ft 
But the constituents and interests within states and congressional dis-
tricts are not necessarily or even generally homogenous. Instead they 
are varied, and this variety of constituency and interest should be re-
flected in the representative system and Congiess. The smaller dis-
trict council districts would make this possible. 
The district councilors could do much of the case work and enter-
taining of visitors. This would free the congressman for the work of 
legislation. The district councilor could observe not only his Con-
gressman, but also Congress. He could attend open hearings, do re-
search, help prepare bills, offer testimony and represent the congress-
man at his request. Together with the other district councilors they 
might provide a quick survey of public opinion that might be more accu-
rate in a political sense than a regular public opinion poll. 
The franked letter of the congressman apparently seeking constitu-
ent opinion is often designed to influence opinion rather than find it. 
District councilors would be more accessible to their constituents and 
could help.those constituents have a greater impact on their congress-
man. 
As an official.of government, the councilor might have access to 
information not generally available to the public, so that he could re-
port back to his constituents as well as get information from them. 
District councilors could also function as explained below as a con-
necting link between state legislatures and Congress, thus extending 
federalism in practice. They could also be available for substate, 
state, interstate and regional conferences as deemed feasible and de-
sirable. 
District councilors, as state employees and members of the legis-
lative branch of Congress, would have the· unique position of being 
parts of both levels of government at the same time. The precedent for 
this could be the selection of U.S. Senators bY their respective state 
legislatures under the provision of the original Constitution. District 
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councilors would have not only representation and observation functions, 
but also elective duties as well. They would serve as members of a 
mixed caucus of their respective parties for proposing a slate of nomi-
nees for President. After the November election for which they would 
be candidates, they as presidential electors would cast the ballot for 
their district as determined by the popular vote for president-elect. 
District councilors should be paid the same amount as House members 
with the same perquisites. All funds should come from the state treas-
ury and be fully reimbursed from the U.S. Treasury. This provision 
would make them state employees not Federal employees and eligible to be 
presidential electors. The funds should be administered by each state 
for its own district councilors so that there would not be the concen-
tration of power found in the hands of a Wayne Hayes. 
The need for district councilors in observing the action of Con-
gress can be seen not only in the formal and behind the scenes negoti-
ations and manipulations. It can also be seen in relation to the activ-
ity of congressional members and their staffs. Ynlen things are so 
tightly controlled 'by those in power that it takes a personal scandal 
to bring them under control, there is something wrong with the power 
structure. 
Ethics is personal and individual. It is also collective. Values 
in personal lives and relations are carried over into public authori-
ties. It is not too much to ask that those who make the law should 
abide by it. If Presidents are not to be above the law then congress-· 
men or their employees should not be either. Bobby Baker, Nat Voloshin, 
Senator Tom Dodd, Adam Clayton Powell, Wilbur Mills and Wayne Hayes are 
examples of abuses. Their arrogance in the use and abuse of power in 
many cases is almost as immoral as their personal lives, in some cases 
more so. 
Nationally syndicated columnist David Broder wrote in the Louis-
ville Courier Journal of June 16, 1976, that Wayne Hayes had been a 
chronic violator of the standards of political behavior for years be-
fore any allegations were raised about his private conduct. During de-
bates on a controversial pay raise for members of Congress, Hayes 
threatened to cut off the staff allowances of Republicans who objected 
to the pay raise.23 In colonial times the Virginia House of Burgesses 
exerted influence on the Royal Governor by having the power to observe 
his conduct and determine his salary. We could well copy colonial ex-
perience and have the district councilors determine the salary and 
other emoluments of congressmen. Constitutional authority to do so 
would make it clear to congressmen that these councilors had the right 
to observe. They would also realize that, even though the councilors 
came from smaller districts than they, the councilors had power over 
them. This would be another way to emphasize constituent power over 
elected officials. 
District councilors could learn much to prepare them for the office 
of congressman if and when it were available. Experience in the state 
legislature would be helpful for a district councilor and for a con-
gressman. Howevev, the experience gained as a district councilor would 
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be even . .more valuable to a congressman. 
In case of congressional vacancy for whatever reason, five dis-
trict councilors from each .congressional district would be available 
to compete for the office of congressman. Their background and expe-
rience in government, gained as district councilors, would be espe-
cially helpful in preparation for representation of the district and 
membership in Congress. 
The potential increase in trained and seasoned candidates might 
help in decreasing the excessive length of time some congressmen serve. 
Specifically limiting the number of terms or years eligible to serve 
would·do even more. House members to be elected to six year terms as 
proposed, would be limited to three elected terms or twenty years. 
This would permit serving up to two years of an unexpired term. Dis-
trict councilors would be limited to ten terms of two years or twenty 
years. 
Much has been done to develop administrative federalism but lit-
tle to develop its counterpart in the separation of powers, legisla-
tive federalism. Administrative fede~alism-has grown through regional 
commissions, interstate compacts, governor's conferences, grant-in-aid 
programs, and federal funding of state and local projects. Much of 
this has been done through the creation of categorical, block and 
project grants. These and others have been created by Congress through 
its power to tax and.spend for the general welfare. These funds have 
been used in areas traditionally under state and local control. Once 
started, the control has shifted to the National level. 
Created by Congress but administered by the executive branch, the 
control of these programs has shifted from the legislative to the ex-
ecutive branch. Financed in part by Federal and in part by state 
funds, these grants have been administered at the state level pursuant 
to the requirements of the National department's rules and regulations 
and within the provisions of National law. There was little or no op-
portunity for state legislatures to have much input into the original 
law. State laws were passed largely to comply with the provisions of 
the National law in order to maintain eligibility for Federal funds. 
Whatever differences there were between states and the Federal gov-
ernment over the objectives and application of the programs were de-
termined by negotiation between state officials, the governor, or Con-
gressmen from that state, with the Federal officials. There was no 
practical provision for the states to be represented in this negoti-
ating process except through the governor or the department head most 
directly concerned. The U.S. Senators and Congressmen represent the 
national point of view. The governor and department heads feel and 
express the administrator 1s point of view. The state legislature op-
erates in the state capitol and usually in short sessions and has lit-
tle opportunity to represent the legislative point of view. There is 
little that the legislature can do other than memorialize about or 
against congressional proposals or pass laws in compliance with the 
Federal law as passed. This 11is largely unsatisfactory as a form of 
communication on policy questions and in no sense is it a¥
4
adequate 
substitute for direct dialogue with members of Congresa. 11 In the 
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early statehood period, the legislature controlled administration at 
the state level through committees. The legislature could balance out 
one program or need against another. As state government increased, 
the legislature, not being in continuous session, lost its control over 
the departments and programs. Supervision within the states was by the 
state departments, each supervising its own functional area. Earmarked 
funds, both national and state, revolving funds, backdoor financing, 
and open end matching have decreased legislative control even further. 
A lack of codification of national-state correspondence has made it 
easier for the national agency to treat different states on other than 
a uniform basis relative to meeting national standards. Significant 
decisions have been made at the bureau level. Professionalism of the 
government ~ployees attending the same schools, belonging to the same 
professional organizations,. and talking to each other tends to develop 
the specialist 1 s point of view. 
Lacking is the overall point of view which could be made available 
in the legislature if something.Jolere done about the present committee 
system. The British use of A, B, C, D and Scottish Committees with 
general jurisdiction is one possibility. But even without this lessen-
ing ·of committee specialization, there is ~till a broader point of view 
available in a legislative body than within any one executive depart-
ment. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations 11suggests 
having the presiding officers of the legislature, the majority and mi-
nority leaders and chairmen.of committees involving Federal-State re-
lations authorized ••• to present testimony to congressional commit-
tees considering new or modified Federal programs significantly effect-
ing the state. 11 Z5 The difficulty with the ACIR suggestion is the prob-
lem of being in two places at the same time. State legislatures are 
either actively involved in legislating and legislators are not free to 
go to Washington to testify, or have adjourned and are not organized to 
have members speak for the legislatures or be paid to represent it. 
District councilors would be free to be in either the state capitol 
or in Washington as the situation demanded. The District Council could 
function as a legislative link between Congress and the state legisla-
ture. The district councilors of a state could meet as a body in Wash-
ington while observing Congress to discuss state policy. At times by 
mutual agreement, they could meet jointly with that state's Congres-
sional delegation to share cotmn0n concern and ideas relative to pending 
legislation. The district councilors of a state would also be avail-
able to meet at the state capitol on call of the state legislature while 
it was in session. More lengthy meetings in preparation for congres-
sional sessions could be held between the regular sessions of the state 
legislature. Being in Washington as a body, they could continue to con-
sult as a state unit. In Washington they could influence Congress more 
effectively than a legislative body from a distant state capitol. As 
individual councilors, they could continue to represent the state point 
of view. Collectively, they would represent all of the states. They 
could also help interpret Congressional points of view to the states. 
Together with Congressmen and the state legislatures, they could develop 
legislative federalism and do much to protect the states• freedom to 
legislate. In so doing, it could strengthen the states in the Federal 
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SENATE 
The three functions of the present congress, as noted before, are 
legislation, representation and oversight. The unicameral congress, 
relieved of much of the representation and oversight functions could 
concentrate more on legislation. The district councilors, as previ-
ously explained, would be primarily responsible for developing proper 
representation. The senate, no longer representing the states nor· 
needed in Congress for that purpose, would be free to concentrate on 
overseeing the executive branch. Placed there it could be far more 
effective in oversight and control. It could be considered or called 
an executive senate. Not all of the power or prestige has to remain 
with the President to maintain a strong executive branch. Even now 
not all executive power is in the hands of the President. The Presi-
dent shares the selection of high government officials with the Senate. 
He appoints and they consent or refuse. It is within their power to 
choose. The executive branch would be strengthened if the Senate hav-
ing the power to consent and the power to ratify were in that branch 
rather than in the legislative branch. Although the executive branch 
would be strengthened, both the President and administrative agencies 
within it would be subject to increased democratic scrutiny and influ-
ence through the elected Senate. 
In addition to the power of confirmation and ratification, the 
Senate would have power of reconfirmation and instant fiscal, person-
nel, program and policy audit of the executive branch with full access 
to pertinent official records. This instant investigation in coming 
without warning would be similar to postal inspection and bank examina-
tion, The Senate would also have investigatory power equal to the leg-
islative and judicial branches. Senators would be ex officio members 
of all departments, boards, and commissions and have authority to at-
tend any and all sessions they wished, to participate but have no vote, 
The Senate would have power to disallow any rule or regulation having 
the force of effect of law if considered to be beyond power granted 
by Congress. 
By being in the executive branch, it could investigate and advise 
without having the burden of legislating, As an elected official of 
government and ex officio member of all departments and agencies, the 
Senator would have access to in-depth information, not available to the 
newsman except through leaks, skuttle butt, wire tapping, informants, 
off-the-cuff or not-to-be-quoted sources. De Tocqueville spoke of the 
Senate as being a grand council to which the President would have to go 
for ratification of treaties and consent to appointments, 26 
The Senate as proposed would have these powers and more, It would 
be free to advise on domestic and foreign affairs, to add to its role 
stated in the Constitution of consenting to nominations and ratifying 
treaties. It could investigate, not only for the purpose of confirming 
nominations, but also for continued performance; not only for the pur-
pose of determining what laws should be passed, but also for determin-
ing how well the laws were being executed. 
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Would the placing of the Senate in the executive branch be con-
trary to the concept of separation of powers? No, because it would be 
a check within the executive branch itself. It would be an internal 
check similar to the bicameral system of legislatures and the dissent 
of courts. The Senate would choose its presiding officer from among 
its own members. The vice president would not be its presiding offi-
cer. The Senate would have power by a two-thirds majority to deter-
mine qualifications of and limitations upon its own members, to refuse 
to seat, to censure, to curb activities, to limit access to official 
records, or to remove. 
A Senatorial appointment secretary, elected by the Senate from 
outside its own.membership, would have sole power to make all appoint-
ments one day every week for all persons having access to the Presi-
dent on that day. More specifically, no other official, not even some-
one selected by the President himself, would have_any authority to make 
appointments .for seeing the President on such a day. Failure to meet 
such appointments could be an impeachable offense. This would insure 
access of the Senate and its members to the President. 
The Senate would elect its own prosecuting officer to start legal 
proceedings based upon its findings. Senators could act individually 
or through committees paralleling departments or areas of concern. 
These committees, just as those of the House, should parallel any 
high executive group such as the National Security Council, Council 
of Economic Advisers) Office of Domestic Affairs, and the like so 
that the Senate could develop overall policy. 
Committee size and membership would be flexible, permitting all 
members so desiring to be on a committee. This would avoid having a 
committee stacked for or against the individual agency or group being 
investigated. The chairman.of the committee would be chosen by secret 
ballot. Further organization within the committee·would be determined 
by the committee itself. Jurisdiction of each committee would not be 
exclusive. Other Senators or committees could investigate the same 
area. Choice of subject for investigation would be made by Senators 
or committees. 
The Senate would submit periodic reports of its findings and rec-
omm.endations to the President and to Congress. It could serve in an 
advisory capacity.relative to Presidential action on bills, whether to 
sign or veto. Chosen from among its own members, the presiding offi-
cer of the Senate would have recognition and prestige,·comparable·to 
that of the Speaker of the House. 
-Selected members of the Senate could function as a board ~f direc-
tors of a National research council. Part of the research facilities 
could include a bill drafting service to provide assistance in the 
preparation of bills being drafted to carry out proposals resulting 
from the research. The Senate could function in a quasi-legislative 
manner, clearing requests of departments and determining the final 
form of administrative bills, subject, of course, to further decision 
by the President. 
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One purpose of·having a Senate as council to the President would 
be to have competition of ideas through two sources, one, from those 
chosen and appointed by the President and two, from those elected by 
the people. Another purpose would be to have double accountability 
of government officials, one, to the President and two, to the Senate. 
A third purpose would be to have internal control within the executive 
branch from an agency answerable not to the President, but to the peo-
ple. 
This would provide a second means of control outside the bureauc-
racy, for its personnel, not being administrative employees, would be 
less apt to try to cover up governmental inefficiencies. In fact, its 
main reason for existence would.be to discover and report such improper 
activity. Since the Senators and President would answer to different 
constituencies, the Senate would be independent of the President. Col-
lectively, the Senate would represent the people of the United States, 
just as the President does. Since ·the members would not stand for 
election at the same ·time as the President, there would be no coattail 
effect to influence the Senate to support the President. 
Although the main purpose of the Senate would be to provide ad-
vice, information, performance audit, assistance in policy formation, 
and control, it· would also be best informed to initiate impeachment 
proceedings. Impeachment would be by a majority vote of the Senate. 
The present method of having an investigation by a Senate committee, 
followed by another investigation by a House committee to determine 
if there should be impeachment, causes both duplication of effort and 
undue delay. Conviction and removal from office should be by the more 
representative body, the Congress, ~nd by a two-thirds concurrent ma-
jority. 
This Ct>ngress referred to above would have one house with 600-mem-
bers. The two-thirds concurrent majority would include two-thirds of 
the members voting, assuming a quorum, plus the majority vote of mem-
bers of two-thirds of the states. The trial would be conducted by a 
panel of members made up of one member from each state as chosen by 
each state delegation. The prosecution would be in the hands of the 
Attorney General and a committee chosen by the Senate, The other mem-
bers of the Congress would be free to continue with other functions of 
Congress until it came time for presenting the findings of the hearing 
with the recommendation of the trial panel for final consideration and 
vote. 
In addition to the general investigatory function, the Senate would 
have the more specific role of ombudsman. Since the Senate would be in 
the executive branch, it would not be limited in its right of access to 
all government files, including secret ones, by the doctrine of the sep-
aration of powers. Individual members having the support of the Senate 
plus the ·proposed Constitutional authorization for access to informa-
tion, would be in a strong position to protect citizens from neglect or 
abuse by government officials or employees. More important, this sup-
port and authority would do much to prevent its occurrence in the first 
place. 
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Recognizing the need for protection of persons, corporations, of-
ficials, or agencies from abuse or investigation run riot, it would be 
necessary to punish severely improper use of information. Laws provid-
ing strong penalties should be enacted to be applied against those using 
such information for personal gain, to disrupt our regulatory systems, 
to· infringe upon rights protected under patents and copyrights, to in-
terfere with law enforcement and judicial processes or to endanger the 
national security. 
The Senate could follow precedents, procedures, and rules of Con-
gress in granting subpoena power and contempt citations. It would have 
as its staff the Office of Management and Budget. The Director of this 
office would be elected by the Senate since this office would be under 
its control-and he would be its agent and chief administrative officer. 
The General Accounting Office would still remain under the control of 
Congress to continue its role of post audit. The Senate would have one 
hundred fifty members, three from each state, having nine-year overlap-
ping terms. This would be comparable to an expanded Senate with three 
instead of two members from each state. Each Senator would be chosen 
from a separate district, thus decreasing his election expenses and 
lessening the need for large donations. One member from each state 
would be up for election every third year. The terms would be over-
lapping and lengthened from six to nine years to provide greater con-
tinuity of supervision. Senators, as proposed, would be eligible for 
two elected terms of nine years each or a maximum of twenty years. 
This would permit serving up to two years of an unexpired term. Dis-
trict councilors elected for two year terms would be eligible for ten 
terms. 
Limiting the length of service would help insure that congressmen 
would serve in key positions while still in their prime rather than 
in their dotage. It would replace congressmen longer in service, who 
have gradually lost touch with their constituents, with younger, more 
constituent-oriented congressmen. Age is not the sole or even most 
important criterion, because some congressmen, gaining prominence 
through other lines of endeavor, may be elected when somewhat older 
than the average freshman. Limiting the length of service of others 
elected at a younger age would give them an opportunity to become pro-
ductive at an earlier stage in their legislative career. 
The denial of the opportunity to remain in office after three 
terms or twenty years as House members, or two terms or twenty years 
as senators, or ten terms or twenty years as district councilors, 
would automatically increase the number competing for each of the 
higher offices. Theoretically, at least, this would guarantee an 
increase in the competence of the official chosen. If it seemed 
desirable to give voters opportunity to check upon the congressmen 
or senators between their elections at the six or nine year intervals, 
provision could be made for recall at three year intervals. Following 
recall, a special election could be called to fill the unexpired term. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL 
There is a strong historical precedent for an executive or Presi-
dential Council. Nine of the thirteen states had them. They were 
Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont and Virginia.27 Colonial councils were estab-
lished to protect the colonists from the governor because there was 
a need for systematic provision for advice from elected sources. 
The Council elected by the representatives of the colonists, provided 
the opportunity for more democratic input in policy formation and in 
its execution. Elected councils, needed in the trying times of the 
colonial period to avoid abuses of policy and its execution, are 
needed now to avoid the repetition of some of the excesses of modern 
administrations. 
Such a council might have been beneficial to the two Adams, two 
Johnsons, two Roosevelts, Jefferson, Monroe, Jackson, Van Buren, Bu-
chanan, Lincoln, Grant, McKinley, Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, 
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. Others might have been included in 
the list for various reasons, but the ones selected were chosen be-
cause of the trying domestic or foreign conditions of their time. 
They were also chosen because of pending disaster to the country, 
corruption of officials or dictat6rial tendencies of their close 
associates. Any one of these is a sufficient reason for a presi-
dential council. The fact that there was a combination of them in 
most of these administrations provides a much greater reason for the 
reestablishment of councils as a means of providing increased demo-
cratic control of the President, his palace guard, brain trust and 
the evergrowing, self-protecting, self-perpetuating bureaucracy. 
The councils were discontinued in most states, not because they 
were unneeded but because the governors did not want to be controlled. 
They were discontinued in the unicameral states because the councils 
wanted to have full legislative power in addition to their role as 
adviser to the executive. Washington, seeking to use the U.S. Senate 
as a council on a treaty with the Indians, was rebuffed when the Sen-
ate referred the proposed treaty to a committee ••• , 11 the Senate 
made it clear that in its own estimation it was not a Council of 
State but a legislative body, in no way subordinate to the Presi-
dent.1128 
Now the Senate is needed less as a legislative body and more as 
a check on the President and his programs. There were those in the 
Constitutional ~onvention who warned about having too strong an ex-
ecutive. Both Madison and Franklin 11thought a Council would not only 
be a check on a bad president but (also) be a relief to a good one. 1129 
There is too much advice and policy formation from appointed 
sources, special interests, the press, TV and cormnentators, and gov-
ernment employees who have never been subject to an election, There 
has not been enough from elected sources, from those chosen by the 
people to be their representatives, and from those representing the 
general public. 
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Jackson had his kitchen cabinet, Roosevelt-and Kennedy, their brain 
trusts. Nixon has had his close advisors, both in and out of govern-
ment, appointed or selected, but not elected. There is nothing sacro-
sanct about those appointed. If special interests have great interest 
and influence in the appointment, the appointee and his policy will 
probably be less representative. 
How can the Senate function in a closer advisory capacity? How can 
it be chosen democratically? How can the bipartisanship of its members 
be ensured to provide a variety of points of view? How can its member-
ship be renewed gradually to achieve both change and continuity? 
Answering the first question, 
tial council to act on its behalf. 
Colonel Mason proposed: 
the Senate could choose a presiden-
In the Constitutional Convention, 
• an Executive council, as a Council of State for 
the President of the United States, to consist of six mem-
bers, two of which were from the Eastern, two from the mid-
dle, and two from the Southern states with a rotation and 
duration of office similar to those of the Senate; such 
Council to be appointed by the Legislature or by the Senate. 30 
A Presidential council would develop in the following way. It 
would be an elected·body chosen by the Senate· by secret ballot. To 
ensure democracy it would be elected, not appointed. To be sure that 
those voting would not be subject to undue pressure, the balloting 
would be secret. To ensure bipartisanship, positions on the Presi-
dential council would be apportioned by party according to the 
strength of the party in the newly elected class. 
This bipartisanship for the executive branch would carry on the 
bipartisanship of committees of Congress and bipartisanship on inde-
pendent regulatory commissions. Once the election is over, much should 
be and is accomplished on a consensual basis. More should be done by 
general agreement between the parties and for the benefit of the na-
tion. Less should be forced on the country and the people by strong 
partisan support and for narrow partisan reasons. 
The minor party and its members should be considered one of the 
minority groups to be protected and its members to be guaranteed equal 
rights. Ours is not a one party system that outlaws al~ opposition· 
parties. Nor should it be a system where the major party takes unfair 
advantage of the opposition or considers it an enemy. The attitude 
and actions of members of the Committee for the Reelection of the 
President should be proof enough of the resultant dangers. 
The composition and activities of the Committee for the Reelection 
of the President are further evidence of the opportunity of abuses from 
entrenched power. Periodic election of officials by those knowledge-
able of their qualities by secret ballot could do much to break up such 
overconcentration of power. 
Since the members of the senate as proposed would be chosen for 
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nine year overlapping terms, one third would be elected every three 
years. Each third would constitute a separate class. To provide 
change, each class would elect one third of the presidential council 
for terms of nine years from among its own members. Vacancies on the 
Council would be filled by each group elected every third year. 
A presidential council of fifteen members would be small enough 
to function as a close consulting body. Five members chosen every 
three years would make possible both continuity and change. Appor-
tioning the vacancies between parties on the basis of the party mem-
bership of the class elected would develop bipartisanship. Designa-
tion of those vacancies by party and having each fill its own vacancies 
would ensure bipartisanship. A secret ballot would make voting without 
fear of favor possible. Each member could vote as his own conscience 
directed. 
A presidential council chosen for its wisdom and virtue from mem-
bers of the senate should provide advice and aid.in policy formation 
that would be both democratic in origin and beneficial in content to 
the President and the country. If we have a democracy, why not pick 
the President's advisors at least indirectly through a democratic 
process. 
To be more truly representative, there needs to be a place in the 
executive branch for the also rans. Where better than in the proposed 
senate would you find a place for them. In Great Britain His Majesty 1 s 
Loyal Opposition is paid by the government. 
In close elections the losing candidate has nearly as much sup-
port as the winner. Could his supporters and backers be that much 
wrong, that a candidate at one time can be presidential timber, then 
suddenly to be such a loser and be apparently of little value. How 
can there be such a difference between Humphrey, the man who wins as 
vice president, and Humphrey, the man who loses the race for president? 
Because of the increase in population, except for the year 1948, 
every losing candidate for president from either of the two major par-
ties has received more popular votes than Franklin D. Roosevelt did in 
1944. That year he received 25,602,505 votes. Losers received the 
following numbers of popular votes in the succeeding elections: 
1952 
1956 
1960 
1964 
1966 
1972 
Adlai Stevenson 
Adlai Stevenson 
Richard Nixon 
Barry Goldwater 
Hubert Humphrey 
George McGovern 
27,314,987 
26,035,504 
34,107,646 
27,174,989 
31,275,165 
29,168,110 
While talking to Senator McGovern in April of 1976, I recalled 
that these losing candidates had each received more votes than Presi-
dent Roosevelt as winner in 1944. I then asked if the major losing 
candidate. should have some role in government similar to His Majesty's 
Loyal Opposition in Britain. He agreed and made the following state-
ment: 
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A losing candidate goes into oblivion. Yes, he should 
be used in some way, because he learns so much in the.cam-
paign. President Roosevelt sent Wendell Willkie on a world 
tour and he wrote the book One ~rld. He died soon after, 
but he did make a contribution. 
A losing candidate with that kind of following and that kind of experi-
ence can 1 t be all wrong. He should be listened to periodically, to-
gether with the presidential council. Perhaps he should become a mem-
ber of it and assist in developing the minority point of view. Proper 
combination of the majority and minority approaches to problems could 
lead to a consensus and broader support for policies and programs. 
Since the President has become chief legislator the bipartisan approach 
is needed in the executive as well as the legislative branch. 
Might there not be a place for a senior advisory council. Are 
past government officials of value only to non-profit corporations or 
in some other full time government position, to be of value only when 
in one office or another? Why not seek ideas within the government 
from those who seek office? l-Jhy not continue to seek advice from those 
who have left office for honorable reasons? The less information re-
ceived from those who have disgraced the office the better, but from 
those who have served honorably in office there should be a wealth of 
information and advice especially following contemplation. Admission 
by the person him.self of fault, miscalculation, or wrong decision on 
the basis of later developments would do more to develop wise future 
policy than outside investigation could ever do. Former President 
Hoover served with honor on the Hoover Commission. He contributed 
much to the study of the reorganization of the executive branch of 
the government. 
Is there anything magic in the appointing process in finding brains 
that can be trusted? Instead of developing a brain trust that may be a 
monopoly for special interests and a combination in restraint of democ-
racy and ideas, why not break up the selection process? Why not break 
it up to provide for more competition in ideas, to seek the truth as 
Mill would, to find the truth in a wealth of ideas in the market place? 
That which might be lost in expertise could be made up in breadth of 
viewpoint. Expertise can be employed to be on tap, but not on top. 
Election by the people, whether directly or indirectly, of district 
councilors, representatives and senators can provide the variety of 
points of view necessary for the development of a balanced policy re-
flecting the needs of the constituencies, and through indirect repre-
sen~ation in the presidential council, the needs of the country as a 
whole. Senators and those on the presidential council can seek their 
own advisers to offset and balance those chosen by the President. 
Eisenhower and Nixon have relied more on business and financial elites. 
Kennedy tended to rely more on educational elites.32 Senators could 
seek others to complement the President's choices. 
To be sure that the presidential council would have adequate oppor-
tunity to consult with the President, it would be necessary to have Con-
stitutional requirements for meetings and agenda. The meetings should 
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occur at least once a month on call of either the President or the 
presidential council, The agenda should be made up on a joint basis 
except that the President would have priority for his items in six 
of the monthly meetings, and the presidential council would have pri-
ority for its items in the other six monthly meetings, ProYision for 
these meetings should in no way preclude others that-might be called. 
The role of the presidential council would be purely advisory. 
The President's decisions would be his own, but at least he would be 
able to get advice from recOgnized officers of the government selected 
in a representative manner. He would be the recipient of opposing 
views fronrwhich he could pick and choose whatever he wished, or sim-
ply use his own. -~·Policy could be formed in a more deliberate fashion 
and, by including opposition in the process, avoid some otherwise un-
anticipated problems and side effects. 
Institutionalized opposition in the policy forming process might 
widen options, lessen the over optimism of anticipated success with 
its probable lack of alternate action and back up plans. It could 
also lessen the pessimism caused by unanimity of anticipated failure. 
The President would still be free for decisive action regardless of 
the source of advice, 
According to Louis Koenig in his book The Chief Executive, Presi-
dent Johnson's favorite tactic with those whose advice he sought was, 
"I want to do this. You tell me Wy I shouldn't. 1133 But what about 
the advice he didn't seek and other alternatives he didn't consider? 
Presidential assistants, Adams and Haldeman, limited both alternatives 
and questions to be considered by Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, 
respectively. 
George Reedy, former White House Press Secretary, stated: 
Presidents are usually political creatures whose 
senses have been dulled by an environment that permits 
apocalyptic decisions to be carried out before they ha34 
encountered the opposition of other str~ng minded men, 
He p~oposed: 
The creation of an over-all congressional committee, 
with members drawn from all the standing committees of the 
Congress, and with full power to require regular reports 
on the international situation and on the executive branch's 
plan to cope with it. Such a group would not--and should 
not--be granted legislative authority. But its access to 
information should be limited only by practical considera-
tions of time and manageability • , • there sho~5d be no 
limitations based upon security considerations. 
The presidential council or senate could perform these functions. 
As proposed, they would be free from legislative functions and would 
have full access to information. 
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Elected as advisers with -overlapping ~erms to proVide experience 
and continuity, having full access to information .and based upon broad 
.representation with a variety of input, the presidential council could 
provide great knowledge, guidance and stability to the executive branch. 
This presidential council could be in a special way what Benjamin Frank-
lin envisioned, 11 a check on a bad President ••• a relief to a good 
one. 1136 The executive branch would be stronger, but more democratically 
directed through increased sensitivity, feedback, and control. 
Significantly, the President and Vice President would no longer be 
the only ones elected in the executive branch. 
The fact that the senate and the presidential council chosen from 
Fit were both elected to give advice would indicate that the President 
needed to receive advice. The fact that the presidential council was 
elected and not of the President's own choosing would indicate that 
unwanted or unpleasant advice could be given. No longer would the Pres-
ident be completely surrounded by his own appointees to be given their 
opinion by the President when he wanted them to have it. As an elected 
council answerable to the senate and to the people, it would be free to 
offer advice as it saw fit and make its reports to both the public and 
the President. The presidential council could take the place of the 
cabinet, whose advice is seldom sought and rarely used. 
Doubtless, some of these councilors would be potential Presidents. 
Several present-day senators already think of themselves as prime can-
didates for the office of President. They would be happy to be in an 
official position to give the President advice, especially to be able 
to do so as a part of the executive branch. As they groomed themselves 
for the Presidency from within the executive branch, they would take 
away some of the prestige of the President by providing a range of, or 
limits on, acceptable policy formation. In their investigating and 
planning role, they would be gaining invaluable experience for the of-
fice of President if they should get it. 
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VICE PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSION' TO THE PRESIDENCY 
The office of Vice President was intended to have great stature 
under the Constitution. The Vice President, by terms of that document, 
was made President of the Senate, a body of prestige and strength rep-
resenting the states. That position was ~xpected to be one of action 
and second only to the President in power. He was authorized to cast 
the deciding vote in case of a tie, further evidence of the power he 
was expected to have. The method of selection of Vice President was 
still further indication of the intended importance of the office. 
As originally planned in the Constitution each elector voted for two 
peraons, one from another state than his own. That person receiving 
the largest number of votes would be President providing he had a ma-
jority A and the one with the second largest number would be Vice Pres-
ident.~7 There was no designation of candidates for Vice President. 
The Vice President was to be the second best man for the office of 
President. 
This system, changed first38 ~ecause of a tie vote between Jef-
ferson and Burr, was changed still further by the development of the 
party system. Party consideration in balancing the ticket meant choice 
of Vice Presidential nominees on the basis of strength toward winning 
an election, rather than strength of the individual in office. Party 
development in the Senate further detracted from the status and power 
of the Vice President, The Senate majority leader, chosen from among 
Senators themselves and by the majority party, was far more powerful. 
Ignored by the President, overshadowed by the Senate majority leader 
and the Speaker of the House, the office of Vice President lost much 
of its intended power and prestige. Vice Presidents as late as Coo-
lidge were not even called to attend cabinet meetings. The office 
meant so little that enemies of strong men like Theodore Roosevelt 
had him chosen Vice President as a means of ending his political ca-
reer. If McKinley had not died in office, and Roosevelt succeeded 
as President, little more would probably have been heard of him. 
Even as late as the time of Vice President Trlµllan, the President was 
not keeping the .Vice President .adequately informed. Alger Hiss knew 
more about what was going on at Yalta than did Vice President Truman. 
In Eisenhower's administration, at the time of his heart attack, 
it was Sherman Adams and not Vice President Nixon who took control of 
the business of the Presidency. Facetiously, taking over is probably 
not the proper term. Under Sherman Adams it was more like retaining 
than taking over. Presidential assistants became more powerful than 
Vice Presidents. Haldeman followed this tradition. Through an act 
of Congress creating the National Security Council, the Vice Presi-
dent was to have a more important role in foreign policy. But how 
could an Agnew compete with a Kissinger in either knowledge or con-
trol? 
Following the serious illness of Eisenhower while in office, the 
death of Kennedy, and Johnson 1 s history of heart trouble, the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment was added to the .Constitution. This provided for suc-
cession of the Vice President in case of disability as well as death. 
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The tragic events leading to this amendment made it even more evident 
that the Vice President should be of Presidential stature. The choice 
of Hubert Humphrey as President Johnson 1s running mate in 1964 gave 
some evidence that the political parties were taking this need seri-
ously. 
What needs to be done to restore the office of the Vice President 
to the status and power to which it was intended? The proposed senate 
in the executive branch, and the corresponding change in functions 
would make possible not only restoring, but also enhancing the Vice 
President 1s status and power. It could enhance his power because he 
would no longei be a hybrid, part legislative and part executive, 
but would be completely in the executive branch. 
Whatever role he played relative to the senate, would add to his 
present executive duties. To give him a more prominent position in 
the senate, he should be elected senator at large at the same time that 
he is elected Vice President elect, He would be elected to both offices 
on the same ballot to continue as senator as long as he was Vice Presi-
dent elect or Vice President. 
As a full member of that body he would have all the rights and 
privileges of it. Elected at large, he would have the advantage of 
prestige that went with that constituency. Being a senator and hav-
ing the rights and privileges of one, he would be in a constitutional 
position to offer advice to the President. He would also have full 
access to any and all departments, boards, commissions and agencies, 
to investigate at will, consult or advise. He would be far more knowl-
edgeable if and when he took over as President. This would include 
awareness not only of domestic, but also of foreign affairs. 
With the great increase in government and resulting responsibility 
on the President there may be a need for not just one but two working 
Vice Presidents. One could be involved primarily with foreign policy, 
the other with domestic policy. The problem of selection would be dou-
bled because of the need to select two, but with past problems of Vice 
Presidential candidates and Vice Presidents such as Eagleton and Agnew 
there might be an advantage in selecting two by the normal selection 
process to be sure that one of those selected would be suitable for 
office or eligible to succeed to the Presidency. 
Following the Eagleton and Agnew affairs there have been many 
questions raised about the method of selecting the Vice President. 
The Institute of Politics at Harvard made several suggestions for 
improving the Vice Presidential selection process. Amo~g those were: 
(1) having the Presidential candidate start the selectibn process 
earlier, (2) discussing the criteria for the running mate and urging 
emphasis on competence to be President as the primary factor, and 
(3) considering the platform at the convention after tQe nomination 
of the Presidential candidat§ to give him more time in the final se-
lection of his running mate. 9 
Training and experience in the legislative and executive branches 
at both state and national levels as well as related experience in 
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metropolitan, academic, corporate or international fields should be 
included as possible items for consideration in the criteria for Vice 
President. Considering the broad nature of the office, experience in 
a variety of these would seem most beneficial, especially experience 
in both legislative and executive branches. Because of the nature of 
our federal system, experience at both the state and national levels 
would be rewarding. 
Not·only should the Vice President have the qualifications for 
President, but also all others in line of succession to the Presidency. 
High ranking Presidential advisers should also have the same prerequi-
sites. This is particularly important relative to those dealing in 
foreign policy, especially since foreign policy has become such an im-
portant part of the President 1 s responsibility. 
In time of crisis the question of bypassing someone in line of 
succession because that person was not a natural born citizen could 
raise additional areas of conflict during a crucial period. The re-
quirement of natural born citizen was included in the prerequisites 
for President to prevent the brilliant, attractive Alexander Hamilton 
from becoming President. This same requirement would lay to rest the 
possibility of Henry Kissinger becoming President. Could not their 
services have been rendered under more control by natural born citi-
zens, just as there is provision for civilian control of the military. 
With the cabinet officer a natural born citizen, the defense for the 
policy of a Hamilton or Kissinger could have been that it had ·the sup-
port of natural born citizens in positions of authority. The Presi-
dent should not be the Sole natural born citizen to be answerable to 
such charges or be subject to such great responsibility, particularly 
in the area of foreign policy. A highly talented Hamilton or Kissin-
ger warmed by the glow of high public acclaim and international praise 
may be blinded by the reflection of their own brilliance. As an actor 
they may place more importance in day by day portrayal in the play of 
events than in ultimate reality or long run national interest, to give 
the appearance of accomplishment regardless of what might be happening 
backstage. 
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PRESIDENT ELECT 
Not only do present-day senators need experience in preparation 
for the Presidency, so also do prospective Presidents. For the first 
140 years under the new Constitution, the President took office about 
four months after he was elected. In the early 1800s that length of 
time for final preparation for office was sufficient. At present the 
transition period should be even longer. But following the adoption 
of the ~entieth Amendment, the President had less time instead of 
more. 
President Roosevelt who proposed the Twentieth Amendment was al-
ready in office when it took effect and didn't feel the need for the 
extra time for preparation. Those following have been thrust into 
office with insufficient opportunity to be informed. Leading candi-
dates are briefed on foreign policy during the campaign but not as 
thoroughly as an incoming President should be. 
Some information is held back since·it may be used for political 
purposes, that is, for the purpose of gaining office. Information for 
a prospective President would not be as full as it would be for a Pres-
ident planning a course of government action. It would be une thing 
to ·be using .information to gain office and .another to be using it while 
having the responsibility of being a government official •. It is one 
thing to talk about negotiating on your knees as .a candidate and an-
other in being conunitted to negotiate on your knees as the head of the 
government. 
A longer transition period is needed for preparation of the bud-
get, development of legislative proposals, and the State of the Union 
Message. Lengthening the transition period would make more gradual 
change possible. It is customary in many organizations to have people 
in training for higher positions and to have a President-elect, even 
for social clubs. If this is common practice in private orgallizations 
and in business, both large and small,.why would it not be even more 
important for the highest office in government and for the incoming 
President of the United States? 
A two-year term as President-elect would give him a session of 
Congress to observe from the viewpoint of the President. It would 
further his understanding of government operations. There would be 
opportunity for him to become better informed on foreign affairs. 
At no other time in his life could he have done more than he could 
as President-elect to prepare himself for the Presidency. As situ-
ations arose, he could think about what he would do if he were Presi-
dent and have an opportunity to compare his judgment with that of the 
actual President. If on-the-job training is important elsewhere, why 
not here in the toughest of all jobs? 
Some might suggest that the term of two years for the President-
elect might be too long. A shorter time might be better, but the 
present length of time is far too short. Candidates seeking the 
Presidency learn much in campaigning as McGovern said, but they are 
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bound to learn more in office. They learn much as Vice Presidents and 
in other offices, but would never learn as much as they would if sure 
of becoming President and everyone knew it. 
The delay in taking office as President would provide two years 
more time to investigate political donations and election irregulari-
ties. This additional wait of two years would discourage illegal do-
nations that were made to get quick protection or early payoff. 
The President-elect could do much to prepare himself for President 
after the heat of the campaign was over and when he was closer to the 
reality and responsibility of office. He could pursue the ramifica-
tions of his election promises from inside the government and might 
even change his mind in the light of additional information, Time 
would be available to prepare his own budget, rather than be bound 
in great part to the one formed by his predecessor. 
There would be time available to consult with those who might 
become part of his administration. They, in turn, could be consulted 
on the development of new programs, changing others, and budget al-
terations to fit proposed needs. Pilot programs might be established. 
Of utmost importance would be the gradual learning necessary to 
be prepared on foreign policy. The opportunity for the President-elect 
to learn would seem to be far greater than that of the Vice President. 
One reason for this would be the certainty that the President-elect 
would succeed the President. Many Vice Presidents have not. Franklin 
Roosevelt had three Vice Presidents. Second, the President-elect would 
not be a campaign rival for office. The desire of the President to 
run for a second term and thereby keep a potential rival uninformed 
has stopped Presidents from preparing Vice Presidents to succeed them. 
A third reason is the incumbent's feeling that no one else is really 
capable of being elected President or being President. The actual 
election of a President-elect would remove that reticence, The Presi-
dent would be dealing with a future equal and would know it. The ten-
dency would be to treat him differently because of the office he held. 
Of even greater importance would be the time and opportunity for 
the President-elect to be informed on foreign policy. He would have 
access to information because he already held office. With more in-
formation, the Bay of Pig fiasco might have been avoided in 1961. By 
knowing well in advance when and who will be involved in a change in 
authority, an orderly transfer of power can be worked out. 
Separating the time of elections from the time of transfer of 
power can maintain stability in foreign affairs. It is common for 
leaders of foreign countries to test the American government during 
Presidential elections and to test American Presidents when new in 
office. The Cuban missile crisis occurred in October, 1962, less than 
two years from the time President Kennedy took office. A foreign gov-
ernment would gain no special advantage in doing this during a Presi-
dent-elect election for the following reasons. The President already 
in off ice would remain in power the next two years while the President 
elect was becoming more thoroughly prepared for office. The incumbent 
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President would probably have little or nothing personal at stake since 
he was not running for office, nor could he be reelected President. In 
addition he would be in a position to continue his policies for the 
next two years while still in office. The incumbent President could 
share much of his experience, concepts and beliefs with the President-
elect while preparing him for the Presidency. This sharing of ideas 
could well insure a more stable foreign policy. Gradual transition 
and implementation would help also. 
The economy might well be more stable during the election period 
because the incumbent President would remain in office for the next two 
years. The independent regulatory commissions are planned with over-
lapping terms of office to provide for more gradu~l change in policy. 
The interchange of ideas between the President-elect and the President 
could provide a similar gradual change. 
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PRESIDENT 
In getting the best person into office, more emphasis should be 
placed on pertinent training and experience in the executive branch 
for those aspiring to be President and more experience or observation 
of the Congress for those aspiring to be congressmen and eventually 
President. 
Some Presidents have had experience as governors, executive expe-
rience yes, but not at the national level. In recent years, more of 
the candidates have been former Senators, who have had.little or no ex-
perience in the executive branch. The establishment of the Senate in 
the executive branch with power of· advice, confirmation, reconfirma-
tion, audit, and control would provide an opportunity for potential 
Presidents to be better.prepared to assume the duties of that office. 
Formerly, governors of large states, notably New York and Ohio, 
men having much experience as executives, became Presidents. More 
recently former governors of California and Georgia have sought the 
office. Because of the emphasis on foreign affairs and the inability 
of governors to develop nationwide constituencies, Senators now have 
a great advantage in the race to become President. Senators or con-
gressmen, unless they have been former governors, have not had exec-
utive experience. Governors of large states, at present, seldom be-
come Senators. They would, thereby, lose an opportunity to· become 
more knowledgeable in foreign policy. The natural line of advance-
ment to President under the proposed system would be up and through 
the House, the Senate, Presidential Council, Vice President elect, 
Vice President, and President-elect to President. This would pro-
vide potential officeholders and candidates with experience in both 
the legislative and executive branches. They would have the oppor-
tunity to grow into the Presidency. 
The modern President has acquired power not envisioned at the 
time of President Washington. Much of this has come from Congress 
itself through the enactment of war and emergency power. Inadequate 
control of such additional power and sufficient, practical power to 
remove it can lead to its misuse and abuse. In Germany, after Kaiser 
Welhelm and World War I, a democracy was established under the Weimar 
Constitution. One section of this permitted the Chancellor to take 
emergency power by decree. The Reichstag could not stop him. Under 
the United States Constitution, as interpreted, Congress can pass 
laws granting emergency use of power by the President. Once enacted 
for a specific war or emergency, these laws stay on the books to be 
used as a continued base of power. This power·given by a majority 
of Congress cannot be taken away by a majority, if the President ob-
jects, because of his veto. The original granting or allocation of 
power in the Constitution required an extraordinary majority. Why 
should not the reallocation of such emergency or.war power require 
an extraordinary majority of Congress? A two-thirds vote of Congress 
should be required for passing emergency or war powers and repeal of 
such laws require a simple majority not subject to veto bY the Presi-
dent. This method of repeal was provided for in the Lend-Lease Act 
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and other war time laws. 
In foreign policy the President has avoided the control of the 
senate by using executive agreements instead of treaties. Nonself-
executing agreements require a majority vote of both houses. ·Self-
executing treaties do not require even that much. In the Missouri 
v. Holland case it was ruled that treaties could take power away from 
the states and give it to the Federal Government. There is no limit 
to the extent to which executive agreements can be used in place of 
treaties. Extensively used as a means of avoiding control by the 
senate, such action thwarts the intent of the Constitution and should 
be stopped. Therefore, executive agreements should be subject to 
ratification in the same way as treaties. Ratification would require 
a two-thirds majority of .the senate. 
The President's power to appoint and remove as well as his power 
over foreign policy would be changed, His appointing power as stated 
above should be shared with the senate for all major policy forming 
positions. This would also include nearly a thousand positions placed 
in Schedule C during the Eisenhower administration. The President 
would be limited further, relative to interim appointments which would 
be subject to disallowance by the senate. Since not only appointment 
and confirmation, but also removal is important in having good person-
nel, Presidents have removed their appointees for various reasons, 
whether policy differences, inefficiency or whatever. The President's 
power to remove has been-successfully challenged only with officials 
having quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. The President 
has sole power to remove even when appointees are confirmed by the 
senate. To increase democratic control of the bureaucracy and to in-
sure better working relations between Presidential appointees.and the 
senate, appointees should be removable by either the President or 
the senate. Under the method suggested above, it would be easier to 
remove undesirable appointees, even those close to the President. 
In the international field, diplomatic personnel considered by the 
host country to be persona non grata are removed to improve rela-
tions between nations. The arrogance of a Sherman Adams or a Bob 
Haldeman are well known. The removal of such an individual might 
improve relations between the President, the senate, and congress. 
If it were improper for Congress to insist that Secretary of War 
Stanton be retained by President Andrew Johnson, why should it not 
be improper to insist that a Haldeman equally repugnant to Congress 
be retained by Nixon. Further details are given below in the sec-
tion on appointment and removal. 
Changes in the President's role relative to emergency power, 
foreign policy, appointment and removal have been designed to in-
crease control over his actions. Another change which might improve 
the direction of his actions would be the use of the senate and the 
presidential council for advice as suggested above. The President 
would be given council and reports by the senate and the presiden-
tial council, but would be as free to accept or reject that advice as 
he is that of the cabinet under the present system. Although remain-
ing Cormnander-in-Chief, Chief Executive, and Chief Legislator, he 
would receive advice from the presidential council and the senate, 
52 
whose members are elected by their own constituency and are not ap-
pointed by him. Not being beholden to him for their position, they 
would feel less reticent to give the President advice that he might' 
need, but not want to hear. A modern President, powerful in his own 
right and subject to great pressure, needs the opportunity for addi-
tional advice and guidance from independently elected officials hav-
ing their own base of power. They, equally answerable to their con-
stituents, could serve as an internal check in the executive branch 
and provide increased democratic control. 
The term of office would be two years as President-elect and 
six years a~ President for a total of eight years. The single term 
of six years proposed by President Eisenhower has considerable merit. 
This was also supported by Senators Aiken and Mansfield who jointly 
introduced Senate Joint Resolution 77, proposing it in the 92nd Con-
gress. The six years is long enough for accomplishment. It is short 
enough for others to strive for the office while in their prime. The 
strain of the office is sufficient to affect the health and competence 
of the office holder so much that a longer term seems undesirable. 
Fully as important as the six year length of term is the provi-
sion· that a President cannot be elected more than once. There would 
then be no way that a President or those officials close to him 
could use their office and the power thereof to further his reelec-
tion. 40 The pressure of office as used by the Committee for the Re-
election of the President to garner large donations from corporations 
and interest groups has caused much law breaking and abuse. This 
precedent and the possibility of its continuance is very dangerous to 
a democracy, the economy, and the middle and lower classes. Since a 
President may not come up to the expectations of the electorate, 
there should be some method of rectifying the mistake and shortening 
the term. To provide for a popular vote on the President and deter-
mine if he should remain ih office for the full six years, a plebi-
scite would be held at the end of each biennium of his service. 
The term of House members was made two years when the intent or 
desire was to have policy determined by laws of Congress subject to 
biennial review. It is true that senators served for six years with 
a third of the senate being elected each two years; but, since it 
was impossible to pass laws without the assent of the House, the two-
year term for the House was sufficient to protect the voters from 
change or new legislation. The President, as Chief Legislator, has 
taken over the role of Congress in policy formation. Therefore, he, 
not the congressmen, should be subject to biennial review. If he is the. 
one whose policies or actions are not popular, why not have him de-
fend or praise his own policies to the nationwide constituency which 
is his. In the past, American voters have given evidence time and 
again that they knew what they did not want. The elections of 1964 
and 1972 cited above are examples. There was a protest vot~ against 
Goldwater in 1964; there was a protest vote against McGovern in 1972. 
Another example was the protest vote against Hoover in 1932. 
Fully as much of a problem may be the apparent mandate resulting 
from overwhelming majorities. 
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., speaks of: 
Nixon carrying the imperial.Presidency toward its 
ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency--with the 
President accountable only once every four years, shielded 
in the years between elections from Congressional and pub-
lic harassment, empowered by his mandate to make war or 
to make peace, to spend or to impound, to give out infor-
mation or hold it back, superseding congressional legis-
lation by executive order, all in the name of a majority 
whose choice must prevail till it made another choice 
four years later--unless it wished to embark on the dras-
tic and improbable course of impeachment.41 
All: alternative, less traumatic and time consuming than impeachment 
and conviction, is needed to make the President more responsible to 
the people. If a vote can make a plebiscitary President, then let 
a vote unmake him if his support changes. Let this vote come every 
two years to strengthen a good President or replace a poor one. 
In time of crisis a President is much stronger with evidence of 
public support behind him. A·vote of ·confidence at such a time could 
strengthen his position and do much to lessen the manufactured carp-
ing criticism of a militant minority. It would also lay to rest the 
concept of the support of a silent majority. The votes would be there 
to prove where the actual support was. The President would .be subject 
to the vote of confidence or· lack of it by the people as counted and 
registered in the electoral vote. 
If the vote were favorable, the.President would continue in power 
fully aware of the strength of his support. If the vote were in the 
negative, he would be replaced by his Vice President. The term "vote 
of confidence" should definitely be used rather than 11recall." The 
purpose is not to "get11 a President. It is to determine the extent 
of support he has, and then if such.support is insufficient, to re-
move him. The shift from President to Vice President in mid term 
rather than at the end should change the course of policy in line 
with the election results, Perhaps such change would be less abrupt 
and less drastic if done at the early stage of disagreement. 
If the President had approval to complete his full term of office, 
a President-elect would be chosen at the end of his fourth year as 
President to be ready to take over at the end of his term. The Presi-
dent would stay in office the next two years while the President-elect 
was gaining experience, This gradual transition would have eased the 
pressure upon a new President, as was Kennedy, by giving him time to 
learn the office and be briefed on conditions and situations that might 
need decisions. 
There would be fewer times of apparent weakness because the tran-
sition from President to President-elect would be smoother than the 
present method. The President-elect would gradually gain in influence; 
and the retiring President would have a longer time in which to help 
his successor gain an understanding of the office. He could, thereby, 
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be of much assistance to the incoming President. 
There would be no question about where the authority rested rela-
tive to the President-elect, just as there is no question about the 
authority of the President in relation to the Vice President. In case 
of succession to the office of President during.the two years of the 
President-elect, the Vice President would succeed to the Presidency as 
presently provided for. Other constitutional or legal provisions such 
as the Twenty-Fifth .Amendment on Presidential succession and disability 
would remain unchanged. 
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ELECTIONS 
Elections, under the present system, have been costly, traumatic, 
dishonest and divisive, and ·have created false impressions of mandates 
and popularity. Crucial decisions have been made in the primaries of 
a few states, and nominations and elections have been manipulated by 
the overzealous or dishonest. 
The Constitution provided for the choice of President and Vice 
President by a majority in an electoral college. In case there was 
no majority, the choice of President would be made by the House with 
each state casting· one vote to give advantage to small states, The 
Vice President would be chosen by the Senate if there were no majority. 
Senators were chosen by their respective state legislatures. No men-
tion was made of political.parties. Changes have been ma"de in the 
election system since the adoption of the Constitution which were de-
signed to extend the suffrage and to gain more popular control over 
elected officials. This was the intention, but ·have the results been 
those intended? Just as amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Federal laws have affected the electoral system, so too has the 
development of factions, parties, state constitutions, state laws, and 
political,practices, both legal and illegal. 
The Twelfth Amendment changed the electoral college voting to dis-
tinguish between voting for President and voting for Vice President. 
Under the system in the original Constitution, the person receiving the 
second largest number of votes for President became Vice President. 
The intent was that the second best man would become Vice President. 
But with the development of parties, those who voted for Jefferson also 
voted for Burr. Their intention was that Jefferson be President and 
Burr., Vice President. Under the terms of the Constitution, the House 
made the choice and selected Jefferson as President. The~senate chose 
Burr to be Vice President. If no parties or a multiparty system had 
developed, the electoral college might have remained a nominating body 
as intended. If that were the case, it would have become the practice 
for the House to choose the President and the Senate the Vice President. 
Even with the development of parties, the electoral college has not made 
the final decision in three elections, that of Jefferson's tie vote, and 
those of John Quincy Adams and Rutherford ID. Hayes. Adams, the eventual 
winner in 1824, had less electoral and less popular votes than one-third 
of the electoral and pOpular votes. In 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes had 
less popular votes than his opponent, Samuel J. Tilden and only one more 
electoral vote as established by the Electoral Commission created by 
Congress to determine the outcome of the election. The electoral col-
lege did make the decision in 1888, but President-elect Harrison had 
less popular votes than his opponent, Grover Cleveland. Until 1881 some 
states selected Presidential electors by districts. Since that time, 
all states have chosen their electors at large. This has added to the 
unrepresentative character of the electoral college. The suffrage has 
been extended to Blacks, women and eighteen-year olds by passage of the 
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments and by civil right 
acts; but no change has been made to expand the electoral college or 
make it more representative of the people. 
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Prior to the final election comes the choice of the party nominee. 
This was first done by caucus, by getting a few of the party leaders 
together to make decisions. Later came the legislative caucus which 
was more representative of the elected members of the party. This was 
followed by the convention. The first national convention to choose a 
President was held by the Anti-Masonic Party in 1831. Apparently more 
democratic than caucuses, the convention was still so unrepresentative 
in practice that the direct primary was adopted eventually in all the 
states. 
Convention delegates are not representative of party members. Dem-
ocrat delegates are apt to be more liberal and Republican delegates more 
conservative than party identifiers.42 The struggle for delegates and 
the convention activity of the Democrats in 1972 continues to raise · 
questions about the representative quality of Democrat conventions. The 
taking over of the Republican convention by the So called grass roots 
movement of the Goldwater supporters in 1964 raises questions of repre-
sentation in Republican conventions. The activities of the Committee 
for the Reelection of the President in 1972 raises still further ques-
tions about the electoral process. Direct primaries adopted to democra-
tize the nominating process are used in about two-thirds of the states 
for selecting convention delegates. Presidential preferential primaries 
are meaningful in less than a third of the states. Since candidates 
pick and choose the primaries most favorable to them, the majority of 
the party members have little to do in the choice of their party's nomi-
nee. Final election results indicate voter dissatisfaction with party 
nominees. Neither Johnson nor Nixon had the great support and mandate 
that the election results indicated, for many of the votes cast for 
Johnson were actually votes against Goldwater, and many of the votes 
for Nixon were votes against McGovern. Party primaries and conventions 
do not necessfrily choose the best candidates and the electoral college 
does not reflect the choice of the voters. At present, Presidential 
primaries do increase the role of party members in the selection of the 
Presidential nominee, but party members do not exert their influence at 
the crucial time of the actual choice of the nominee. They exert it 
earlier and in a piecemeal fashion in the state primaries. The elec-
toral college is now far less representative than it was at its incep-
tion. It has no part in the nominating process, and with but few excep-
tions, is an automatic inaccurate recorder of the outcome of the popular 
election. 
Under the present method of having Presidential electors chosen at 
large, the state electoral vote is cast as a block, giving a tremendous 
advantage to big states and even small minorities within them. As the 
plurality of the popular vote goes, so goes all the electoral votes. 
This has the effect of casting the electoral votes of the losers for 
the candid~te they voted against. Senator Mundt called this legalized 
thievery. 43 
Are Presidents to be chosen in an accidental or manipulative, 
self-aggrandizing basis or are they to be chosen in a democratic or 
representative manner? Ia there some way of returning the electoral 
college or its equivalent to its intended role of nominating rather 
than electing? Is there a way of incorporating part of the legislative 
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caucus concept in the nominating process? Can the convention and the 
direct primary method be included also? Can the electoral college dis-
trict and popular election be incorporated in the final selection of 
President? Judson James in his book on parties, suggests 11greater use 
of preprimary conventions ••• , and generally th~modification of 
nomination procedures to emphasize party members." 
Starting first with the nominating process and the electoral col-
lege, its representative and judgment making character needs to be re-
turned. By having district. councilors as the electoral college for nom-
inating purposes, the number of electors would be increased over five-
fold, from 538 to3,000. The development of parties makes this proposal 
by itself unrepresentative in practice and undemocratic. If the fea-
tures of the mixed caucus were added, then a representative body would 
be cre8ted. The district councilors of each party from each of the dis-
tricts carried by that party would be supplemented in their delibera-
tions by voting delegates chosen by the party leaders within each of 
the nonparty represented districts. The vote of such delegates would 
be reduced by the percent vote less than 50 percent cast for President 
in the preceding Presidential election to keep voting strength parallel 
to party strength. The district councilors and delegates from each 
party in mixed caucus would select three nominees who would be certi-
fied as· Presidential candidates to the national convention of their re-
spective party. A variation of this method might include the possibil-
ity of nominating from the floor. That national convention· would narrow 
the field to two nominees whose names would be placed on the ballot of 
a national closed party primary. This would rest the final choice of· 
party nominee on the party members themselves. Instead of being faced 
with the complete and final decision of a convention with all of its 
recognized faults, t~e party members themselves would choose their 
Presidential nominee. They would be responsible for and bound by their 
own decision, to be subject to all its advantages and disadvantages. 
Possibly the candidate second high in number of popular votes would be 
that party's choice for Vice President. To keep electioneering ex-
penses down, this national primary should occur as soon after the con-
vention as possible, still providing time for printing ballots and pre-
paring machines for voting. By selecting the candidate most preferred 
by the party members of each party, the eligible voters in the general 
election would be more apt to be voting for their own preference rather 
than voting against someone they did not want or refusing to vote be-
cause they were not satisfied with either candidate. The electoral 
system should be designed to make actual voter choice possible. There 
may be greater significance in the choice of the nominee for each party 
than the final choice of the President-elect. If the best candidate is 
chosen from each party, then the final choice will be between the best. 
This would be much preferred to the choice of the lesser of two medi-
ocre candidates foisted upon the parties and electorate by factional 
manipulations in conventions. 
Choice of the nominee for President-elect, by electors in mixed 
caucus, delegates in convention, and party members in direct primary, 
is improved by the special function performed by each group. The mixed 
caucus, made up of district councilors serving in an observing capacity 
in Washington and a listening capacity at the state and district level, 
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would consist of persons in position to evaluate members of the Presi-
dential Council, the most likely candidates for President under the pro-
posed system. District councilors would be in a position to study po-
tential candidates at close proximity on a day-to-day basis. This would 
add greater knowledge of the qualities of potential candidates to the 
selection process. The voting delegates in the mix~d caucus would add 
a request for qualities acceptable to voters in weaker party areas. 
The second phase in selection by the convention delegates would 
entail the choice of the two of the thr~e candidates with the greater 
opportunity for winning the election. This type of decision is most 
appropriately made by convention delegates because they represent the 
party organization whose primary function is the winning of elections. 
The third phase., the actual choice of .the party nominee is best 
made by the party members in closed primary for their personal choice 
will influence their willingness to give final support in the general 
election. The three phases together should result in the selection 
of the best qualified, the strongest and the most popular candidate 
of the party. 
Increasing the democracy of the nominating process needs to be 
followed by a more accurate method of recording voter choice for Presi-
dent in the general election. The present method, as previously ex-
plained, is highly inaccurate and has already resulted in selection of 
Presidents who are not the popular choice. The most common complaint 
is against the practice of having the total electoral vote cast as a 
block for the candidate winning the plurality of that state's popular 
vote. By using the proposed council districts as Presidential election 
districts, the state electoral vote would not be cast as a block but 
would be a summation of the choices of each electoral district. The 
number of electoral votes would be increased nearly sixfold from 538 to 
3,000. The districts not voting with the plurality winning the state 
would have their votes counted as they were cast and not for the oppo-
sition candidate. By decreasing the size of the electoral college 
district, the task of recount in contested elections would be simpli-
fied. 
The substitution of the votes of the Presidential election dis-
tricts for the votes of the electoral college would do much to increase 
representation over that of the electoral college system. The expecta-
tioµ that electio~ of the Presi~ent would be regularly determined by 
the House with each state having one vat~ was intended to protect small 
s~ates. The use of the 3,000 district councilors as Presidential elec-
tors would not overbalance the selection process in their favor. A 
convocation of the.°district councilors to decide contested elections 
for President-elect and Vice President elect would be compara~le in 
size ·to the present party nominating conventions. 
Just as the advantage of the small states should be eliminated in 
such contested elections, so too the advantage of the large states 
should be eliminated in the nominating and election process. For with 
the development of parties and practice, governors and senators from 
large states have been chosen party nominees. This has been particu-
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larly true since the state electoral vote has been cast at large. Two 
changes could decrease the overwhelming advantage of the large states. 
The first would be the use of the district council districts as elec-
toral college districts and casting the electoral vote in conformity 
with the ballot decision in the district. The second would be the form-
ing of new states so that there would be less variation in population 
among the states. Potential candidates from all states could be judged 
more on their personal merit and less on the size of the state from 
which they came. Exigencies of today demand the best in leadership re-
gardless of the state of origin. If the larger the area and population 
is to give the best choice, then let that area be thewholeof the United 
States and the population be all of the people therein. 
Under the present system the development of a strong third party 
could put the major parties at its mercy by holding votes enough to 
barter in the electoral college. Minority rule or coalition might be 
established which would weaken the government. The need is not for a 
weak government, but for a strong government democratically chosen and 
democratically controlled. The proposed method of nomination and elec-
tion would be a significant step toward making this possible. 
The common complaint today is that only the rich or those who have 
access to wealth can run for the Presidency. Hubert Humphrey 1 s experi-
ence in the West Virginia campaign against John Kenned¥ is a prime ex-
ample of what can happen. The plight of the various candidates in their 
seeking funds from the Federal Elections Commission in the 1976 Presi-
dential primaries is further evidence of inequality of opportunity 
caused by lack of funds. The incumbents or those already well known 
have a tremendous advantage. The increase in primaries increase the 
advantage of wealth and/or organized special interest groups. 
This complaint about financial and incumbent advantage in the 
race for President is valid also in ta~ races for senator or governor. 
Twenty-two senators are millionaires. As population increases it 
would be far more true for new candidates for Congress than for candi-
dates for district councilor. The cost of a senatorial election is far 
greater than that of a congressman. Elimination of the state at large 
district and having three senatorial districts in each state would cut 
the cost of nomination and election to one third. Granting statehood to 
areas having three million and over population could cut election costs 
in the California area seven times. The combination of the two methods 
could cut the cost of election to the senate from the California area by 
twenty-one times. Primary and election costs of congressmen would be 
even less and those of district councilors approximately one-fifth that 
of the congressmen. See Table VI. 
Again, cutting down the size of the district would cut down the 
cost of election, thus increasing the number of potential candidates. 
The goal of increasing democracy is part of the American tradition and 
action as seen in the expansion of suffrage. Why is it not just as im-
portant to democratic government to increase the number of potential 
candidates as it is to increase the number of potential voters? 
In the past, proposals have been made that election for Congress 
61 
TABLE VI 
Approximate Cost of Election of Senators Under Proposed Plan Compared to Present Cost of Election 
of Senators From Sixteen Largest States Assuming New States of Three Million Population 
Present Proposed Proposed senatorial 
Senators Senators Senators District Population 
Entitled 2 Per Present States New as Percent of Present 
~ Rank States Po2ulation Cons;ressmen State 3 Per State States Senate State Population 
Cal. l 7 19,953,134 43 2 3 21 4.87, 
N.Y. 2 6 18,241,~66 39 2 3 18 5.5% 
Pa. 3 4 11,793,909 25 2 3 12 8.3% 
Tex. 4 4 11,196,730 24 2 3 12 8.3% 
Ill. 5 4 11,113,976 24 2 3 12 8.3% 
Ohio 6 4 10,652,017 23 2 3 12 8.3% 
~ Mich. 7 3 8,875,083 19 2 3 9 11.1% 
~ N.J. 8 2 7,168,164 15 2 3 6 16. 77. 
Fla. 9 2 6,789,443 15 2 3 6 16.7,% 
MasS. 10 2 S,689,170 12 2 3 6 16.7% 
Ind. 11 2 5, 193, 669 11 2 3 6 16.7% 
N.C. 12 2 5,082,059 11 2 3 6 16.7% 
Mo. 13 2 4,677,399 10 2 3 6 16.7% 
va. 14 2 4,648,494 10 2 3 6 16.7% 
ea. 15 2 4,589,575 10 2 3 6 16.7% 
Wis. 16 2 4,417,933 9 2 3 6 16. 7% 
Total I6 50 300 32 48 160 
Old States 
Unchanged 34 ·68 102 102 
Total 84 TiiO 150 262 
Increase in Senators to new states 112. The last colwnn indicates how much it would cost to campaign for 
proposed senate as compared to campaigning for present senate, 
and President determine a mandate and provide a Congressional majority 
to carry it out. This has been pushed in the name of party responsi-
bility. But there is a serious question about doing too much too soon 
rather than having programs better planned and executed on a more grad-
ual basis. To provide for smoother transition and avoid the trauma of 
too much politics at any one time, Presidents would be elected to hold 
office for two years as President-elect, and six years as President, 
unless removed earlier. Senators would be elected for nine-year over-
lapping terms. The members of the new single chamber Rouse would be 
elected for six-year overlapping terms with elections not taking place 
in Presidential election years. In this way each candidate, Presi-
dential-elect, senatorial, or congressional, would run on his own plat-
form and on his own merit. All district councilors would be elected at 
the same time as the President-elect and would be Presidential Electors. 
Their terms would be for two years. This would give them an opportun-
ity to run twice on their own between Presidential-elect elections. 
The senators, elected for nine-year overlapping terms, would not run 
at the same time as the President-elect. By scheduling these elections 
in proper sequence, all senators and congressmen would not be up for re-
election at the same time as the President-elect and could be free to 
seek that office, without relinquishing their own, until and if they 
became President-elect. Except for one-third of the House, once each 
eighteen years, all members of the House would be· in office and free 
to run for the Senate while incumbents.. All members of the district 
councils would be free from an election for their own office and avail-
able to run for Congress whenever there was an election in their own 
Congressional district. The use of such terms and sequence of elec-
tions would provide for a gradual change in personnel and for competi-
tion by experienced candidates for each of these offices with the ex-
ception of district councilors. Candidates for district councilor 
could come from state legislators, other state officials, mayors or 
other public minded citizens. See Table VII. 
Elections have not only been costly, traumatic, dishonest and 
divisive; they have also been too time consuming and disruptive of gov-
ernment operations. Favors have been promised and granted to gain del-
egates at conventions and votes in the elections. 
At times it seems valid to raise the question of when is there a 
bribe and who is bribing whom. There is supposed to be a distinction 
between a political donation and a bribe based on whether it occurs 
before or after an election. Does it also depend upon who offers it 
and who takes it? 
Why not use the same criterion to distinguish between a properly 
or improperly promised contract or grant made by a politician. Was 
it made before or after the election? Is it any more honest for a 
politician to bribe a voter than it is for a voter to bribe a politi-
cian? There is a special danger when an incumbent is running for of-
fice. 
Many states forbid a governor to succeed himself. As indicated 
above, Presidents should have one term for six years after serving 
two years as President-elect. House members should be limited to three 
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TABLE VII 
Periodic Table of Elections 
Year Office 
1980 DC 
Hl sl 1981 
1982 DC H2 PE 1983 
s2 1984 DC 
H3 1985 
1986 DC 
Ill s3 1987 
1988 DC 
H2 
PE 
1989 
sl 1990 DC 
n3 1991 
1992 DC 
Hl s2 1993 
1994 DC 
H2 
PE 
1995 
s3 1996 DC 
H3 1997 
1998 DC 
Hl s1 1999 
2000 DC PE 
DC District councilors elected in 1980 and biennially. 
H House elected in 1981 and one-third replaced biennially. 
s Senate elected in 1981 and one-third replaced tri-
ennially. 
PE President-elect chosen in 1982 and every sixth year 
thereafter. 
President to take office in 1984 and every sixth year there-
after. 
Superior number indicates class to be elected. 
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elected terms of six years so they could run as ·incumbents only twice 
unless they filled less than two years of an unexpired term. Senators 
would be limited as proposed to one opportunity to run as an incumbent 
unless they too were to fill out an unexpired term of less than two 
years. 
As districts get bigger campaigns become not only more costly, 
but also much longer. The longer the election period the more time 
there is to make election promises. The closer to the election the 
more promises there are to spend money and the less apt Congress is 
to tax. 
Another problem, fully as serio~s and perhaps more so, is the 
tendency for action on domestic and foreign policy to grind to a halt 
while the campaign waxes hotter. Military action may be geared to 
short run political gain, for example, the bombing halt just prior 
to the 1968 election in November. 
Government is in limbo while problems grow. How can we go through 
the trauma of an election and govern properly at the same time7 Great 
Britain limits this period of stalemate by setting a six weeks' limit 
on campaigns. The good of this country and the need for stability in 
economic and foreign policy demands that government continues while 
there is a changing of the guard. 
If we are to survive there can be no sleeping at the post or de-
sertion for a party. Security comes first and somebody has to be on 
duty at all times. The sickness of society, the emergencies of the 
country, the fine line between economic stability, inflation and un-
employment demand it. 
Under the proposed system some would not be able to run for the 
office they had because of the time limit. They could aspire to and 
compete for other offices. By increasing the competition, better of-
fice holders should be chosen. If an increase in the number of candi-
dates and the widening of choices for the appointing officers is sup-
posed to improve the quality of those appointed, then it should be 
logically assumed that competition would improve the quality of those 
elected. 
Returning to the problem of a need of continued government action 
during elections, an answer can be found for the House. Since only 
one third of its members are up for reelection, two thirds are left 
who could continue to transact business for only a majority of its 
members are required for a quorum. 
The calendars of bills under consideratio~ by the class up for 
reelection could be divided between the other two classes. Members 
up for election could make provision to vote on bills in absencia, 
a practice already used in Congress. The House under this method 
could continue in operation while those up for election were out 
campaigning. 
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APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 
Not only is democratic control through the election process .impor-
tant, but is is also important through appointment and removal. High 
appointed officials as well as elected officials have much to do with 
policy formation. It is important for the Chief Executive to be able 
to select individuals who will work with him and for him. The Presi-
dent, however, does not now have the sole power to place a person in 
office. The Constitution provides that: 
He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all 
other orficers of the United States, whose appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-
lished by. law; but the Congress may by law vest the appoint-
ment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of 
departments.46 
He.may also make interim appointments. The only provision in the Con-
stitution for the removal of persons from office requires impeachment 
by the House and conviction and removal by the Senate. In practice, 
however, the President can and does remove those appointed by him. 
If the President can remove an office holder at all, he can do so with-
out action by the Senate.47 He is limited in his removal power of 
those holding quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial positions to those 
reasons stated in the law establishing that agency with which the offi-
cial is connected.48 The attempt by Congress through the Tenure of 
Office Act to stop Andrew Johnson from removing Secretary of War Stan-
ton failed when the impeachment and trial of Johnson ended without a 
conviction. The President should not be forced to keep someone he 
dues not want. But if the Senate does have a significant part in con-
firmation, why should it not have a part in the remov.al process? If 
the President alone can remove undesirable personnel, why then should 
not the Senate alone remove undesirable personnel? The Senate should 
have the authority to remove those considered undesirable. Let the 
President be free to pick someone else, but also let the Senate be 
free to remove them. However, it should be more difficult to remove 
than to confirm. Confirmation is and would be by a majority, but re-
moval should require a two-thirds vote of the Senate, This would not 
be considered like impeachment and the vote for conviction, but would 
be a political action showing that they did not want some official in 
office plus the Constitutional power to remove. 
The importance of professionalism, career and security is recog-
nized for those competing for positions under the merit system and de-
nied ~articipation in politics, but even many of ~hose have important 
policy making duties. Those in policy making positions should be held 
more directly accountable to representatives of the µeople. Those in-
volved in policy formation or holding positions' confidential in nature, 
as in Schedule C, should be subject to Presidential appointment, con-
firmation, reconfirmation and removal as previously indicated. Indepen-
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dent regulatory cotmnission members should continue as at present to be 
removable only for the causes stated in the law establishing the com-
mission. Subjecting such other officials to reconfirmation would ma.ke 
them accountable in.the same way as those elected or appointed for spe-
cific terms. Periodic reconfirmation should not be perfunctory, but 
should be fully as thorough as initial confirmation hearings. The Sen-
ate, having had the various departments, bureaus and agencies under con-
tinuing study, would be in an excellent position to conduct such hear-
ings. 
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<!UREAUCRACY 
Democratic government is dependent upon dispersal of power, lines 
of upward cotmllunication, election, observation, control and removal 
from below. The Wilsonian Prussian model of bureaucracy is based upon 
concentration of power, lines of authority, appointment and close su-
pervision from above. It is designed for control from the top by the 
expert. The goal is efficiency in administration. In bureaucracy, as 
developed in the United States, major control is from the expert--the 
bureau chief--who is in turn controlled largely by the major pressure 
groups of his specialty. Through the leadership and influence of offi-
cials borrowed from private industry, special interests are served from 
within the government.49 In addition to the difficulties of regulation 
caused by the presence of strong partisans of the regulated groups, are 
the problems of administering the department itself. 
The goal of efficiency cited earlier is hampered by the dysfunc-
tions of bureaucracy, excessive rules, regulations, directives, proce-
dures and overspecialized and ingrown personnel. For example, PPBS 
(planning-programming-budgeting system) had to be dropped because 11it 
got caught up in the hands of people more interested-in process than 
in results. Those who put too much emphasis on the process tend t3 
stifle, not improve, performance and to forget about objectives. 115 
Efforts have been made to develop advisory committees, particu-
larly in the Department of Agriculture. These, however, are largely 
made up of clientele, still overrepresenting special interests. "In 
time, government agencie~ become lobbyists for the clientele whom 
they are supposedly regu.1.ating. 1151 An example of the demands of over-
specialization is the 11g'reat clamor, not only from inside the execu-
tive branch--all those people who have their own favorite programs--
but also from the Hill, to spend increased revenue, even while there 
is a deficit. 1152 In fact, "our reward system is such that failure 
in a ta§k environment has generally resulted in larger appropria-
tions.11~3 
The balan~ing out of special interests is supposed to occur 
through the budgetary process and be determined on a dollar basis. The 
phrase almost used was a dollar-and-cents basis, but with costs in the 
millions and billions it was hardly appropriate to use "cents. 11 A moLe 
appropriate term would be 11a dollar-and-sense basis," because money and 
policy are so closely connected. A better ordering of priorities would 
put sense before dollars and policy before money. With that emphasis, 
policy-wQuld determine the use of money, rather than having money the 
major determinant of policy. Overcentralized purchasing and the devel-
opment of a comm.on plane for the Navy and Air Force that couldn't take 
off from a carrier are examples of money as determinant of policy and 
its resulting false economy. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's 
blunder in developing the F-111 at a cost of $14 million per plane and 
a cost overrun of between $~4and $4.5 billion· found most of the test planes crashed or grounded. . 
A second example of irrational economy is the refusal of the 
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Defense Department to build nuclear-powered submarines and surface 
ships. 11The United States is spending on its strats3ic nuclear forces 
about forty per cent of what it spent at its peak." At a time when 
the Russians are expanding their nuclear-powered forces, 56 Admiral 
Rickover reveals 11a proposal of the Defense De~'rtment systems analysts 
to sink ten Polaris submarines to save money." This is in spite of 
the importance of a lack of oil in Japan 1 s defeat in World War II. The 
Mideast oil crisis is further evidence of the need of spending addition-
al funds to develop an oil free nuclear-powered force with unlimited 
range. "A six per cent i~grease in cost would increase military effec-
tiveness fifty per cent. 11 
A third example of the false economy of having money the major de-
terminant of policy, is the percentage cost of administration as a cri-
teria in a welfare program. Granted, administrative costs are signifi-
cant, but a staff so overloaded with cases that it can't keep up with 
the changes in financial conditions of recipients, and the emphasis on 
short waiting periods which hampers adequate investigation, plus the 
insistence of taking the client's word for his or her financial situ-
ation, lead to less efficiency and a poor use of money. In these cases, 
both the worthy and the chiselers may not get what is coming to them. 
Frank Goodnow's proposal to separate politics from administration 
was designed to get politics. out of bureaucracy and develop a nonpolit-
ical public servant who would treat clients on the basis of need rather 
than party affiliation. The expansion of the merit system has added 
professionalism and protection to public employees. Expertise is a 
natural by-product. At times it has added narrow vision, arrogance, 
favoritism, and overprotection. The role of the servant has been re-
versed. Singly operating as human, collectively they may be dehuman-
ized. The language of earlier times has changed and so has the spirit. 
Letters of two hundred years ago were signed, 11Your humble servant, 11 
or 11Your obedient servant." Now they are signed 11 Yours sincerely," or 
just 11Sincerely." The question is, "How sincerely!" Bob L. Wynia con-
cludes that "the more years a bureaucrat s5ends in the public service, 
the more antidemocratic his views become." 9 
Martin Landau, in the November-December, 1973, issue of Public 
Administration Review, stated that "Bureaucratic systems appear to act 
as ends in them.selves and their functionaries seem more protective of 
status and power than concerned with the search for rules of adequate 
solution. • • • Modern bureaucracy devotes inordinate amoun~6 of en-
ergy to the construction of barriers to review and account. 11 
The ninety~third congress has endeavored mightily to 
extend the Senate 1 s power to confirm presidential nomina-
tions to a wider range of executive branch officials ••• 
The Senate and the House have passed bills (S 37, S 2045, 
H.R.-11137) requiring confirmation of future appointees to 
the OMB posts • • • (director and deputy director) as well 
as of the executive secretary of the National Security 61 Council and the executive director of Domestic Council. 
Other bills have proposed confirmation for other high officials. 
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It is just as important to require the confirmation of a Henry Kis-
singer as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and 
on the National Security Council as it is for him to be confirmed as 
Secretary of State. It was as Presidential adviser for national secur-
ity affairs that he made "secret arrangements with Soviet leaders in 
1972 on the number of strategic nuclear missiles on each side. 11 This 
was done without informing Congress 11which may be a violation of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. 1162 Kissinger later denied 
this claim. In either.position, he needs to be. under the observation 
and control of more than the President alone. This is because he, like 
Kaiser Wilhelm, has been "fearful and distrustful of his bureaucracy1163 
as Smith Simpson describes him. His leadership in foreign policy fal-
ters because he fails to maintain adequate contact with his followers 
to give or receive ideas. 
Norton Long, recognizing the fact of administrative discretion and 
even administrative legislation, questions its representative character, 
11 If the bureaucrats decide for the people, then ••• does the bureauc-
racy represent the people? The process and extent of repreg~ntation 
needs to be applied to administration as well as Congress. 11 Demo-
cratic input through boards and commissions es.tablished by law or Con-
stitution if necessary, could add different or enforcing points of view 
to policy now formed in a bureaucratic fashion. At the National level 
this input is available sporadically through special commissions set up 
by the President or Congress. These tackle large problems on a crisis 
basis. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a committee of Congress, 
is an example of a government. organization for con~inuing input in pol-
icy formation. Within the Federal government there are over 2,000 ad-
visory grou5s, but most of them are technical and represent special 
interests. 6 
The use of boards and connnissions for quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial purposes is a long established practice. The independent reg-
ulatory commissions at the national and state level are ample evidence 
of this. Boards and councils are used for governing schools, cities 
and counties. The function of the board, commission, or council is to 
form policy, set up rules and regulations and hold hearings. The exe-
cution of the policy is usually left under the more immediate direction 
of a single administrator, An extension of these principles of organi-
zation to the executive branch would incr.ease the opportunity for 
greater variety of input in policy formation, establishment of rules 
and regulations and holding hearings. Method of ·selection, terms, 
qualifications, and distribution of board members are significant in 
the representation process. 
Questions of conflict of interest arise relative to administrators, 
legislators and judges, These same questions are pertinent to board 
members. They should not preclude completely the opportunity for those 
most vitally concerned from serving on such boards, but some method is 
required to counterbalance the possible overrepresentation of special 
interests •. This is done elsewhere by providing publi.c members of 
boards. Public members of boards should be used and make up over half 
the members on any board or commission. The choice of members of the 
board requires taking additional factors into consideration. 
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The distribution of board membership is significant in the repre-
sentative process. This includes party, profession, sex, age, economic 
level or interest and geography as some of the criteria. Regardless of 
which party wins the Presidency or Congress, the people of this country 
are not all members of that party. If party is a factor in the dis-
tribution of seats on committees in Congress where policy and laws are 
determined, then party should be considered in distributing positions 
on boards which form policy and review rules and regulations having 
the force and effect of law. 
Profession is important because those having the same profession 
tend to form cliques, advocate their own cause, see things from their 
specialist point of view and protect their own interest. This includes 
military personnel, planners, economists and engineers. Another is the 
legal profession which is greatly overrepresented in government rela-
tive to the number of lawyers in the total population. 
Common sayings, which cannot be taken too literally, still have an 
important element of truth that bears consideration. Some which are 
applicable to the present example would be as follows. It is the busi-
ness of the law to make business for the law. Lawyers overrepresented 
in legislatures and Congress write laws to require the services of a 
lawyer. Chief Justice Burger, addressing the American Law Institute in 
Washington in May, 1974, "urged members to use their influence to sim-
plify procedure and reduce legal costs in two areas--the probating of 
wills and the purchasing of homes. 1166 They live by what is the law and 
go by the letter rather than by the spirit of it. Living on the edge 
of the law they may court disaster and slip over the edge into the il-
legal. The large proportion of lawyers involved in Watergate is evi-
dence of this. There are many fine lawyers and law can be an honorable 
profession, but more has to be done by the AmeriCan Bar Association and 
state and local bar associations to make it so. The disbarment of for-
. mer Vice President Agnew and the accompanying criticism of him may do 
much to reestablish the status to which this profession should be en-
titled. 
Other professions and businesses, including the medical, planning, 
banking contracting, fuel and automotive, can also do much soul search-
ing to control their own people and improve their public image. Lead-
ers of all of these and other groups, the experts, can be hired as con-
sultants when needed. They shouldn't be overrepresented on boards or 
be on boards where their decisions involve conflict of interest. Bal-
ance, on the board, of interests including consumer interest is impor-
tant. Board members should be chosen for breadth of view, not just 
for a special area of interest or training. 
They should be chosen for their competence, not for their sex; but 
competent people of both sexes can be found. The same is true for 
race. A paraphrase of the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Amendments would 
read, "The right of the citizens of the United States to board member-
ship and policy formation shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any state on account of race or sex." The right to vote 
is not enough. Participation in policy formation after the election is 
over is fully as important. The same holds true for those of different 
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ages and economic levels or interests. If policy determining positions 
are held primarily by those of wealth, the point of view of wealth will 
largely prevail. If the oil interests are overrepresented by a Kerr or 
a Johnson, there needs to be some counterbalance. 
Geography is generally accepted as being important in representa-
tion. States have their senators, congressmen their districts. Sena-
torial courtesy generally helps keep patronage distributed geograph-
ically. But with the concentration of policy formation in the Executive 
Office of the President and especially in the hands of the President and 
his close advisers, the question of where the advice comes from geo-
graphically is especially important. During President Kennedy 1s admin-
istration, with some notable exceptions such as Theodore Sorensen, much 
advice came from around the Boston area. President Johnson gradually 
found more advice from the Southwest. President Nixon seemed to get 
much of his from California. Boston and Florida have gained somewhat 
as sources·. 
These advisers were appointed by the President, who develops a 
clique or entourage as he campaigns for office. He may inherit advisers 
from his predecessor. To offset this narrow selection of advisers, 
election of boards or commissions by the senate would provide a broader 
choice of talent as each senator would tend to propose for consideration 
those within his constituency. Some would claim that this idea is pro-
vincial. But what areas do the constituencies cover1 They cover the 
whole of the United States. To provide a second scree~ing if it seemed 
desirable, the persons e_lected would be subject to confirmation by the 
House. Through this method, variation and Balance in points of view 
would be avai.lable in the policy making process. Consumer or voter com-
plaints come too late after the_ loss is suffered or the damage is done. 
Democratic input in policy formation at an earlier stage in the govern-
mental process might prevent some of this loss or damage. Granted, it 
might not; but if it didn't, the people and their elected representa-
tives would have only themselves to blame. Through increased democracy 
the power of big government would be cut down to a more manageable size. 
Adding similar boards or committees up and down the line of the de-
partments would make administrators more responsive to the public and 
less in need of tighter administrative control. 
The growth of bureaucracy at the national level has frustrated 
those proposing new programs. It has been said that if you want to ruin 
a new program, put it into an old agency. This accounts in part for the 
placing of some of the new programs in the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident. This has added to the super bureaucracy of that office. The 
Brownlow Committee recommended control agencies in the Executive Office, 
such as budget and personnel. They made no recommendation that operat-
ing agencies be placed there. Personnel and operations in the Executive 
Office of the President should be kept at a minimum. If operations of 
regular departments are not adequate, organization and personnel changes 
should be made. The answer is not to continue to create new agencies 
but to make proper use of the ones already in existence. If new agen-
cies are required, then the functions of old agencies should be reevalu-
ated, and transfer or elimination considered. Placing of new programs 
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in new agencies brings a sudden influx of aew personnel instead of a 
redirection of·the old. New programs need some special consideration 
.but also need to be balanced out against other demands for government 
action. To avoid some of the necessity for later reorganization greater 
initial consideration should be given to the proper long range location 
of such an agency. Temporary independence or overprotection should be 
avoided and the agency located in one of the established departments un-
le&s the size of the program or other viable criteria indicate other-
wise. Competition for funds or personnel within a department are inter-
nal controlling factors in determining priorities and tend to keep new 
programs within manageable limits. Placing new programs in old depart-
ments would rejuvenate them and avoid the continuance of a self-perpetu-
ating bureaucracy making work for itself just to survive. Increased 
opportunity for lateral entry into all of the primarily policy making 
positions, even those at the bureau level and below, would aid in the 
rejuvenation of the departments. Lateral transfer even at the lowest 
level and including field workers might also be beneficial. 
Lateral transfer of personnel within and between departments, bu-
reaus, and agencies can be used to break up cliques, provincialism, and 
-networks of special privilege and even dishonesty. This principle is 
valid for all government, no matter what branch or level. Police and 
foreign service personnel are regularly reassigned. State Department 
employees are reassigned between countries and between home office and 
overseas. Similar transfer could take place between Washington and re-
gional offices for other departments. The transfer of personnel can 
add variety of experience and broader understanding. It can break up 
opportunities for favoritism. The merit system, designed to take pol-
itics out of bureaucracy to provide equality of treatment to clients, 
has developed a bureaucracy of experts granting special privileges to 
special interests. 
A new trend in the merit system is needed to replace specialists, 
within reason and as rapidly as possible, by generalists of high qual-
ity relative to competence. Special-i.sts are needed in some positions. 
They are irreplaceable in certain positions, but those positions should 
be kept at a minimum primarily for two reasons, cost and provincialism • 
. It costs more to use personnel overtrained for positions. More to the 
point, overspecialization develops its own provincialism and narrowness 
of view with a resulting inability to recognize or care about many of 
the ramifications or side effects of proposals. The ends may be so 
intensely desired that the means and implications become secondary. 
This narrowness of viewpoint may include the feeling that Washing-
ton has all the answers, that states and localities need to conform to 
decisions made in the National capitol. Rules, regulations and direc-
tives increase. Guidelines beginning with a threat ••• and running 
to 46 pages have been sent to agencies participating in the Medicare 
program. 57 They feel that the states and localities don't know what 
is best for them, nor could they know, because they are understaffed 
and don't have their own corps of specialists. They are partly under-
staffed because of so much red tape. The feeling on the part of some 
seems to be that Washington has a corner on the talent available for 
government service. Their belief is that the states could not get 
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competent personnel to handle these programs, but states are big enough 
now to develop personnel to handle these problems. If some of the Fed-
eral bureaucracy were phased out, that same talent would be freed to 
work in state government doing the same type of work for less money • 
.Salary incentives could be used to attract the few experts otherwise 
unattainable within a state. Persons now employed by the Federal gov-
ernment could work for the states instead of vice versa. An expanded 
Council of State Governments could facilitate sharing of research so 
that state talent and ideas could be made more generally available 
throughout the United States. 
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COURTS 
Courts and justices have had a special place ·in governmental sys-
tems. In some, the court has been a political arm of the government 
to do the bidding of the executive. In others it has been a law unto 
itself as in the star chamber proceedings in France. Under the Brit-
ish and American systems it has sought to be impartial. Individuals 
are considered innocent until proven guilty. To protect the court from 
outside pressure and promote its function of impartial judgment, judges 
have been given the security of long term in office with no decrease in. 
pay. Article III, Section I in the Constitution states, "The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts shall hold their Offices during 
good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services, 
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance 
in Office. 11 This was construed to forbid their paying Federal income 
ta~, in that it would lower their salary. However, in the case of 
0 1Malley v. Woodrough, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court 
stated that 11to subject them (United States Judges) to a general tax 
is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their 
particular function in government does not generate an itmnunity from 
sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the govern-
ment whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering. 1168 
As citizens they should not only pay their fair share of taxes to real-
ize what it is like to pay taxes, they should also contribute to their 
own retirement. Under present law, judges can retire at full pay at 
the age of 65 after 15 years service or at 70 after 10 years service. 
The only justification for full pay upon retirement is to encourage re-
tirement. This noncontributory pension plan does little to make judges 
feel what it -is like to be a citizen with full responsibility for each 
to pay his own way. 
The intent of long term and stable nonreducible salary is to pro-
vide for independence of the judiciary and to keep the courts out of 
politics. But over ninety percent of judges appointed by a Republican 
President are Republicans .and the same percentage ho~~s true for Demo-
crats being appointed judge by a Democrat President. Between 1933 
and 1963, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy made a 
total of 799 appointments to federal judgeships at all levels; of them, 
61, or less that 8 percent, were to nominees of 11 the other Party. 11 It 
seems strange that party seems so significant in the qualification of 
an impartial judge. It looks as though the judge is taking his poli-
tics with him. Presidents pick men for judges who are basically sym-
pathetic to their own political philosophy. There is nothing strange 
about this, but there are political implications. 
President Nixon appointed four justices to the Supreme Court, in-
cluding a chief justice. This is especially significant, because the 
Chief Justice, by terms of the Constitution, is to preside at the trial 
of a President following impeachment. There are important implications 
if a President's appointee presides at his trial. Should this be per-
mitted? President Roosevelt appointed nine members. Under the circum-
stances of the possibility of such strong influence or control over the 
judicial system and the increase of the President's role as chief leg-
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islator, are we not back to the problem facing Montesquieu when he pro-
posed the separation of powers. Madison 1s concept of checks and bal-
ances as developed in relation to the Presidency has left the President 
with more checks on the other branches than they have on him and has 
created an imbalance in his favor. A method of removing the President's 
check on the court would be to have the justices of the Supreme Court 
elected by Congress. A large proportion of the congressmen are lawyers; 
and they, particularly as lawyers, would· be qualified ~o choose someone 
from their own profession to be a justice. The Senate did refuse to 
confirm Haynsworth and Carswell. The Senate would have the- role of 
confirming, or refusing to confirm, the candidate elected by Congress. 
Since the Supreme Court has moved away from judicial self-restraint and 
into what was formerly called political thickets and has made more sig-
nificant changes than Congress in some areas such as civil rights, the 
court should be considered' to be making policy. In 
modifying, interpretation or declaring unconstitutional, 
provisions of federal law restricting the rights of unpop-
ular or even widely detested minorities--military desert-
ers, Communists, and alleged bootleggers, the Supreme Court 
tends to oppose law making majorities and the majority of 
their constituents. It is said that the judges, after all, 
inherit an ancient tradition and an acknowledged role in 
setting higher standards of justice and right than the ma-
jority of citizens or their representatives might otherwise 
demand. 70 
At the same time they are 11setting higher standards of justice and 
right" they may be setting lower standards of morality and defense. 
This conflict between the rights of individuals and groups is parallel 
to the right of an individual to pollute, and groups of ecologists to 
oppose. Pollution of the mind or the defense system is just as impor-
tant a problem as the pollution of air or water. Prevention of strip 
mining in one case might be similar to an attempt to prevent, in an-
other. As the Court moves contrary to the representatives and their 
constituents, each acting within their constitutional limitations, it 
acts contrary to democracy, and begins to make policy. If the court 
is making policy, then it should be· subject to some form of democratic 
control; for it should not be an agent to itself and subject to no one. 
Appointment of judges to serve during good behavior, protects the 
court and its independence in deciding individual cases, but it does 
not permit.removal for mental or physical disability. It does not per-
mit adequate periodic renewal of the court. The time of renewal de-
pends on death and resignation, not on physical and mental deteriora-
tion. Replacement is erratic, not gradual. 
Recall, used by a few states, would be another possible method for 
removing unwanted or unfit judges for whatever reason. However, a na-
tionwide popular vote for recall of Supreme Court justices would be too· 
costly. Another method would be to require reconfirmation of each 
judge by the senate on the tenth anniversary of his original confirma-
tion, and each tenth year thereafter as proposed by Robert Byrd of West 
Virginia. By having reconfirmation at a specific time, the judge's 
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qualification would not be taken into cons1deration because of any spe-
cific last moment decision but would be determined on the basis of his 
overall record. If it is proper to raise questions about decisions 
made by a judge prior to original confirmation as in the Haynsworth and 
Carswell cases and the Stevens confirmation, why is it not proper to 
raise questions about his record as a Supreme Court Justice in deter-
mining reconfirmation. Reconfirmation proceedings should be just as 
thorough as those for the original confirmation. In deciding qualifi-
cations for original confirmation, to avoid the question of undue spe-
cial influence, judges should agree to having their funds placed in a 
blind trust before taking the oath of office, and to not accepting out-
side funds for personal use during service on the bench. They should 
refrain from being involved in political controversy, and should not be 
a close adviser to the President, as was Abe Fortas. Their role as 
judge is different from a lawyer's role as advocate. They should not 
be judges on the bench and advocates of specific public causes at the 
same time. Their actions, statements and activities should not be such 
as to detract from the traditional impartial role of judges. Just as 
they determine the limits of the Presidency or Congress in relation to 
the separation of powers, they also have a responsibility in recogniz-
ing their own limits. 
A more politicized court, characterized by less judicial self-
restraint would logically lead to a need for increased democratic con-
trol. The method proposed above might be·used to check individual jus-
tices, as a means of bringing the Supreme Court back into tune with the 
law making majority, or of recognizing that the justice and the court 
were supported by the confirming body. Chief Justice Earl Warren would, 
with little doubt, have been reconfirmed in 1963 following ten years of 
service on the Supreme Court. 
A method directed toward action relating to specific decisions 
should involve more than the original confirming body of individual jus-
tices. Amending the Constitution requires action of both Congress and 
the states. Ratification of amendments is considered by the states in 
a rather haphazard manner. State legislatures do not all face up to 
the issue at the same time. Delay may have its advantages, but timely 
action is not one of them. The Court is upheld by default. Since the 
Supreme Court sometimes reverses itself, can it then be considered in-
fallible. in its decisions? Should it be the final arbiter, or should 
the final arbiter be more representative of the people? A means of in-
cluding Congress and representatives of the state in overruling the Su-
preme Court can be found in the voting method recommended foF the sin-
gle chamber Congress. A three fourths concurrent majority would be re-
quired to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. This would be the 
equivalent of action by Congress and three fourths of the states through 
their elected representatives as now required for amending the Consti-
tution. If further protection of the states seemed necessary, an addi-
tional reqqirement of a three fourths vote of district councilors voting 
as states, could be added. 
Greater emphasis should be placed on speedy trials as guaranteed 
in the Sixth Amendment. Greater effort should be made to eliminate un-
due delay, whether caused by overcrowded court dockets, lack of action 
79 
FEDERALISM AND COMMUNITY 
There is no substitute for community solidarity in a democracy. 
A stable connnunity tends to be self-governing. Thomas Jefferson was 
fully aware of its strength at the time of his embargo. The Greeks, 
at the time of the city states, conscious of the importance of strength 
in the city considered the question of proper size. As the cities of 
the United States grew, they were divided into wards. With the rapid 
growth of cities and government reform to give greater control to the 
elite through election of councilmen at large, some of the representa-
tion and sectionalism of the city was taken away. 
Following urban sprawl, annexation, the growth of metropolitan 
areas and big government, there was a drive for efficiency, economy and 
consolidation. In the drive for centralization of the large govern-
mental units or singleness of administration, there came an overconsoli-
dation. 
One large prison would be built instead of regional centers of cor-
rection. Local educational facilities were abandoned. Schools were 
consolidated. Pupils were shuttled about from one place to another. 
Classes became overcrowded. Students went on ha~f-day sessions. Dis-
cipline problems increased. More emphasis was placed on counseling, 
some being required because there was too little personal attention 
available elsewhere. 
Metropolitan areas grew and the larger they became, the sharper 
was the resource gap favoring the suburbs. 11 Core cities, problems 
mounting, losing tax resources, controlled in bits snd pieces by its 
bureaucracy, beca~e ungovernable. Much of the policy making and con-
trol was taken from governing bodies and given to administration. 
The rush was from the personal relations of the primary group to 
the impersonal of the secondary groups. Individuals became numbers. 
The big house, the state prison, was typical. Individuals receiving 
other governmental services became lost in the crowd. Persons in soci-
ety lost their identity, sense of being, and sense of belonging. Reis-
man aptly describes it in The Lonely Crowd. 
Then primary groups began to be identified within the secondary. 
The need for personal, instead of impersonal, relationships was being 
partially fulfilled. The cottage system was established in some insti-
tutions to instill some group and community identification. This was 
but a step in the right direction. 
Instead of a premium being offered to further consolidation, a 
premium should be offered to discourage it. Effort should be made to 
improve the communities we have, rather than destroy them. Each com-
munity and neighborhood should be a fit place in which to live. 
The concept of divide and conquer is as true in government as it 
is in warfare. Cutting problems down in size can decrease the number 
of personnel required. Decreasing the responsibility or duties of 
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positions can lessen the amount of professional training needed to fill 
them. Lessening the training required can provide more jobs for local 
people. Simplifying the administration by decreasing the size of the 
unit would require less assistance from professional outside consul-
tants. A Bedford Stuyvesant could come closer to managing its.own 
school system. 
The drive for efficiency brought consolidation. Consolidation, 
although expected to, did not save.money. The main purposes of a bet-
ter educated citizenry and better cormnunities were lost in t_he drive 
for consolidation. Bigger schools became a goal in themselves. Classes 
became larger at the same time. 
There is no substitute for the personal attention which a teacher 
can give to students in a small class, particularly in kindergarten and 
in the early grades. Here the teacher can be a second mother and in 
many cases be the closest thing to a real mother. This is the time to 
teach good principles, the things that really count above and beyond 
counting itself. 
If children achieve academically at a higher level because they 
are given personal attention, self-confidence, a good self-image and 
more is expected of them, they can also achieve higher moral standards 
for the same reasons. Considering the social cost in misery and the 
econ·omic cost in taxes, there are sufficient reasons to emphasize high 
moral standards in school for the protection of both individuals and 
society. 
The family is the best place to teach this, but if it isn't done 
there, it should be done in church or in school. In school, all of the 
children of the community are together. Here they mingle together to 
share what standards they have or don't have. Having them together in 
small classes under close supervision, more can be done to maintain and 
improve standards than is possible in crowded conditions with little 
supervision. 
In the long run, cutting problems down to manageable size can de-
crease the total cost of government. Those given proper consideration 
and treatment in the education system are less apt to need it in a 
penal system. The loss of freedom and identity in modern highly urban-
ized society can be adjusted to by learning self-respect, consideration 
of others and self-control in a small group situation under the gui-
dance of a teacher who cares. The choice of teachers requires consid-
ering. not only method and subject matter, but also personal character. 
As time goes ·on, the latter becomes more and more important. 
In the attempt to develop mass production in education and govern-
ment to match mass production in industry, the realization of the most 
important difference between them was lost. Mass production in indus-
try is based upon uniformity and interchangeable parts. But students 
are not machines made up of identical parts with interchangeable hearts 
and brains, they are individuals who need more personal attention than 
is available in overconsolidated schools. 
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As individual schools and communities were swallowed up, overcon-
solidation and overcentralization with its accompanying inefficiencies 
resulted. It sapped the strength of communities and destroyed many, 
and the system and cities as they grew approached the unmanageable. 
What started with local and state control with the Federal govern-
ment having its own sphere of operation and was called dual federalism, 
has been followed by cooperative federalism. This cooperative federal-
ism in which national and state activities have been intermixed was fol-
lowed by Johnson's creative federalism. This was nationally directed 
and used both governmental and nongovernmental agencies to carry out its 
programs. States had less and less control over programs. as they were 
bypassed by direct grants of money to communities and nongovernmental 
units. 
In spite of attempts to regain state.control, administrative fed-
eralism and revenue sharing have continued to strengthen the national 
and local governments at the expense·· of the states. Michael Reagan sug-
gests that this trend may go through permissive federalism (his term) to 
the unitary system by the eighties.72 That is in the next decade. 
States have little time to unite and protect themselves from further 
Federal encroachment. 
The unitary· system would come at too high a price, one exacted in 
taxes and in the liberty of its citizens to plan on a state basis. Liv-
ing in any society has some cost, the loss of some liberty. But being 
subservient to a larger government can be more of a burden and policies 
may be harder to change under it than under a smaller one. 
say, 
Describing conditions in large American cities, Fantini and Gittell 
The great similarity in institutionalization of urban 
services under a highly centralized system is evident in 
all large American cities. Innovation is rare in these 
large systems. Professionalism, centralization, and in-
tricate bureaucratic development are major detriments to 
innovation.73 
But if and when change comes, its wide application may mean the 
adoption of a new.policy which hasn't been adequately tested, rather 
than adoption for experimentation in a smaller area. The unitary sys-
tem of government would simply·increase these problems, not arithmet-
ically but geometrically. 
Gottfried Dietze em4hasizes the importance of federalism as a basis 
for popular government.7 De Tocqueville stated that centralization 
comes naturally, democracy comes by reflection. The time has• come for 
deliberate economic and political decentralization, which is necessary 
not only for domestic strength, growth and development, but also for 
strategic strength in national defense. 
For the latter especially, it is necessary to deploy defense es-
tablishments, automotive, aircraft and space industry, and governmental 
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units so that what is left after initial damage in case of attack can 
operate at maximum efficiency. Overconcentration can lead to blackmail 
and massive attack. The Cuban Missile Crisis is ample evidence of that 
possibility. 
Further evidence of the need for economic and political decentral-
ization can be seen in the disparity between the per capita income of 
central city inhabitants and persons living in surrounding suburbs. 
Lineberry and Sharkansky as noted above, state that 11 the larger the 
metropolitan area, the sharper the gap favoring the suburbs •11 In ma-
terial they quoted from the U.S. Bureau of Census, the ideal m'~ropol­
itan area would have a population between 250,000 and 500,000. 
Granted, there are geographic, economic and political limit-ations, 
but industry, commercial enterprises and communities can be relocated 
and established through tax incentives and other encouragement, such as 
those recommended by the Advisory Cormnission on Intergovernmental.Rela-
tions in 1968.76 New ones can not only be established, but they and 
older ones can also be protected, both in economic base and in local 
control. The tax incentives referred to above would be federal corpo-
rate tax rebates or allowances and not local property tax exemptions. 
They would be designed to favor metropolitan areas of less than 500,000. 
Through changes in Federal government policy, states and cormnuni-
ties could reassert more control over functions traditionally theirs. 
They could act more for themselves and less as agents of the National 
government. Dahl says, "Even though the most pressing questions of the 
day cannot be de-nationalized, the existence of local autonomy helps to 
free_the national arena for precisely these national i-ssues. 1177 
James L. Sundquist states, "The conscious policy of the Federal 
government as a whole--and, hopefully, the state gov,9nments as well--
should be to defer increasingly to local judgments." The same concept 
should be followed by the Federal government in its relationship to 
States. The conscious policy of the Federal government as a whole 
should be to defer increasingly to state judgment. In both cases the 
Federal government should exert leadership, but let the state and local 
level decide whether and in what way to follow. 
Leland Baldwin, in his book, Reframing the Constitution, talks of 
combining states into regions 11as a means of decentralizing Federal 
functions and power. 11 But he cQncedes that these new region states 
might become "nascent nations. 1179 To achieve his purpose of decentral-
izing and yet avoid the possibility of developing nascent nations, the 
answer might well be to give statehood to subregions within the present 
states. Charles Merriam in the 1930s proposed that Chicago, New York, 
and ·other large cities and their immediate areas become separate city 
statesBO so that they could control their own politics and have greater 
representation at the national level. The increases in state popula-
tion and the increase in complications of government since then would 
lead to a greater need for his proposal now than when he first made it. 
Reapportionment of state legislatures alone has not given the 
cities what they want. Subdividing the bigger states might cut their 
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problems down to manageable size. The present move to city county con-
solidation might go another step to include the state. By making these 
city states big enough to include the suburbs of the metropolitan area, 
there would be one government for the whole metropolitan unit. A New 
York City State could solve its own problems without the hindrance or 
help of upstate New York so often condemned by the City. Metropolitan 
areas, centers of wealth and poverty could solve their own problems. 
Creation of single member districts within the city state could 
provide_ for the variety of representation necessary to protect the var-
ied interests of its people. By interstate compacts, the sections of a 
metropolitan area could combine into a single city state. By using 
three million as a quota for a state, the New York City Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Area would be a combination of four states with 
that amount of representation. 
By using three million, the mean in population between the large 
and small states, as the quota only six Standard Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Area would have over that amount, They would be New York, Los An-
geles-Long Beach, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit and San Francisco-
Oakland. 
By using this quota with the concept of moiety in determining addi-
tional representation when half the quota was reached, California would 
become seven states; New York, six; Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania and 
Texas, four; Michigan, three; Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia, two; and Wisconsin 
would have nearly enough population to become two states. This would 
make a total of thirty-three new states or thirty-four when Wisconsin 
increased sufficiently in population, With the stipulation· that no 
state would lose statehood, that would make a total of eighty-three or 
eighty-four states. Each of these might well be a more governable unit. 
A commission type of government could be established to govern 
metropolitan areas of over three million. -Each area having three mil-
lion population would become a separate city state. Those city states 
within the metropolitan area would be further organized into a super-
state. The superstate would have a commission type government to co-
ordinate the government of the separate city states. The mayor of each 
of the separate city states would be a member of the governing commis-
sion of the ·superstate. The superstate could serve as a special dis-
tric.t for all functions which needed metropolitan wide coordination. 
The superstate would have power to tax and spend in functional areas 
specified by the city states. 
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DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY 
Political liberty and economic liberty are closely intertwined. 
John.Locke believed in the inalienable right of man to life, liberty and 
property. 
Americans of two hundred years ago were complaining about the 
abuses of the British mercantile system and sought political liberty 
that they might have economic liberty. But freedom alone was not 
enough. Innnediately after the Revolution, the new United States suf-
fered from actions of British merchants designed to destroy the little 
industry remaining in the former British colonies. Tariffs designed to 
protect these infant industries were enacted following Hamilton's pro-
posal of a Plan of Manufactures. 
Passing through greater freedom from government control in the new 
economic era following the Revolution, business grew with the help of 
patents, tariffs and· other government aid. Inadequately controlled by 
state or national government, trusts developed, monopolizing banking, 
manufacturing and trade. Farmers were taken advantage of by railroads 
and milling interests, paralleling recent actions by truckers,.packing 
plants, oil companies .and wheat dealers. 
Antitrust laws were passed correcting· some of the abuses. Others 
continued. Distinction was made between good and bad combinations in 
restraint of trade. The danger of bigness per se was not recognized by 
Theodore Roosevelt or the courts. Frontiers were still open at the 
time for those blocked by the trusts. They could still go west. 
These frontiers, now gone for smaller businessmen, remain open only 
for huge corporations and conglomerates within the United States and 
overseas. We are now in an era of neo mercantilism with huge corpora-
tions a government unto themselves, inadequately controlled under the 
antitrust laws. This modern mercantilism is fully as stifling to some 
Americans as was the earlier British mercantilism. Giving political 
donations to gain special concessions, placing leading company e~icu­
tives in high government positions in the executive departments, in-
dependent regulatory commissions and the World Bank, business protects 
its own interests, expects and receives special privileges. Widespread 
ownership of property has been hindered by concentration and control of 
wealth by multinational corporations both in this country and abroad. 
The overseas flight of capital went in search of cheap labor and 
windfall profits, Aided and abetted by the Marshall Plan, it went in 
part becaus~ of unwillingness to face competition at home. The Marshall 
Plan, following World War II, was probably necessary to avoid a depres-
sion. There was great merit to it on humanitarian grounds. But it was 
not an unmixed blessing. There was some waste, Other aid was later 
used against us. 
The more highly industrialized countries which received the greater 
part of the economic aid used it to improve their productive machinery. 
Germany's rebuilt steel mills were completely modernized and were ahead 
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of United States mills in modernization st that time. We loaned them 
money to build facilities that could outcompete us. 
The European Common Market, encouraged and aided by the United 
States and its capital, is a stronger competitor now because of our 
assistance. Naturally, more interested in protecting their own coun-
tries, they acted in concert against us and, for an example, excluded 
the Americans from their broiler market in Germany to satisfy the 
French. As could have been expected, they continue to look out for 
their interests first. 
From 1947 to 1974, as reported by Representative Gross of Iowa 
in debate in Congress on January 23 of that year, the United States 
spent over $260 billion in Foreign Aid. 82 Much of American assistance 
funds, not used to develop competition against American business, has 
been used for "valueless objects such as roads to airports, luxury ho-
tels and office buildings11 as stated by Congressman Long of Maryland 
in his objection to R.R. 11354, a bill to grant an additional $1.5 8 . billion in soft loans to the International Development Association. 3 
Congressman Miller concluded the debate by saying, 
Let us barter this aid for bauxite, lead, chrome, and 
all of those metals we need or will need to run our economy 
and maintain our life styles. If we do not act now to stock-
pile critical raw materials, we will soon face a mineral cri-
sis and future generations of Americans will have to go beg-
ging for them.8'1-
Congress refused the requests for the $1.5 billion by World Bank Presi-
dent Robert McNamara by a vote of 248 to 155. This was in spite of 
strong support by Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz. 
A recurring theme and probably the strongest objection to the bill 
was opposition to its soft loan feature. Designed as interest free 
loans to underdeveloped countries, receiving nations charge 12 to 20 
percent to their own farmers and small businessmen for these· funds. 
Complaints were made against loaning money practically interest free 
to foreign countries at the same time that potential homeowners and 
small businessmen were paying much higher rates in this country. 
Using a similar principle of low-rate loans in the United States 
and lowering the rates of interest for home contruction, not even com-
ing close to making it interest free as in the IDA proposal would in-
crease building and get Americans less auto and more home oriented. 
Selective credit controls as proposed by the National Urban Coalition 
would also make additional funds available for home loans at a lower 
rate of intereat.85 
Seeing some of these and other unfortunate results of overseas in-
vestments, what can we do to reverse the trend~ Overseas appropria-
tions can be decreased. A tax on the income of United States citizens 
or corporations from whatever source or wherever derived might help 
reverse the outflow of American capital. This would return it to, or 
keep it in the United States for investment purposes. 
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With this increase in domestic funds, more money might be avail-
able at lower interest for home building. Today the reverse is true. 
High interest once considered usury is now the usual, and home build-
ing is down. The 11 $28 billion home credit crunch" is enriching the 
banks with the help of the Federal Reserve Board.86 High interest 
rates set by the Board to curb inflation 11represent an added cost of 
doing business and tend to be inflation~ry in and of themselves when 
hikes are passed down to the customer. 11 ~7 Increases in interest rates 
are deceptive. A change in rate from 7 to 8 percent looks like a one 
percent increase, whereas the additional percent is 1/7 the amount of 
the previous rate. This is the equivalent of a 14 and 2/7 percent in-
crease in the cost of interest to the borrower. 
The principles of the Founding Fathers have been turned around 
not only in appropriations and interest but also in taxation. Under 
the Constitution, .. the intent was to levy taxes, to raise revenue, to 
pay the debts, provide for the cotmnon defense and general welfare. 
General welfare itself was left to the states. The tariffs were to 
control foreign and interstate c0tmnerce. A Bank of the United States 
was created to control the currency and stop some of the speculation 
of the state banks. The state of Maryland enacted a law taxing the 
federal bank notes to try to drive the Bank of United States out of 
Maryland. In the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice 
Marshall·stated, "The power to tax is the power to destroy11 and ruled 
Maryland's tax unconstitutional. The states did not have the power to 
destroy a federal instrumentality by taxing it to death. 
Today, because of the federal income tax, it is now the states 
themselves that are being destroyed. Their power is being taken away 
from them through the grant-in-aid system supported primarily by the 
federal income tax. The claim is that the states are actually doing 
more, that they have more power, but much of what they do is done in-
creasingly for the National government. The argument sometimes used 
in defense of grants-in-aid is that the states don't have to take it 
if they don 1 t want to. That argument doesn't stand up. The intent 
is there to influence. 
Grants-in-aid do distort state ~pending. They tend to encourage 
wasteful or low yield undertakings. 8 State correctional and rehabil-
itational institutions have been neglected for years because funds 
have been drawn elsewhere by grants-in-aid, Overspending is justified 
by saying that if we don 1 t get it, someone else will. Waste occurs in 
interstate highway contruction because it costs the states less to 
complete ill-conceived projects and receive 90 percent back from the 
Federal government than it would to abandon the project when the mis-
takes were found while far less was spent. Waste occurs because money 
is not put in places of greatest need. It occurs beg~use planners and 
engineers are not realistic in their cost estimates. The list is 
endless. 
The Federal aid projects are paying higher salaries and attract-
ing former state employees to do the same work in the same place for 
more money. Welfare funds are being wasted. Federal reports state 
that grants are improper in 40 percent of the cases. If states were 
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spending their own money, much of this incorrect payment would be elim-
inated. The Federal income tax has turned the financial situation 
around. In the Marbury case it was the power to tax that was the power 
to destroy. Now it is the power to spend based on the power to tax 
that can be used to destroy. Today the dictum in the Marbury case is 
true, but now it is the states which need the protection. Revenue shar-
ing is a start in the right direction. The income tax, not added until 
1913, should be used for national purposes, especially national defense; 
and that portion not needed should be returned to the states to be spent 
by them according to. their own priorities. Revenue sharing is a start 
in the right direction, but the money sent directly to communities may 
place much of it where it is not needed. Rich suburbs may get too much, 
while poorer core cities or poor rural areas get too little. Funneling 
these grants through the states with the use of need and tax effort as 
criteria could make more equitable distribution possible. 
Grantmanship90 and the development of Washington offices by the 
bigger cities will develop Federal grants into a modern pork barrel that 
will far overshadow the old rivers and harbors bills. To avoid the 
problem of determining priorities for such a multitude of requests on 
a national scale, revenue sharing should go directly to the states and 
into the general fund.· By this method, the various relative community 
needs could be determined Within the state itself. The old argument 
of rural domination of the legislature is no longer valid following re-
apportionment. Granted, suburban areas and middle sized cities might 
not see eye to eye with core city needs, but that should.only help in 
the compromise part of politics. 
Revenue sharing money is now being spent for capital goods and 
things, not services. It is not being used for services or lowering 
taxes because Congress can 1 t be trusted to continue the sharing. A 
law or an amendment clarifying the distribution of the receipts of the 
Federal income tax, reserving a fair share for national expenses, espe-
cially national defense, would eliminate much of the uncertainty in-
volved in planning state budgets. 
If increased war expenses were necessary, Congress would need to 
find additional revenue. The cost of wars or threats of war would have 
to be met somewhat more by action of Congress and the President facing 
the situation and mood of the time. The inflation of war could be 
checked by taxes, especially excess profits taxes and surtaxes. Serv-
icemen alone would not be asked to sacrifice. Those not in the service 
could make their contribution, also. The Nation could not be expected 
to raise enough taxes to fight a war on a cash basis. Long term bor-
rowing and an increase in the national debt would be expected, but a 
current effort to raise funds would increase the morale of the service-
men. 
Some funds in addition to that amount needed for war o~ defense 
could be left with the National government to be used for pilot proj-
ects in the states. Some could be used for variable grants to states 
based on differences in wealth and need. Federal experts, fewer in 
number, could be used to encourage states to adopt certain programs. 
But persuasion, not bribery, would be the method. Programs would rise 
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or fall on their relative merits. States would decide how much pro-
grams were worth at full price, paid for by their own funds. States 
would have a greater part in determining priorities and balance within 
their own budgets. 
Nationally most of the emphasis would be on defense and on doing 
for the states what they couldn't do for themselves. Because of the 
energy crisis and wheat shortages, more emphasis would be placed on 
the conservation of human and natural resources. Care would have to 
be taken to accumulate stock piles of food and strategic materials. 
In the haste to trade with the Soviet Union, private industry might 
make deals that would ignore some long range security problems. Gov-
ernor Rockefeller was critical of American private industry's vlan to 
build a huge·refinery and an aluminum plant for the Russians. 91 His 
warning should bring a reminder of the Russian wheat deal which ruined 
dairy, beef cattle, and poultry farmers and gouged consumers generally. 
Trading with the USSR, if it must come, should be done through a 
U.S. Government corporation so that the full extent and ramifications 
of the trade could be more completely controlled and understood. Let 
the U.S. Government sell from its surplus of grain and not take grain 
out of the market and away from American consumers who need wheat for 
bread, and grain for the production of milk, poultry and beef. It 
would be even better to refuse such a deal to avoid arming a potential 
enemy. Reliance upon and conservation of our own resources are needed 
for our own well-being and protection... The food we raise should not 
be wasted or bargained lightly away; strategic stockpiles of food alld 
other natural resources are needed to tide ua over natural or man-made 
disasters. Both occur frequently enough to provide ample evidence of 
the dangers from the traditional American approach of too little and 
too late. 
Other disasters to be avoided include the economic. The last 
great economic domestic disaster was the depression of the thirties. 
At that time the private sector of the economy could go to the public 
for help. Now with government the biggest purchaser, where can it go 
for help, if bankrupt? The best economy will result from people and 
the government living within their means. The best insurance is being 
able to take care of ourselves. John Kennedy said, "Ask not what your 
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." This 
means being self-reliant and helping the less fortunate help them-
selves. This requires a stable economy with its units kept down to 
manageable size by taxation, controls and competition. It requires a 
fluid economy providing new·opportunities for each coming generation, 
a new frontier for their time. It means a return to Locke's concept 
of inalienable rights, the right to life, liberty, and property, mean-
ingless without opportunity. 
Adequate political action will be required of an alert citizenship 
to ensure the development and continuation of such an economy, Move-
ment for the control of bigness, whether in the economy or government, 
should occur gradually. Self-control and control through competition 
should come first. Government regulation, from as little to as much 
as necessary, would come next, with government ownership coming only 
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as a last resort, and then only because of refusal of business to rec-
ognize other less drastic control. Government, of necessity, has to 
be bigger than whatever it seeks to control. Both should be kept with-
in a manageable size. 
Not only the form of government and its administration, but also 
the policies formulated and carried out by that government, will be 
the determinants of its continuity and the freedom, opportunity, and 
protection of its people. Increased democracy in form and administra-
tion should provide greater individual freedom and opportunity, greater 
support for government from within, and a stronger government to deal 
with other countries. Policies formulated through a democratic process 
including consultation and variety in input should protect the demo-
cratic form of government and the people. Acting through informed rep-
resentatives, voters should be able to protect themselves. 
Democracy cannot be saved if connnunist totalitarianism cannot be 
as readily recognized as Nazi totalitarianism. World conquest by the 
Russians and Communism would be no better than world conquest by the 
Germans and Naziism. The wheat deal and the oil embargo are two exam-
ples of what can be done to us economically by those who, according to 
some, are supposed to be our friends. The Soviet Union, supposedly 
more friendly to the United States than the Peoples Republic of China 
during the war in South Viet Nam, supplied four times as much war mate-
rial to North Viet Nam as did the latter. 
The enemies of past wars have sometimes become allies in the next, 
but it is after a change in ideology and intent. The USSR of today is 
not much better than Germany was under Hitler, scarcely more friendly 
even though somewhat more subtle. Actual statements, careful analysis 
and avoidance of wishful thinking makes this quite evident. 
Detente, Mr. Brezhnev said in June, 1972, in no way im-
plies the possibility of relaxing the idealogical struggle. 
On the contrary, we must be prepared for this struggle to be 
intensified and become an ever sharper form of the confronta-
tion between the two systems1~2 
One of the weaknesses in present day American thinking is the sub-
conscious acceptance of a modification of the Marxian-Hegelian dialec-
tic as an explanation of economic development, According to Hegel, 
there would be the original concept, the thesis; a counter concept, the 
antithesis; and the synthesis resulting from the conflict would become 
a new thesis. Applied to economics by Marx, this conflict would con-
tinue with communism the inevitable result. Present day pseudo Marxian-
Hegelians start with capitalism as the thesis, communism as the anti-
thesis and they think of socialism as the synthesis. They get the im-
pression that Russian communism and U.S. capitali~m will get closer to-
gether as the struggle continues and that eventually they will be so 
much alike that peace will come. Even that is no guarantee of peace. 
There is nothing more bitter than a family feud or a civil war. 
But if Marx is right and the Russians are right, our capitalism 
would become communism, and private property would be a thing of the 
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past. Yet Locke believed that property was one of the inalienable 
rights of man. The others were life and liberty. The real contest 
is between democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and the loss of it. 
Economics· is an important part of life, but not all of it. The eco-
nomic system can be used to-preserve liberty; it can be used to deny 
it. Political liberty cannot exist unless there is wide distribution 
in the ownership of property. Taking property in the name of the state 
under con:anunism is no better than having the complete control of prop-
erty through naziism. Both are extreme measures as carried out under 
extreme ideologies. Less extreme methods and less extreme use of such 
methods are available first and should be used to maintain a strong 
economic base for democracy. 
A second weakness in thinking is the comparing of communism as an 
ideology with democracy in practice. That is, comparing something at 
its best with something at its worst. This is particularly dangerous 
with questionable activities in government so much a part of news. Com-
munism as an ideology should be compared with democracy as an ideology, 
and communism in practice with democracy in practice. That is a fair 
comparison. 
A third weakness in thinking. is the use of ideas out of context. 
President Wilson developed the right of self determination as a justi-
fication for breaking up the Austrian Hungarian Empire. The same con-
cept used relative to Castro's taking over Cuba might justify communism 
there. However, that in no way changes the reality of a small unfriend-
ly country associated militarily with our most powerful potential enemy, 
the USSR. Nor does it change the reality of the missile crisis and 
present day military danger from the USSR through Cuba. 
A fourth weakness is that of discounting the revolutionary polit-
ical and economic ideas that some young people get, by saying that they 
are just theories. These are often minimized by saying that they are 
just a passing fancy or a 'phase in their development. This may or may 
not be true. Castro, Patricia Hearst, and Lee Harvey Oswald put their 
ideas into action. What young people think does make a difference. Ac-
tion may follow ideology. The teaching of the overthrow of government 
by force and violence is incompatible with democracy. 
In seeking democratic control of government and democratic input 
in domestic and foreign policy, ethnocentricism and its dangers must 
be recognized. The greatest of these is wishful thinking, overestimat-
ing the strength of our own country and underestimating that of others. 
This wishful thinking includes the hope and mistaken bel~3f that the 
aims and ends of our enemies will coincide with our own. 
Another weakness is that of assuming that foreign diplomats will 
reason and negotiate like those from the United States even though they 
have a different social,cultural and ideological background. Negoti-
ations under those circumstances may lead to inadequate protection of 
the national interest when conducted with countries of great ideological 
difference. 
In attempting to understand the differences in ideology, there is 
93 
a danger in being oversympathetic to .the different belief and overcrit-
ical of one 1s own. Both beliefs should be analyzed carefully, recog-
nizing whatever strengths or weaknesses there might be. A significant 
part of an analysis is the strength gained from reasonable self-confi-
dence, for in defeatism, as in·overconfidence, we may well contribute 
to our own downfall. 
Above all, foreign negotiations should.be avoided during a period 
of internal weakness such as that of a Nixon facing impeachment, or 
during Presidenti'al elections, for unwise concessions might be made to 
gain some measure of apparent success. That is the time when such ne-
gotiations are most apt to occur, and can, because foreign policy is 
under the control of the President and his emissaries. The Senate as 
presently operating can do little to prevent such negotiations. A 
President, challenged in domestic affairs, ethnocentric in his own way, 
may seek to prove himself where he can be least controlled, that is, in 
foreign affairs. He may wish to regain his ego in world leadership. 
Increased democratic input through elected representation might re-
strain him from using foreign negotiations for that purpose and instead 
limit their use to periods of governmental stability. An incumbent 
President may put our foreign policy in limbo while seeking ·reelection, 
to avoid embarrassment. 
A successful democracy requires not only democratic control and 
~democratic input, but also competent .leaders and participants in the 
governmental process. A systematic method of gradual renewal of lead-
ership, based on knowledge, preparation and experience, rather than 
experiments, passions, and power of neophytes would come closest to 
providing the competence necessary to solve both international and do-
mestic problems. Adequate opportunity for democratic or representative 
input would help insure that policies selected would work for the ben-
efit of the people who would be sovereign. 
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DEMOCRACY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 
The strength of a democracy is found in a big middle class willing 
to accept the wisdom and leadership of the gifted, strong enough to 
control the political and economic power of the elite, and compassion-
ate enough to be considerate of and helpful to the less fortunate. A 
self-renewing democracy requires a fluid social structure in which op-
portunity for advancement exists and each person is rewarded according 
to his talents and labor, to rise or fall in the social, economic and 
political system on the basis of proven contribution and merit. 
The preservation of this middle class is dependent upon control of 
the economic system sufficient to prevent overconcentrations of wea1th 
or power in any corporation, individual or generation which would hin-
der or prevent economic opportunity for those of coming generations. 
Democracy and a prosperous middle class cannot endure when there is.an 
overconcentration of wealth in the hands of a few. 
The Economic Unit of U.S. News and World Report esti-
mates that ••• one tenth of 1 percent of the total (U.S.) 
population ••• owns ••• 12 percent of all personal net 
worth in the u.s., including nearly one fifth of all the 94 cormnon stock that has been issued by American corporations. 
Nor can it exist if there is too great a burden of care for the poor who 
have a greater need for opportunity than assistance. 
Some have been in favor of redistribution of wealth. The graduated 
income tax is based on that principle. The concept is thought of as 
meaning taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Of greater impor-
tance than redistribution of wealth alone is the concept of redistribu-
tion of opportunity not just for the poor but for all but the extremely 
wealthy who already have more than enough. 
This would provide the new economic frontier for the slower to 
achieve and for the coming generations, that more individuals might 
come closer to their greatest potential growth. President Theodore 
Roosevelt developed the concept of the President as a steward in his 
office. Those having wealth need to adopt the concept of steward in 
the use of their wealth. The Protestant Ethic includes the idea that 
the acquisition of wealth is ethically permissible, but that is because 
it may be used for good purposes. 
The vast fortunes accumulated in the United States were not made 
trading shirts on a desert isle. Granting a fair share for inventive-
ness, initiative, skill, entrepreneurial ability and for other efforts, 
a great part of the amount came from underpaid workers or overcharged 
consumers. The general public has paid the bill. 
Government action can be taken to limit this acquisition of wealth 
at the taxpayers 1 expense. Subsidies can be scaled down to be available 
for the smaller economic unit, with the elimination of the subsidy after 
the economic unit reaches a certain size. From that stage on, it would 
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survive or fail on its own ability. Subsidies for larger corporations 
should be available only when there is some special need for a product, 
and it is in the national interest to grant that subsidy. 
Stronger enforcement of antitrust laws are necessary to create a 
new freedom of competition. Learned Hand, one of our greatest judges, 
has said that the Sherman Act is based on three premises, 
• that possession of unchallenged economic power 
.deadens initiative, discourages thrift, and depresses energy; 
that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is 
a stimulant, to industrial progress •••• 95 
Antitrust suits alone are not enough to protect consumers and 
maintain a fluid economy. They come too late, after the abuse has de-
veloped. They take too long. Existing competition, difficult to re-
establish, is destroyed while suits are still pending. In agriculture, 
corporate farms, resulting in large part from tax breaks and subsidies, 
having greater capital assets, even though less efficient than the one-
or two-man farm, will buy up fertilizer in short supply, corner the 
markets and drive the small farmers out of existence. Remed~gl action 
has been too little and too late to revitalize family farms. Diffi-
culties have been encountered in trying to break up ITT. The mistake 
was made in permitting excessive growth in the first place. 
Two centuries or more ago excessive growth in land holdings in 
Europe and the American colonies of Britain resulted from the law of 
entail and primogeniture. Under this law the eldest son inherited the 
land intact. The injustice of this law on other relatives is obvious. 
Its impact on the economy and politics of a colony could be seen in 
Virginia where much of the land was held by a few wealthy slaveholders. 
Thomas Jefferson did much to end this practice. Now redistribution of 
property takes place each generation as it is passed on from one to the 
next. 
But corporations by law may never die. There is no specific peri-
odic time when redistribution takes place. There is no recurring time 
when decisions must be made about what to dispose of and what to keep 
to meet the equivalent of an estate tax. There is no division of the 
corporation that its parts can compete with each other as redivided 
family farms would. Estate taxes and inheritance taxes help redistrib-
ute wealth owned by individuals, but do nothing to redistribute the 
holdings of the corporation to avoid or meet tax obligations. Some 
property is now retained to show a loss for tax purposes. Disposal of 
such property would make the corporation more efficient. Placing such 
property on the market could make it available for purchase and pos-
sibly more efficient use by another smaller corporation. 
To many the size alone of a corporation does not constitute a dan-
ger. They speak of 11 economy of size. 11 But size alone is not a virtue. 
Bullies are usually bigger. Only in Phantasia have we seen elephants 
fly. More seriously, still a few, but more large banks are becoming 
improperly managed and incompetent. A Lockheed Corporation is misman-
aged and seeks government help, when what it really needed was tighter 
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control. Imagine the impact of the failure of a General Motors. Some 
would say, and we all hope correctly, that it would never happen. But 
that is a chance we cannot take. 
When a leaf falls in the forest, it can hardly be heard. When the 
might oak topples, the sound reverberates. A falling redwood would 
cause great havoc all around. There is danger in bigness per se, just 
as there is danger in a benevolent despot. 
The benevolent despot does many good things, but weakens those who 
should do much for themselves. Worse than that, he paves the way for a 
dictator, one who mainly has his own interest at heart. He makes possi-
ble big mistakes instead of a series of lesser ones or perhaps other 
choices that in the long run would be much better. Lacking competition 
the big corporation, like the dictator, can choose at will. There, too, 
lies the possibility of big mistakes. 
Exceptions to the limit on size because of the danger of bigness 
per se could be made for natural monopolies such as public utilities. 
The size of a public utility, subject to government regulations, should 
not be limited so long as it is operated within the scope for which 
it was established. Holding companies, conglomerates or subsidiaries 
should be forbidden. Interlocking directorates, now forbidden, should 
be broken up. 
Standards of maximum size should be established by Congress to be 
used as yardsticks for breaking up larger economic units and for stop-
ping excessive growth. Exceptions to such maximum could be made by a 
two-thirds vote of Congress and denied subsequently by a majority vote 
not subject to Presidential veto. The mechanics of voting suggested 
are for the purpose of making it harder to approve exceptions and easier 
ta remove them to hold closer to the general rule.· Nor should the Pres-
ident have the power to veto in these cases and thereby subject himself 
to excessive pressure from trusts or conglomerates. 
The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, added to the original 
Constitution, have limited the national and state governments in their 
authority to break contracts, but this can be done if the contract has 
been used for illegal purposes. Automobiles used in transporting il-
legal cargo can be confiscated. Contraband is subject to seizure. Re-
duction of patent rights could be used to break up monopolies. Forfei-
ture of patent rights could be a possible penalty for conviction in an 
antitrust suit. The power to give should carry with it the power to 
take away. 
Laws passed to break up huge corporations a~d conglomerates could 
substitute competition for artificial prices, artificial shortages, 
price controls, rationing and other more difficult methods of control. 
Reducing the size and increasing the number of firms 
to , •• restore ••• price competition • • • may be the 
only course ••• consistent with minimizing the role99f government in controlling private enterprise economy. 
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This in turn would decrease the amount of bureaucracy necessary by sub-
stituting controls of the market place for controls of government, com-
petition for bureaucracy. 
Study could be given to the interlockings of credit, 
investment and inaurance companies with industrial firms 
to see whether it is desirable to broaden the prohibitions 
of Section 8 of the Clayton Act • • • also the legalization 
of export-trade agreements could be limited to firms of 
small size. 98 
Taxes could be used to discourage the growth of, or break up huge cor-
porations by having new truces or taxes at higher rates on vertical inte-
gration, horizontal integration and conglomerates. Fritz Machlup lists 
several in his article on 11Taxation and Monopoly Power." 
They are 
• steep progression in the corporate income tax, 
heavier taxation of intercorporate dividends, ••• gradu-
ated taxes on very large undisrributed prefita ••• gradu-
ated sales tax, taxes on the number of establishments, 
taxes according to the number of employees • • • and making 
nondeductible for income tax purposes, exg§ss expenditures 
on sales and certain kinds of litigation. 
The graduated income tax with its rate of 70 percent -for the high-
est bracket gives the appearance of .an opportunity to redistribute 
wealth. However, according to Gabriel Kolko, 
Taxation has not mitigated the fundamentally unequal 
distribution of income. If anything, it has perpetuated 
inequality by heavily taxing the low and middle income 
groups--those least able to bear its burden.loo 
Stock options, buying tax exempt securities and paying lower rates on 
capital gains are among the methods used to avoid paying the regular 
income tax rates. 
Taxes need to be revised to do away with special IB! breaks for 
the wealthy which amount to nearly $80 billion a year. The National 
Urban Coalition proposes to treat capital gains as ordinary income for 
tax purposes except when used for new funding, ••• limiting to· $15 ,000 
a year the amount of 11phantom" farm tax loss any individual or corpora-
tion can apply against other income and setting maximum allowable deduc-
tion .ceilings on mortgage interest and property taxes, setting a life-
time exemption limit of $50,000 on recipients of estate and gift taxes 
and others.102 Excess profits taxes would cut down on the tax burden of 
others or the prices they paid. Either one would increase the buying 
power of the general public. 
The income tax as presently administered not only favors the rich 
through tax breaks, it also gradually impoverishes those with moderate 
or fixed incomes. For those with salaries raised to offset the loss 
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of buying power, there is another loss. The increase in income ~ushes 
the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket and takes more from him. Infla-
tion and increases in Social Security taxes add to the amount taken by 
FICA. In spite of ordinary raises, buying power decreases. 
Tax rates for those of moderat·e and lower incomes should be tied 
to the actual buying power of the dollar to be decreased during times 
of inflation. This would leave a more constant purchasing power for 
those two groups. Tax rates for those in the higher income brackets 
.should be increased during inflation to discourage luxury spending. 
The government having less tax income would be forced to face cuts in 
spending or borrowing. Government spending should be held at a minimum 
during inflation. The·exception to this would occur in wartime when 
increased sacrifice and increased taxes would be expected that the bur-
den of servicemen and their families might be shared. 
Federal fiscal policy for stimulating the economy during a reces-
sion should be chosen for long run improvement of the economy as much 
as possible. Tax breaks for conversion to the metric system would not 
only provide for increased employment in the conversion, but also for 
increased efficiency and competitive ability following conversion. 
A decrease in roadbuilding due to a lessening of automotive use 
could be offset in part by an increase in the use of cement for improv-
ing railroad beds in areas of increased urban and interurban travel. 
Conversion from gasoline and diesel fuel for automotive and rail trans-
portation, to electricity and coal for urban travel could do much to 
relieve the gas and oil shortage. This conversion process could also 
be encouraged through tax breaks. 
Losses in tax funds could be offset by a federal graduated sales 
tax .(previously proposed) and by a graduated property tax on the bigger 
corporations and on corporate farms. The latter would not only provide 
additional funds but would also aid in recycling corporate property and 
assets. This would increase the opportunity for newer £inns to be es-
tablished to increase business competition. 
Waiting for such redistribution to occur through personal income 
tax, and estate and inheritance taxes takes too long. Proper steps to 
recycle property should be taken year by year, not generation by genera-
tion. In Jefferson 1 s time they did away with primogeniture to prevent 
the growth of a landed gentry in the United States and provide land for 
other than the first born sons. The need is for action to prevent the 
growth of a corporate gentry; and prevent the continued holding of prop-
erty by the corporation, a fictitious person with everlasting life. 
The recession in Van Buren's time followed the destruction of the 
Bank of the United States by Jackson and Jackson's specie circular to 
stop speculation in government land. The recession in our time followed 
the overstimulation of the American economy by a tax cut favoring the 
rich in Kennedy 1 s administration. It came after Johnson 1 s policies of 
guaranteeing both guns and butter, a period of a war stimulated economy, 
an overspending administration and Congress, and an administration and 
Congress unwilling to tax war profits and a growing wealthy class. It 
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came after Nixon 1 s policies continuing to favor the rich and the poor 
at the expense of the middle class. 
Unemployment, started by decreased military spending, returning 
G.I.s and increased by a strike at General Motors, became prevalent 
with the oil embargo and continued losses to the auto industry. In-
flation, already high, was fed by the oil embargo and what is commonly 
referred to as the 11Russian Wheat Deal. 11 The postwar recession was 
made worse by continuing inflation. 
In spite of the losses by many, the oil companies have increased 
their profits. In the name of stopping inflation, banks have added to 
inflation costs by increasing interest rates. Claiming that there was 
a shortage of money to loan, increased rates made it possible for banks 
to receive more interest money from less money loaned. The Federal Re-
serve Banking System, financed by its members and developing policies 
to protect its members rather than customers, needs to have more compe-
tition. 
A Bank of the United States, destroyed by Jackson to stop its com-
petition with state banks, may need to be recreated to provide more 
competition for the Federal Reserve System. The TVA, a government cor-
poration, was created to compete with private utilities and provide 
electricity at a lower cost. A Bank of the United States, recreated, 
could compete with private banks and provide loans at lower interest 
rates. Competition would be better than increased regulation and fix-
ing loan rates. The threat alone might be sufficient. 
Another method of improving the economic climate and of providing 
opportunity for the coming generation of taxpayers would be to grant a 
tax offset, dollar for dollar, to college students for money actually 
spent for college tuition. This would encourage individuals to invest 
in their own education and future and know that they would be repaid in 
education, opportunity and money. This tax offset would be for the 
student himself, not his parents. The present method favors the chil-
dren of parents who can afford to send their offspring to college. It 
does nothing for those whose parents cannot. 
The student at tax time, whether in school or after he graduated 
and had his first employment, could get refunds from his withheld in-
come tax to be applied on tuition or loans for tuition. The maximum 
tuition offset limit could be that of average instate tuition in the 
state university system. 
Since education tends to increase earning capacity, this offset 
would be repaid many times over in later income tax. Additional funds 
for educational opportunities could come from the apportionment of all 
income from Federal estate and gift.taxes on a per capita basis to the 
states to be used for education. These funds in turn could be appor-
tioned by the states to the local governments in the same way and for 
the same purpose. As additional funds were needed, rates could be in-
creased. 
Younger workers with less experience may have difficulty in finding 
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employment because prospective employers may not feel that they can 
earn the minimum wage. A scale of wages paralleling the gradual learn-
ing of an apprentice might come closer to matching comp-ensation with 
production. A lower minimum wage might be paid to those eighteen years 
old and the amount increased in yearly steps to the full minimum wage 
at twenty one. This might increase the opportunity for younger indi-
viduals to gain initial employment. 
A sheltered workshop similar to those found in Goodwill Industries 
could be used to give employment to less efficient workers. The mini-
mum wage established to raise the income and level of living of workers 
and their families works to the disadvantage of these less efficient 
workers. 
Some potential employees are priced out of a job. They cannot 
earn enough to be paid the minimum wage without financial loss to their 
employer. Those last hired and the first fired tend to be the least 
productive. They may need experience or training to be more productive. 
They may need to learn good work habits. 
Subcontracting of·production to a sheltered workshop paying lower 
wages geared to the actual production of the worker could provide tem-
porary employment for th~ unskilled or the less skilled. As these 
workers gained in skill, dependability, and efficiency, they would be 
preparing to compete in the labor market for at least the minimum wage. 
Provision should also be made for more gradual retirement. Instead 
of having full time work until a person reaches retirement age and then 
have instant complete retirement, the potential retiree should gradually 
decrease his hours of work until fully retired. He might drop from 
forty to thirty to twenty hours a week and have two years of partial re-
tirement. This would help not only with income but also with adjustment 
to retirement itself. The broadening of the economic base of society as 
a result of these actions would be conducive to an increase in political 
democracy, the aim and purpose of exploring old and new approaches to 
democracy. 
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DEMOCRACY AND THE HOME 
In the United States, democracy many times is taken for granted. 
Almost forgotten is the fact that its principles must be taught and car-
ried on from generation to generation. There is a tendency to think of 
a democratic United States emerging suddenly full blown and forget the 
time and effort responsible for its development. We need to be reminded 
that our American heritage includes the democracy of the Greek city 
states, concepts of proper forms of government and constitutions from 
Aristotle, the power to tax controlled by the House of Commons, the tra-
ditional rights of Englishmen, experiences in colonial self-government, 
New England town meetings, and nearly two hundred years under state and 
national constitutions. 
The social background is fully as important as the political for 
the development of democracy because it shapes the participants, the 
citizenry, the voters, and the officeholders, and also those who don't 
vote or hold office. Children become politically socialized at a very 
young age, much younger at times than we might expect. A woman was tak-
ing two boys to Church Primary. She was driving along the street and 
the boys were riding in the back seat. They were a little late, and she 
was driving forty miles an hour on a broad street with no traffic; but 
they were going that fast in a twenty-five-mile-an-hour zone. Suddenly 
they heard a siren. These boys, both three years old, began to sing 
out, "Ya! Ya! Mrs. is going to jail." At the age of 
three, they had a concept of the results of lawbreaking; and they were 
on the side of the law even at the expense of their friend. 
Democracy and good government begin in the home and come from 
principles that are taught and practiced. Joseph Smith.was asked years 
ago how it happened that his particular group.of settlers got along so 
well together. His answ~t' was, "I teach them the right principles and 
they govern themselves."l03 The place to teach democracy is in the 
home. Young people need to be listened to and realize that someone in 
a position of authority hears their problems. This doesn't mean that 
little ones will make the decisions of the home anymore than it means 
that those under eighteen will be permitted to vote. However, there 
are many times in the home when those under eighteen can make decisions 
for themselves. There are other times when the parents and children can 
make decisions together, Still other times it is more appropriate and 
necessary for the parents to decide what is best for the family. A com-
parison in a political situation would be actions taken in a town meet-
ing, other decisions made by Congress and still other decisions, par-
ticularly those in foreign affairs, made by the President alone. 
However, in the family, just as in politics, there should not be an 
abuse of power. In both places there are some, who once they get a lit-
tle authority, will abuse it. Those who would, should be counseled and 
checked; and if they abuse that authority enough, it should be removed, 
for each individual having authority has certain obligations to use it 
wisely. In the home at times, it means to correct sharply those in need 
of correction, but only as much as is needed and not in anger. In gov-
ernment it means judgments and penalties for those breaking the law. 
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Following correction comes rehabilitation, the showing of greater love 
in the home, and the use of suspended sentences, probation or parole for 
lawbreakers. Rehabilitation requires a joint effort, compassion on one 
side, and recognition on the other side that along with rights there are 
responsibilities. To be successful it requires an understanding on both 
sides, that proper use of freedom earns the right to greater freedom and 
responsibility. It means that no one, at home or in government, is an-
swerable to himself alone, that he is not above the law in either case. 
In fact, the higher the position the greater the freedom to do good or 
ill and the greater the responsibility for those actions. Homes that do 
not teach democracy and responsibility, those that teach special privi-
lege, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, do not giv.e adequate 
preparation for citizenship in a democracy. Instead they prepare a de-
structive element to such a society. They teach antisocial behavior and 
are a detriment to society and government. There is no substitute for 
teaching democracy in the home. 
Certain minimum standards are essential in a home ·giving proper 
preparation for democratic citizens. Food, clothing and shelter are 
generally accepted as the bare minimum. Poverty level, defined in dol~ 
lars, does not go far enough. It says nothing ~bout the quality of life 
or the concept of a suitable home. Too much emphasis has been placed on 
direct money grants to the poor without sufficient recognition of the 
inability of many of the recipients to use it even moderately well. 
Poor nutrition is not the result solely of a lack of funds. It is due 
in large part to the failure to use the money for a balanced diet. Al-
cohol and soft drinks are not an adequate substitute for milk. Poor 
choices are made in other ways. 
A suitable home requires more than just food, clothing and shelter. 
Poverty is no excuse for filth. A lack of work is no excuse for filth. 
A person on welfare not working outside the home should have time enough 
to keep that home and the children reasonably clean and sufficiently 
fed. They should have the time to teach the children to do some things 
for themselves and learn some responsibility. If these things cannot be 
done in some measure, that home is not suitable and the children would 
most likely be better off elsewhere. 
A home should not be broken up except as a last resort; but if the 
health or well being of children are deteriorating because of the envi-
ronment, malnutrition, abuse or neglect where they are living, that 
place is no real home for them. Each child in every generation should 
have the opportunity to develop to his or her· full potential. The Soci-
ety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals should have its counter-
part--The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Action in 
cases of cruelty or neglect should not be taken without careful investi-
gation, provision of social services, weighing alternatives and taking 
sufficient time to avoid hasty or inadequate decisions. A man's home is 
his castle, but which is more important, his privacy or adequate protec-
tion ·for children as well as animals. Whether it is the failure of the 
parent or parents, social worker or the courts, something more needs to 
be done to combat child neglect and abuse. Selection of social workers 
who are compassionate without being too soft would speed up the action 
to improve the child's situation. 
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Some social workers have what might be called a defeatist poverty 
syndrome which looks at the poor as unfortunate, second class citizens 
who can 1 t be expected to live as high standards as others ,1 This tends 
to support a lack of expectation of a type of living and morality com-
patible with a strong democracy made up of people who can take care of 
themselves. Poverty and low morals don't have to go together, but when 
they do, problems are compounded. This lack of expectations condones 
living conditions which aid the continuance of the cycle of poverty. 
The Work Incentive Program, enacted in 1967 and amended substantially in 
1971, placed "about 65,000 welfare recipients into jobs where they 
lasted at least 90 days. About half of those left welfare rolls com-· 
pletely. 11104 
More should be done to help individuals raise their own goals and 
more should be expected from those receiving assistance. They too, 
should work for what they get. More emphasis on the potential value of 
the women in the home and the dignity of being a housewife might improve 
care for the children and the conditions within the home. Changing the 
terminology from welfare to workfare and from Aid to Families of Depend-
ent Children to Child Care Income with a parallel change in thrust might 
also lead to bette~ child care, healthier and happier children. This 
program, originally called Mothers Aid when started by the states, was 
changed by the Social Security Act to Aid to Dependent Children to em-
phasize that children were the primary concern. This was also done be-
cause the new terminology had greater public appeal. Why not carry this 
concept another step and use Child Care Income to denote not just rights 
but responsibilities. 
There would be a double responsibility for this program to be oper-
ated effectively. The first would be the care of the child or children 
by the adult or adults in the home, and the second would be the alloca-
tion of funds to that home for that purpose. The assistance received 
should not be considered as a gift, but as a paycheck with the sense of 
respect that goes with that. But, being a paycheck, something should be. 
expected in return, just as there are certain minimum expectations from 
a baby sitter. If those who are poor through no fault of their own have 
a right to be taken care of, those paying the bills and the children 
themselves have a right to expect the recipients to do as well as they 
can to provide the necessary child care. Following this philosophy, a 
mother would be rendering a greater service staying at home and taking 
care of her preschool children, than she would be working out and having 
them reared.by a baby sitter. This does not preclude her working while 
her children are in school. 
Positive incentives such as honest praise, special recognition and 
a bonus could be used to encourage better child care and better homemak-
ing. Teaching the parent and children responsibility and dependability 
will improve the education the child receives both at home and in 
school. With a better education, job opportunities will improve. Three 
significant factors in breaking the cycle of poverty are: knowledge, 
dependability and sociability in .the sense of getting along with others. 
It is necessary to have knowledge to be prepared tor a job and get it. 
It takes dependability and good work habits to keep it. The ability to 
get along with others helps to get a promotion. A good home can do much 
105 
to develop these plus a good self~image which will add to the potential 
productivity of the individual. Breaking the cycle of poverty is essen-
tial in relieving the frustrations of the lower class, in building a 
bigger and stronger middle class and in perpetuating stronger families, 
the basis of self-government and the means of limiting government that 
it may be democratically controlled. 
Social workers .cannot solve social problems by themselves; parents 
and the courts among others have their responsibilities. Child neglect 
and child abuse are not confined to the homes of the poor. In many of 
the poorer homes there is far more love and understanding than in homes 
having more funds. Homes broken through death, desertion or divorce 
have special problems. Support should come first from within the fam-
ily. If not given voluntarily, legal means ·should be used to compel 
this support for children. While support cannot be required of rela-
tives for the elderly, it should be sought on a voluntary.basis. A lien 
should be taken on the property of the elderly receiving assistance for 
the amount of assistance-granted. No ~laim could be enforced on this 
property during the lifetime of the recipient or the surviving spouse. 
Repayment to the government ~or assistance granted should come first, 
for there is no justification for guaranteeing an inheritance, however 
small, to a child who won't support his or her parents in time of need. 
The recent change to Supplementary security Income for15ge elderly nearly doubles the number eligible from 3.4 to 6.2 million. With its 
huge increase in number of recipients and in cost, because of lower eli-
gibility requirement including the dropping of the property lien, SSI 
shifts more welfare cost and administration to the National level and 
increases the Federal bureaucracy. State employees are being hired by 
the Federal Government to do their same type of work for higher sala-
ries. Federal requirements that grants remain at least at the same 
level have made it necessary to continue the state system for supple-
mental grants to supplement Supplementary Security Income. If the above 
seems to be redundant, that is what is intended--to show the waste, in-
efficiency, duplication and extra expense of SSI. ''The central com-
puter system that was supposed to control the nation's first venture 
into a federalized welfare program collapsed during its first year of 
operation. 11106 Two others were established in turn when each failed. 
In the last two and one half years clients were overpaid by $622 mil-
lion. 
Laws should ·be passed to strengthen the home and provide better 
homes for the neglected and abused. More should be done to strengthen 
family ties between parents and children. Drawn in many directions, the 
modern urban family is losing much of its influence on its children. 
The generation gap arises in part because the family is not together 
enough to communicate. Effort should be made to have the immediate fam-
ily together socially at least once a week. Laws enacted against immor-
ality, laws protecting children and enforcement of these laws to elimi-
nate the bad do not do enough to eliminate the causes of immorality 
and abuse. Positive efforts to strengthen the family gets at the core 
of the problem, the original neglect of the child. Counseling, home 
making advice and assistance can do much to make a house a home. Con-
tinuing present services and adding to them along these lines can do 
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much toward developing the right kind of family. The right kind of fam-
ily, caring for its own, teaching and practicing democracy, and living 
a respectable standard of morality can do much to prepare prospective 
citizens to be law abiding and self-sustaining. This, too, is the es-
sence of democracy. 
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CONCLUSION 
This combination of old and new approaches to democracy and a re-
turn to colonial and early constitutional princip.les would establish the 
framework within which the middle class and others could present their 
problems in a systematic and democratic fashion. The channels would be 
there not only for the gradual development and change of policy, but 
also for the gradual development and change of leaders. The channels 
would be there for sufficient feedback to make possible the ultimate 
control of government by the people, the essence of democracy. Elitists 
and so called practical politicians will say, 11 1 know, but politics just 
does not operate that way. 11 Robert Michels saw the difficulty in main-
taining democratic control as he developed his theory of the iron law of 
oligarchy. He.said, "Nothing but a serene and frank examination of the 
oligarchial dangers of.democracy will enable us to minfBtze these dan-
gers, even though they can never be entirely avoided. 11 Madison, rec-
ognizing t;he nature of men knew that a "number of citizens, united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest adverse to 
the rights of other ~igizens, or to the permanent and aggregate inter-
ests of a community11 O .would develop into a .faction. Re worried about 
these factions being represented and judging their own causes which 
could lead to bias and corruption. He went on to say, 11It is vain to 
say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing in-
terests.11109 He developed checks and balances to control the effects of 
factions. 110 
Michels in pursuing dangers to democracy further said, "rlhen de-
mocracies have gained a certain stage of development, the! ~ndergo a 
gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit!' 1 ''Bigness in 
business, together with parallel developments in other sectors of soci-
ety has moved us away from pluralism to a pluralism of elites. 11 112 
These factions and elites are not being controlled. 
Dye and Zeigler say in The Irony of Democracy 
• • • that the responsibility for the survival of lib-
eral democratic values, depends upon elites, not masses ••• 
We have observed thet both the procedures of the democratic 
process and the values of liberal society are not widely 
shared by the masses of Americans and are occasionally aban-
doned by America's elite~.ll3 
If the term masses· refers to many from the middle class, it is inaccu-
rate. If it refers to the lower class, it is more appropriate. The 
lower class, not having shared much in the benefits of liberal democ-
racy, has not yet had the feeling of its value. As individuals from 
that class move up and gain more social and economic rewards, they gain 
a sense of loyalty to the democratic system. In like manner, as those 
from the middle class move up and are absorbed by the upper, more priv-
ileged class, they forget its benefits and gradually lose their appre-
ciation for it. In contrast, the newest members of the middle class, 
like the newest citizens appreciative of their newly won gains, are apt 
to be the most loyal. The new black middle class may well be such an 
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example. 
The more privileged class, the elitists, are aped by their newest 
members. The nouveau riche, sure that they have earned their way re-
gardless of the means, have little feeling for others still in the mid-
dle class. Elitists in general, and self-made elitists in particular, 
tend to be nondemocratic. They are most liberal in looking out for 
their own special interest, not the interest of the majority. Political 
donations in the 1972 election campaigns, Presidential and Congression-
al, but particularly Presidential, are prime examples. 
In a discussion of elites and counter elites, the needs and 
strength of the middle class are commonly overlooked. Its apparent po-
litical weakness and other weaknesses are magnified and multiplied. 
Seldom does the middle class receive due credit for its contributions 
and accomplishment. The mass media is looking for the unusual and the 
spectacular. Society is geared to lavish high praise on those coming 
in first. Insufficient credit is given to others who have done their 
very best and have given their utmost. Too much emphasis is placed on 
competition and not enough on cooperation. For some, competition gets 
the better of Christianity. The contributions of the middle class, in-
dividually not always spectacular, but collectively considerable, merit 
recognition and appreciation. Not motivated as much by greed as the 
upper class, or by frustration as the lower class, able to muddle 
through and adjust to most difficult situations, resilient and generally 
passive, occasionally aroused and momentarily politically powerful, the 
middle class can vote to throw the rascals out. It knows what it does 
not want and will set limits if the elite and special interests do not. 
This nation, still potentially great if self controlled and self direct-
ed, will lose much of its greatness if controlled by elitists and spe-
cial interests to be kept, sold or betrayed to the highest. bidder. The 
place to start talking about democracy is with faith in the people to 
rise to challenges, choose leaders, develop leadership and govern them-
selves. Otherwise the concept of democracy has no meaning. Likewise 
the extension of suffrage and the election process would have no value. 
Who are the people? The majority of the people in the United States are 
in the middle class. This middle class and its needs have been over-
looked. It may need its own party. This party might be called the Con-
stitutional Party. Disillusioned by what can happen to and through our 
present government and parties, voters may gradually feel that the time 
has come for a center or middle party to provide new direction and give 
this country a new lease on life. Evidence of discontent with both the 
Democrat and Republican Parties has been seen in the growth of a new 
Populism. Newsweek in its issue of October, 1969, reported, "This is 
the year of the New Populism, a far-ranging, fast spreading revyl~ of 
the little man against the Establishment at the nations polls. 11 Con-
ditions since that time have deteriorated even more. Discontent is in-
creasing not only with those in the lower income bracket, but also those 
in the middle income group. As inflation decreases their earning power, 
dissatisfaction will become even more widespread. As the dissatisfac-
tion spreads, the base of opposition to the present major parties will 
be broadened, unless one or the other meets these growing needs and ab-
sorbs this growing number of discontented voters. A source of· leader-
ship and core of members could come from young people looking for job 
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opportunities to grow and develop over the years. Struck by inflation 
and diminishing buying power, the consumer and home oriented voters will 
seek more protection and a party that would meet their needs. Continu-
ing inflation will drive more older middle class-persons in the same po-
litical direction. Following the traditions of the agrarian movement 
and the Populist Party, a middle party would attempt to reestablish dem-
ocratic control of big business and big government. It would also seek 
methods to protect the general interest from special interests. Without 
the political protection and renewal of the middle class, the middle 
class-may decline. The decline of the middle class would leave the ex-
tremes to fight it .out. Should this happen, the final result might be 
a dictatorship of the right or the left with place for little or no de-
mocracy. Is this to be .the fate of our country or will the United 
States -government be redemocratized, rejuvenated and redirected toward 
the economic and political liberty of the great majority of the people, 
the middle class; including, through a recycling of wealth, ample oppor-
tunity for the youth of coming generations and the lower class. This 
recycling should also be designed to retain a sufficient amount for giv-
ing reasonable recognition and reward to the older and renewing elite. 
But won't these changes require too much control and won't they be too 
drastic or too sudden? An analogy may be helpful in putting the answer 
into perspective • 
. Pets in a home or pets in society have to learn self-control or be 
taught. It is important in both places to let them know who is.master. 
Once this is accomplished, home and society are much more livable. Even 
the pets become-more lovable and less subject to harsh treatment, pro-
viding the master has sufficient self-control. Neither the people in a 
. democracy nor the master of pets should be abusive. Control in both 
places should be adequate but at a minl.lllum. Jefferson said, "That gov-
ernment is best which governs least." Fully as important but unsaid 
was, ''and still governs." 
Methods of achieving democracy old or new may not be readopted or 
even used for the first time. This does not mean that they should not 
be considered, to be accepted or discarded on merit as they relate to 
the political setting. Rate of change is significant. Timely, gradual 
change is preferred to delayed upheaval. If it is going to take a thou-
sand years to accomplish something of value, then at least a thousand 
years ago or now at the latest is the time to start. SetFing the tone 
for increased democracy and strengthening the middle class can help 
those tempted to take advantage of either, recognize the need for self-
control to avoid the appearance of abuse. For the appearance of abuse 
would bring retribution and greater control from other elements of soci-
ety and government. 
Gradual readjustment would be necessary to avoid undue hardship. 
True greatness would have to be found outside the political and economic 
spheres which in and of themselves are only a means to a higher end, the 
growth and development of each and every individual within the society, 
the real goal of a true democracy. 
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For forms of government let fools contest 
That which is best administered is best. 
Alexander Pope 
Administration is important. It does depend upon who is in the 
driver's seat and the way a vehicle is driven. But the best driver in 
the world can't make a cheaper car ride like a Cadillac. The form is 
important and needs to be revised by revising the Constitution. By re-
vising the Constitution the passengers can have more to say about who is 
in the driver's seat. Back seat driving properly done can have an im-
portant and significant role, for the passengers have a right to say 
where they are going, because they are paying the bills. The driver has 
the title and the responsibility and has the most to say about the de-
tails of driving. But the passengers who are paying the bills should 
set the general direction and prescribe the limits. They know when they 
are going too fast and when they are going in the wrong direction. At 
times they may not know the details of what they do want, but they can 
and will surely tell what they don't. The final control is theirs and 
the American voter is highly competent to fulfill that task. 
The driver, himself, is important. He does not own the car, but is 
selected by the passengers from candidates with known qualities. But 
can you ever know enough about him? Can he ever have enough experience 
and ability to traverse the· challenging terrain of tomorrow with its 
congestion, its upheavals, its dens of iniquity as well as its promised 
land over the horizon. The line of travel must be chosen well for there 
are no short cuts. There will be storms, floods and detours, but we 
will never arrive at the proper destination by going very long in the 
wrong direction. We won't find freedom by heading where there is little 
or none. Nor will we make progress if the vehicle is so cumbersome that 
it can 1 t be maneuvered with some measure of precision. The vehicle> 
too, will require proper care. We don't want to end up with nothing but 
junk or spend so much on the vehicle that there is little left for a 
home or the people who wish to inhabit it. 
( 
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS REVISED 
(New material underlined.) 
We the People of the United States, in recognition of the·innate 
worth of each and.every individual and in Order to~ Justice, in-
sure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity, do reestablish this Constitution as revised for the 
United States of Ame~ica and do dedicate ourselves to support it-and the 
government established thereby. 
Section 1. 
in a Congress of 
Representatives. 
Article I 
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
the United States, which shall consist of a House of 
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem-
bers chosen for six years by the People of the several States, and the 
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requiSite for Elec-
tors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. 
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the 
first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three 
Classes. The seats of the Representatives of the first Class_ shall. be 
vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at· the 
Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration 
of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year. 
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to 
the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the · 
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of the 
district within that State in which he shall be chosen. No Person shall. 
be elected to this office more than three times or serve more than 
twenty years. 
Representatives shall be apportioned-among the severer States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers. The actual Enumeration shall be made within· every Term of ten 
Years, in.such Manner as they shall be Law direct. The Numbec of Repre-
sentatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each 
State shall have at Least three Representatives. 
lolhen vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Ex-
ecutive Authority thereof may·make temporary appointments until such po7· 
sition can be filled at the next annual election. The House of Repre-
sentatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers; shall elect 
the Attorney General of the United States fo~ a six .year term; and shall 
have the sole Power to try all impeachments. Such trial shall be con-
ducted by a committee made up of one member from each state chosen bv 
that state 1 s delegation. The Attorney General of the United States 1 
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together with a committee chosen by the Presidential Council. shall con-
.duct the prosecution. At the end of the hearing the findings shall be 
presented with recommendations to Congress for final consideration and 
vote. A two thirds concurrent majority shall be necessary for convic-
tion. The two thirds concurrent majority shall include two thirds of 
the members voting, assuming a quorum, plus a majority of members from 
each of two thirds of the states. 
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office 
of honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party con-
victed shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, 
judgment and punishment, according to law. 
Section 3. District Councilors shall be apportioned and elected in 
the following manner, There shall be five Councilor districts within 
each Congressional district, the boundaries of which are to be deter-
mined by the state legislature. District Councilors shall be elected 
for two years starting in 1980 and in every second year thereafter. 
No person shall be a District Councilor who shall not have attained 
to the age of twenty one years, and have been five years a citizen of 
t;he United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of 
that district in which he shall be chosen. No person shall be elected 
to this office more than ten times or serve more than twenty years. 
District Councilors shall .be elected to observe Congress and its 
members, represent their constituencies to Congress. its committees and 
to the executive branch; as Congressional District Council advise their 
respective Congressman and· as State Congressional District Council coop-
erate with their state legislature to represent such state legislature 
to Congress. These District Councilors shall also function as the elec-
toral college for President and Vice President when no candidate re-
ceives a majority of the electoral vote. 
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators, Representatives and District Councilors, shall be prescribed 
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations. 
'nle Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such 
Meeting shall be on the third day of January, unless they shall by law 
appoint a different Day. Members shall take office the third day of 
January following their election. 
Section 5. 'nle House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns 
and QualificationS""Of its own Members, and a Majority shall constitute 
a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to 
day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, 
in such Manner, and under the Penalties as each House may provide. 
To facilitate the dispatch of business, there shall be established 
three Rules Committees with concurrent jurisdiction and three Commit-
tees of the Whole with concurrent jurisdiction. Business shall be 
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scheduled from Monday through Friday. Adjournment from day to day may 
be authorized by a two·thirds vote. Such adjournment or recess shall 
not be counted in the ten days allotted to the President for considera-
tion of billS. 
To insure that special interests are not over represented, a major-
ity of the members of each standing committee. apportioned between par-
ties in the ratio of party members in Congress, shall be chosen by lot. 
The remaining committee members, apportioned between parties in the same 
way, shall be selected by their respective Congressional party organiza-
tions. The chairman of each committee shall be elected by the majority 
party members of the committee through secret ballot. 
The House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its 
Members-"for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two 
thirds, expel a Member. 
The House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to 
time publish the same, -excepting such Parts as may"in their Judgment re-
quire Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members on-any question 
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of the present, be entered on the 
Journal. 
Section 6. The representatives shall receive a Compensation for 
their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury 
of the United States. They shall in all Cases, excep-t Treason, Felony 
and Breach of ~he Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Atten-
dance at the Session of the House, and in going to and returning from 
the same; and for any Speech or Debate in the House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place. ~-
District Councilors shall receive a Compensation for their serv-
ices. to be ascertained by Law. and paid out of the treasury of their 
respective States to be reimbursed fully from the treasury of the United 
States. 
No Representative or District Councilor, shall, during the time for 
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the author-
ity of the United States, which shall have been crested, or the Emolu-
ments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of the 
House or a District Councilor during his Continuance in Office. 
Section 7. Every Bill, except as specified below in this section. 
which shall have passed the Rouse of Representatives by a concurrent ma-
jority made up of a maiority of members voting, assuming a quorum. plus 
a majority of the members voting from each of a majority of the states 
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the 
United States; if he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall re-
turn it, with his Objections to the House, who shall enter the Objec-
tions at large on their Journal,""""Bri'd proceed to reconsider it. If after 
such Reconsideration, a two thirds concurrent majority of~ House 
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall become a Law. But in all such 
Cases the Vote of the House shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and 
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the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be en-
tered on the Journal of the House. If any Bill shall not be returned by 
the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have 
been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he 
had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Re-
turn, in which Case it shall not be a Law. 
Every Bill. Order or Resolution to which the concurrent vote of the 
House of Representatives may be necessary es specified above, Which 
shall receive either the votes of majority of the members voting, assum-
ing a quorum, or the votes of a majority of the members voting from each. 
of a majority of the states, but not a concurrent majority. shall be re-
committed to committee for further consideration, revision, or recom-
mendation. 
Every Bill, Order, Resolution or Vote to which the concurrent vote 
of the House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question-
of Adjournment, repeal of emergency power or removing exception to the 
limit on size of corporations) shall be presented to the President of 
the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be ap-
proved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by a two 
thirds concurrent maiority of the Hbuse of Representatives, according 
to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power 
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general welfare of the · 
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States; 
To borrow Money on the Credit of the United States; 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; 
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and 
fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; 
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and 
current Coin of the United· States; 
To establish Post Offices and post Roads; 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries~ 
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court, 
To define and Punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
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Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
To raise and support Armies, .but no Appropriation of Money to that 
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
To provide and maintain a ·Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval forces; 
To provide for calling for the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress .Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for ·organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, 
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of 
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment 
of the Officers, and thaAuthority of training the Militia according to 
the discipline prescribed by Congress; 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over 
such District (not- exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of 
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the ·Seat of 
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over 
all Places purChased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in 
which tbe Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, 
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
.into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof. 
To elect the Attorney General for a term of six years and to frll 
any unexpired term by special election; 
To elect justices of the Supreme Court and choose the Chief Jus-
tice. subject to confirmation and decennial reconfirmation by the Sen-
ate; 
To overrule decisions of the Supreme Court by a three-fourths con-
current majority. which shall include three-fourths of the members vot-
ing. assuming a quorum? plus a majority of members from each of three-
fourths of the states. 
Section 9. The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it. · 
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Laws shall be passed, 
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Pro-
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portion to the Cen~us or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. 
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. 
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Reve-
nue to the ports· of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels 
bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties 
in another. 
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from 
time to time. 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:· And no 
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without 
the Consent of the Congress,, accept of any present, Emolument, ·Office, 
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. 
Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit 
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and·silver Coin a Tender in 
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any. Title of Nobility. 
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Im-
posts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all 
Duties and Im.posts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports·, shall be 
for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws 
shall be subject to the Reviai·on and Control of the Congress. 
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lSy any Duty of 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or en-
gage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will 
not admit of Delay. 
Article II 
Section 1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America subject to the advice of a Presidential 
Council and the Senate. 
The first election for President-Elect shall take place in 1982. 
He shall take office as President-Elect January 20, 1983, and as Presi-
dent on January 20. 1985. Election and assumption of office shall occur 
every sixth vear thereafter. Having served two years as President-
Elect, he shall thereafter hold office dUring one term of six years un-
less removed by death, disability, resignation, popular vote, or im-
peachment and conviction. The President-Elect and Vice President-Elect 
shall be elected as follows: 
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The District Councilors. functioning as.electors, shall meet in 
their respective States, and vote by ballot as directed by the majority 
of popular votes cast in each district for President-Elect and Vice 
President-Elect; they shall name in their ballots the-per;on voted for 
as President-Elect, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President-Elect, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President-Elect and of all persons voted for as Vi~e Presi-
dent-Elect, and of the~r of votes for each, which lists they shall 
sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the- government of 
the United States, directed to the Speaker of.the House;--The Speaker of 
the House shall, in the presence of the House of Representatives, open 
all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.--The person 
having the greatest number of votes for President-Elect, shall be the 
President-Elect, if such number be a majority of the whole number of 
District Councilors elected; and if no personhave·such majority, the 
District Councilors shall be called in convention to choose the Presi-
dent-Elect by majority vote. The person having the greatest·number of 
votes as Vice President-Elect shall be the Vice President-Elect, if such 
number be a majority of the whole number of District CounC'ilorS elected, 
and· if no person have a majority, the District Councilors shall be called 
in convention to ~hoose the Vice President-Elect by majority vote. But 
no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall 
be eligible to that of Cabinet Secretary or Vice President of the United 
States nor shall be elected President--Elect or Vice President-Elect. 
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and 
the day on which they shall give their votes; whicb. day shall be the 
same.throughout the United States. 
No person except a natural born citizen shall be eligible to the 
office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that office 
who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been 
fourteen years a resident within the United States. 
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his 
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of 
the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the 
Congress may by law provide for the case of-removal, death, resignation, 
or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. 
The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a 
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the 
period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive 
within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of 
them, nor from private sources except as interest from investments 
placed in a blind trust prior to his accession to office. 
Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the 
following oath or affirmation:-- 11 I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, 
and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States." 
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Section 2. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
forces of the United States and of the militia of the several states 
when called into the actual service of the United States. He shall be 
given counsel and reports ·by the Presidential Council and the Senate and 
reguest and receive reports and opinions from.the principal officer in 
each of the executive departments, boards, or commissions and he shall 
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against.the 
United States except in cases of impeachment. 
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. to make treaties and executive asreements, provided two thirds Of""" 
the Senators concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with ·the advice 
and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public minis-
ters and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose 
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of 
such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in 
the courts of law, or in the heads of d~partments. 
The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies by granting 
commissions which expire upon disallowance by the senate, at the end of 
one year. or upon appointment and confirmation of ·the office holder or 
of a successor, whichever occurs first. 
Section 3. He shall receive counsel· on a regular and freguent ba-
sis from the Presidential Council and Senate and from time to time give 
to-the Congress information on the state of the·Union and together with 
the Presidential Council recommend such measures as they shall judge 
necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary. occasions, convene 
Congress; he.shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he 
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commis-
sion all the officers of the United States. 
The President shall meet with the Presidential -COuncil in each and 
every calendar month at the call of either the President or the Presi-
dential Council acting by a majority vote. A refusal of the President 
to meet with the P~esidential Council when so requested by a two thirds 
vote of the Presidential Council shall constitute an impeachable of-
fense. The agenda for such meetings shall be determined jointly by the 
President and the Presidential Council. Priority of business shall be 
accorded the President and the Presidential Council in alternate monthly 
meetings. The President shall have priority in determining the agenda 
for the first meeting in January. These constitutional reguirements 
shall not preclude additional meetings or further determination of 
agenda items by mutual agreement of the President and the Presidential 
Council. 
On one day each week the President shall meet only with those given 
appointments by the Senate Appointments Secretary. Refusal of the Pres-
. ident to grant one day of appointments each week unless upon approval of 
a two thirds vote of the Senate shall constitute an impeachable offense. 
Section 4. The Senate shall be composed of three Senators from 
separate districts within each state. elected by the people from that 
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district. for nine years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The 
first election shall take place in 1981. 
Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the 
first election. they shall be divided into three classes with one member 
from each state in each of the three classes. The seats-of the Senators 
of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the third year. 
of the second class at the expiration of the sixth year. and of the 
third class at the expiration of the ninth year. so that one third may 
be chosen every· third year. 
No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age 
of thirty years. and have been nine years a citizen of the United States 
and who shall not, when elected. be an inhabitant of that district with-
in that state in which he shall be chosen. No person shall be elected 
to this office more than two times or serve more than twenty years. 
When vacancies occur in the Senate from any state. the executive 
authority thereof may make temporary appointments until such position 
can be filled at the next annual election. 
The Senate shall elect its own presiding officer and be judge of 
the elections. returns and qualifications of its own members. It shall 
have the sole power of impeachment. 
Senators shall be ex officio members of any and all departments, 
boards or commissions with full access to information as though direct-· 
ing or being employed by that agency. 
Section 5. A Presidential Council of the United States shall be 
composed of fifteen members chosen from and by the Senate for nine years 
in the following way. As soon as possible after being assembled, five 
members apportioned by party on the basis of party membership in the 
first class shall be elected by the members of their own party in the 
first class for a term of three years; five members selected on a simi-
lar basis and in the same manner shall be chosen by class two members 
for six years; and five members selected on a similar basis and in the 
same manner shall be chosen by class three members for nine years. Sub-
sequently on every third year successors shall be chosen in like manner 
for nine year terms by members of their respective class. Vacancies 
shall be filled for unexpired terms in the same way as above. 
Section 7. The President, Vice President and all civil officers of 
the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and 
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Article III 
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behav-
127 
ior, subject to reconfirmation on the tenth anniversary of the date of 
assuming office and every tenth year thereafter, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office. This shall not be con-
strued as limit1ng the obligation to pay taxes or to contribute to their 
own retirement, They shall not receive within that period any other 
emolument from the United States. or any of them, nor from private 
sources except as interest from investments placed in a blind trust 
prior to their respective accession to office. 
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and T~eaties made, or which shall be made, under their Author-
ity;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to Controver-
sies. between two or more States;·--between a State and Citizens of an-
other State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of 
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and be-
tween a State, or the' Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall 
have original Jurisdiction. In al~ the.other Cases before mentioned, 
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and 
Fact,. with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall 
make. 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be 
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been cormnitted; but when not committed within any State, the 
·rrial shall be at such Place of Places as the Congress may by Law have 
directad. 
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only 
in levying War against them or in adhering to their Enemies; giving them 
Aid and. Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in 
open Court. 
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, 
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfei-
ture except during the Life of the Person attainted. 
ARTICLE IV 
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. 
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such 
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 
Section 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
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Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. 
A Ferson charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, 
who shall flee from· Justice, and ·be found in another State, shall on 
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be 
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the 
Crime. 
Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union; but no new State shall be formed without the Consent of the Leg-
islatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. 
The Congress shall have Fower to dispose of and make· all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular State. 
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of 
them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the 
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic 
Violence. 
Article V 
The Congress, whenever by two thirds concurrent majority, shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, 
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, 
shall be valid to all Intents and Furposes, as Fart of this Constitu-
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the 
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. 
Article VI 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Fursuance thereof; and all Treaties·made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing. 
The Representatives before mentioned, Senators, District Council-
~' and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all execu-
tive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be. bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitu-
tion; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States. 
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Article VII 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the·press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Glvernment for a redress· of g~ievances. 
This article is Rot to be construed to favor atheism over religion. 
It shall not be construed to carry with it the right to toin organiza-
tions advocating the overthrow of government by force and violence with-
out sacrifice of other rights available to other citizens. Rights of 
citizens in a democracy carry with them corresponding·responsibilities 
to support the democratic form of government and operate within its 
framework. 
Article VIII 
A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free 
State,·the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed. 
Article IX 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any.house, with-
out the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
Article X 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article XI 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ex-
cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subjected for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation. The term 11person11 in this amendment 
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shall not be construed to include fictitious persons or corporations. 
Patents or copyrights .granted, may also be taken sway as a penalty for 
violation of the law. 
Article XII 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compu~sory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
faVor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Article XIII 
In Suits at common law, ~ere the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, sha11 be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Article XIV 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Article XV 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
Article XVI 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people. 
Article XVII 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
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Subjects of any Foreign.State. 
Article XVIII 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for a crime whereof the party shell have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jur-
isdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
Article XIX 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United states, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges of il!Dllunities of citi-
zens of the United Statesj nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The 
term 11person11 in this amendment shall not be construed to include ficti-
tious persons or corporations. 
Section 2. No person shall be a Representative in Congress, Presi-
dential Councilor. District Councilor, or elector of President-elect and 
Vice President-elect, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States,~der any State, who, having previously taken an oath, 
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall 
have given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a 
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 3. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Article XX 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State except for trea-
son, impeachment and conviction of felony. 
Article XXI 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
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from whatever source derived, .without apportionment among the several 
States; and without regard to any census or enumeration. All personal 
income taxes from income of less than $20,000--derived wholly from with-
in that state with the exception of nontaxable retirement funds shall be 
collected by the state within which that person"resides. All other Fed-
eral personal or corporate income shall be collected by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
Article XXII 
Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the 
United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct; a 
number of District Councilors equal to five times the number of Repre-
sentatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were 
a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall 
be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be con-
sidered for the purposes of the election of President-Elect and Vice 
President-Elect, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall 
meet in the District and perform such duties. 
Section 2. The Congress shall-have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation. 
Article XXIII 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in 
any primary or other election ~or President-Elect or Vice President-
Elect, for District Councilors, or for Presidential Councilors or ~epre­
sentative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other 
tax. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation. 
Article XXIV 
Section 1. In case of tbe removal of the President from office or 
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a person Constitutionally eligi-
ble to be President as Vice President who shall take office upon confir-
mation by a concurrent majority vote of Congress, or by a majority vote 
of the District Councilors meeting in the capitol of their respective 
states and voting by secret ballot. 
Section 3. Whenever the President transm1.ts to the Speaker of the 
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House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to 
him a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall 
iie"""discharged by the Vice President as Acting. President. 
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either 
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other 
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the· Speaker of the 
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice Presi-
dent shall inunediately assume the powers and duties of the office as 
Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability ex-
ists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the 
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law pro-
vide, transmit within;four days to the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives their written declaration that the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall 
decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose 
if not in session. If the Congress within twenty-one days after receipt 
of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, 
within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, deter-
mines by two-thirds concurrent majority vote that the President is un-
able to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice Presi-
dent shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; other-
wise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. 
Article XXV 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of age. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article · 
by appropriate legislation. 
Article XX.VI 
The Ratification of the Conventions of thirty-eight States, shall 
be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the 
states so ratifying the Same. 
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